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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges
SCIRICA, AMBRO, FUENTES, FISHER, CHAGARES
and VANASKIE, join.
At issue on appeal in this class action litigation is the
propriety of the District Court‘s certification of two
nationwide settlement classes comprising purchasers of
diamonds from De Beers S.A. and related entities (―De
Beers‖).1 The settlement provided for a fund of $295 million
to be distributed to both the direct and indirect purchasers:
the direct purchasers were to receive $22.5 million of the
fund, while the indirect purchasers would receive $272.5
1

The Settlement involved five individual class actions
pending in federal court and two other class suits pending in
state court. The individual federal suits presently before us
are: Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., Index No. 04-cv-02819
(D.N.J.); Null v. DB Investments, Inc., Madison Co. No. 05L-209 (Madison County, Ill. Cir. Ct., removed to S.D. Ill.);
Leider v. Ralfe, No. 01-CV-3137 (S.D.N.Y.); Anco Industrial
Diamond Corp. v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 01-cv-04463
(D.N.J.); and British Diamond Import Co. v. Central
Holdings Ltd., No. 04-cv-04098 (D.N.J.). The two other class
actions pending in state court pertinent to the Settlement and
this set of appeals are: Hopkins v. De Beers Centenary A.G.,
San Francisco County No. CGC-04-432954 (Cal. Super. Ct.),
and Cornwell v. DB Investments, Inc., Maricopa Co. No.
CV2005-2968 (Ariz. Super. Ct.).
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million. A panel of our Court held that the District Court‘s
ruling was inconsistent with the predominance inquiry
mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), and
remanded the matter for further proceedings. See Sullivan v.
DB Investments, Inc., 613 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en
banc granted and vacated by Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.,
619 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010). We then granted the plaintiffs‘
petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the prior order.
Accordingly, we address anew the propriety of the District
Court‘s certification of the direct and indirect purchaser
classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)
and 23(b)(3), and also consider for the first time the
objections raised to the fairness of the class settlement.2
We believe that the predominance inquiry should be
easily resolved here based on De Beers‘s conduct and the
injury it caused to each and every class member, and that the
straightforward application of Rule 23 and our precedent
should result in affirming the District Court‘s order certifying
the class. But the objectors to the class certification and our
dissenting colleagues insist that, when deciding whether to
certify a class, a district court must ensure that each class
member possesses a viable claim or ―some colorable legal
claim,‖ (Dissenting Op. at 10).
We disagree, and
accordingly, we will reason through our analysis in a more
2

Because the Panel found the certification of the class to be
flawed, it did not reach the Rule 23 fairness objections to the
settlement, distribution plan, and fee award, or the District
Court‘s resolution of these objections. See Sullivan, 613 F.3d
at 142 n.6. Because we now conclude that the District
Court‘s certification of the proposed settlement was
appropriate, we will also address these issues.
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deliberate manner in order to explain why the addition of this
new requirement into the Rule 23 certification process is
unwarranted.

I. Factual & Procedural Background
A. Present Litigation & Settlement Proceedings
The allegations in the present case arose from De
Beers‘s undisputed position as the dominant participant in the
wholesale market for gem-quality diamonds throughout much
of the twentieth century.3 It is alleged that, beginning in 1890
and continuing through the filing of the Complaints at issue in
this appeal, De Beers coordinated the worldwide sales of
diamonds by, inter alia, executing output-purchase
agreements with competitors, synchronizing and setting
production limits, restricting the resale of diamonds within
certain geographic regions, and directing marketing and
advertising. Through its coordinated network of diamond
producers, De Beers was able to value diamonds according to
certain physical characteristics and to then control the
quantity and prices of diamonds in the marketplace by strictly
regimenting sales to preferred wholesalers, known as
3

The vacated Panel Opinion describes the history,
progression to power, and eventual market dominance of De
Beers and its related entities in greater detail. See Sullivan,
613 F.3d at 138-39. For the sake of brevity, we provide a
summary.
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―sightholders.‖4 Sightholders resold these diamonds to
jewelry manufacturers and retailers – either as rough
diamonds or as cut, polished, and finished stones – and
constituted De Beers‘s primary channel for distribution of its
diamonds.5
Between 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs brought suit
complaining that De Beers‘s aforementioned business
4

Sightholders are selected by De Beers‘s subsidiary
Diamond Trading Company (―DTC‖) based upon specific
criteria, ―including their financial standing and reliability,
their market position, their distribution ability, their
marketing ability, and their compliance with Diamond
Trading Company Diamond Best Practice Principles.‖
(App‘x 1438.) In 2006, DTC had ninety-three sightholders,
nine of which had head offices in the United States and
seventy-six of which had sales offices in the country. (Id.)
Sightholders sell both rough and polished diamonds, as well
as diamond jewelry. (Id.) By way of example, the retailer
Tiffany & Co. is a majority-owner of the South African
sightholder Rand Precision Cut Diamonds, which sells
polished diamonds and manufactures jewelry for sale in
Tiffany stores. (Id. 1438-39.)
5

The process by which De Beers sold its rough diamonds
entailed a ―diamond pipeline,‖ which began with the sale of
rough diamonds and ended with the purchase of retail
diamond jewelry by consumers. The participants in the
diamond pipeline included rough stone wholesalers, cutters
and polishers of rough diamonds, finished stone wholesalers,
diamond jewelry manufacturers and wholesalers, and
retailers.
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practices contravened state and federal antitrust, consumer
protection, and unjust enrichment laws, and constituted unfair
business practices and false advertising under common law
and relevant state statutes. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that De Beers exploited its market dominance to artificially
inflate the prices of rough diamonds; this, in turn, caused
reseller and consumer purchasers of diamonds and diamondinfused products to pay an unwarranted premium for such
products. The initial two price-fixing lawsuits were filed in
the United States District Courts for the District of New
Jersey and the Southern District of New York in 2001, and
five subsequent lawsuits were initiated in federal and state
courts in other parts of the country.6 Three of the lawsuits
6

The theories of recovery in the individual cases are as
follows: Anco Industrial was filed on behalf of all direct
purchasers of rough diamonds pursuant to Clayton Act §§ 4
and 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, to prevent and restrain
violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12. British Diamond was filed on behalf of direct purchasers
of polished diamonds pursuant to Clayton Act §§ 4 and 16, 15
U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, to prevent and restrain violations of §§ 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. Cornwell was
filed on behalf of all purchasers of diamonds in Arizona
pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1402 for
monopolization of the market for diamonds, and under § 441403 for establishment, maintenance or use of monopoly.
Hopkins was filed on behalf of California residents who
purchased diamonds in California pursuant to Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 16720, et seq., alleging engagement in a
continuing unlawful restraint of trade; pursuant to § 17200, et
seq., for violation of the unfair competition law; and under
California common law for monopolization and attempted
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were filed in state court in Arizona, California, and Illinois,
respectively; the last was then removed to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The five
suits in federal court were subsequently all transferred to and
consolidated in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, and are presently before us.
The plaintiffs in the seven cases are best characterized
as falling within one of two types of purchaser classes. The
first category includes direct purchasers of gem diamonds,
who purchased directly from De Beers or one of its
monopolization. Leider was filed on behalf of consumers
who purchased diamonds or diamond jewelry pursuant to the
Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11; under § 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for injunctive relief in
connection with §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and for
damages for violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act; pursuant to
federal and New York state common law for damages and
injunctive relief; under N.Y. Gen. Bus. §§ 349-350; and under
New York‘s Donnelly Act and the antitrust laws of fifteen
other states and the District of Columbia. Null was filed on
behalf of all purchasers of De Beers diamonds pursuant to
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/1, et seq., and § 510/2, alleging
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, and, in the alternative, pursuant to the consumer
fraud and deceptive practice laws of the various states where
purchases of diamonds were made. Sullivan was filed on
behalf of a class of all persons and businesses in the United
States who purchased polished diamonds indirectly from De
Beers pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for
injunctive relief, and pursuant to state antitrust and deceptive
practices acts for monetary relief.
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competitors (―Direct Purchaser Class‖ or ―Direct
Purchasers‖). These plaintiffs advanced claims of pricefixing and monopolization pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and sought monetary and injunctive relief
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. The second category
of plaintiffs consists of indirect purchasers of rough or cutand-polished diamonds; this category of consumers, jewelry
retailers and other middlemen acquired diamonds from
sightholders or other direct purchasers, rather than directly
from De Beers or its competitors (―Indirect Purchaser Class‖
or ―Indirect Purchasers‖).
While both categories of
purchasers alleged the same antitrust injury and sought
injunctive relief pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, the
Indirect Purchasers sought damages pursuant only to state
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment statutes
and common law.
As it had for well over a half-century, De Beers
initially rejected the plaintiffs‘ assertion that courts in the
United States possessed personal jurisdiction over it and its
associated entities, arguing that it never transacted business
directly in the United States. De Beers refused to appear in
the lawsuits, resulting in defaults or default judgments being
entered against it in each of the filed cases with the exception
of Cornwell. While continuing to insist that these default
judgments were unenforceable, counsel for De Beers
approached plaintiffs‘ counsel in May 2005 to discuss
settlement of the Indirect Purchasers‘ claims.
These
discussions yielded an agreement to settle Sullivan, Hopkins,
Null, and Cornwell (the ―Indirect Purchaser Settlement‖),
with De Beers agreeing to establish a settlement fund of $250
million to be distributed to class members, and further
agreeing not to contest certification of a settlement class of
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indirect purchasers.7 The settlement also provided for a
stipulated injunction, enjoining De Beers from engaging in
certain conduct violative of United States antitrust laws.
Pursuant to the settlement, De Beers would consent to the
District Court‘s jurisdiction for the limited purpose of
fulfilling the terms of the settlement and enforcement of the
injunction.
The District Court entered an order on November 30,
2005, preliminarily approving the Indirect Purchaser
Settlement and conditionally certifying a settlement class of
Indirect Purchasers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2) – for purposes of entering the stipulated
injunction – and 23(b)(3) – in order to distribute the
settlement fund to class members.
De Beers then entered into settlement discussions with
plaintiffs‘ counsel for the Direct Purchasers in Anco and
British Diamond, ultimately reaching an agreement in March
2006. The latter agreement paralleled the Indirect Purchaser
Settlement in that De Beers agreed to not contest certification
of a Direct Purchaser settlement class, to abide by
substantively identical injunctive relief as imposed under the
Indirect Purchaser Settlement, and to establish a $22.5 million
fund to satisfy the Direct Purchasers‘ claims. As part of this
settlement, De Beers also agreed to increase the Indirect
Purchaser Settlement fund by $22.5 million to accommodate
those putative class members characterized as Indirect
Purchasers in the lawsuits filed by the Direct Purchasers who
had not participated in the Indirect Purchaser Settlement.
7

The Leider plaintiffs subsequently reached agreement with
the parties to the Indirect Purchaser Settlement to resolve that
matter in accordance with the terms of the Settlement.
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On March 31, 2006, the District Court modified its
November 30, 2005 Order to conditionally certify both the
Direct and Indirect Purchaser settlement classes under Rules
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), and to preliminarily approve a
combined settlement fund for both classes totaling $295
million, of which $22.5 million was allotted to Direct
Purchasers and $272.5 million was allocated to the Indirect
Purchaser claims. The combined settlement also provided for
entry of a stipulated injunction, which required De Beers to,
inter alia, comply with and abide by federal and state antitrust
laws, to limit its purchases of diamonds from third-party
producers, to abstain from setting or fixing the prices of
diamonds sold by third-party producers, to desist from
restricting the geographic regions within which sightholders
could resell De Beers diamonds, and barred De Beers from
purchasing diamonds in the United States for the principal
purpose of restraining supply. Notably, De Beers agreed to
subject itself to personal jurisdiction in the United States for
purposes of enforcing the combined settlement agreement.
B. Special Master & Objections
After granting preliminary approval to the combined
settlement agreement, the District Court referred the case to a
Special Master pursuant to Rules 23, 53, and 54 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to consider and recommend
a plan for dissemination of the Notice of Settlement, a
distribution plan for members of the Indirect and Direct
Purchaser settlement classes, division of the fund between the
Indirect Purchaser reseller and consumer subclasses, the
amount of incentive awards for named plaintiffs, and the fee
requests filed by plaintiffs‘ counsel. After two years of
proceedings, the Special Master authored several lengthy
Report and Recommendations finding the settlement fair,
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reasonable, and adequate based upon the parties‘ agreement
to seek the certification of the following two nationwide
Settlement Classes:
(i)
The ―Direct Purchaser Class.‖
All
natural persons and legal entities located in the
United States who purchased any Gem
Diamond directly from a Defendant or
Defendants‘ Competitors (including any entity
controlled by or affiliated with any such party)
from September 20, 1997 to the date of
settlement class certification. The class shall
exclude Defendants, the officers, directors or
employees of any Defendant, any entity in
which any Defendant has a controlling interest,
any affiliate of any Defendant, Defendants‘
Competitors, any person or entity which is or
was a Sightholder for the time period(s) during
which such person or entity had Sightholder
status, any federal, state or local governmental
entity, and any judicial officer presiding over
this Settlement, and any member of the judicial
officer‘s family and court staff; and
(ii)
The ―Indirect Purchaser Class.‖ All
natural persons and legal entities located in the
United States who purchased any Diamond
Product from January 1, 1994 to the date of
settlement class certification, provided that any
purchases of any Gem Diamond made directly
from a Defendant (including any entity in which
any Defendant has a controlling interest and any
affiliate of any Defendant) or Defendants‘
competitors (including any entity controlled by
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or affiliated with any such party) shall be
excluded.
The class shall also exclude
Defendants, the officers, directors or employees
of any Defendant, any entity in which any
Defendant has a controlling interest, any
affiliate of any Defendant, any federal, state or
local governmental entity, and any judicial
officer presiding over this Settlement, and any
member of the judicial officer‘s family and
court staff.
(App‘x 270 (quoting September 4, 2007 Report and
Recommendation of Special Master Alfred M. Wolin
(―R&R‖) at 21, App‘x 1433-34).) The Indirect Purchaser
Class was further subdivided into two subclasses for purposes
of effectuating the Settlement Agreement:
(1)
The ―Indirect Purchaser Reseller Subclass,‖
consisting of all members of the Indirect Purchaser
Class who purchased any diamond product for resale;
and
(2)
The ―Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass,‖
consisting of all members of the Indirect Purchaser
Class who purchased any diamond product for use and
not for resale.
(Id. 270-71.)8
8

The Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass is estimated to
contain between 67 and 117 million members, while the
Indirect Purchaser Reseller Subclass contains an estimated
38,152 members. The Direct Purchaser Class is estimated to
contain approximately 130 members. (App‘x 275 n.1.)
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After reviewing the record, the competing econometric
reports furnished by several experts, and other reliable data,
the Special Master recommended that, apart from the $22.5
million allocated to the Direct Purchaser Class,9 the Indirect
Purchaser Settlement Fund of $272.5 million should be
allocated 50.3%, approximately $137.1 million, to the
Resellers Subclass, and 49.7%, approximately $135.4 million,
to the Consumers Subclass.10 (App‘x 1508.) Unlike Direct
9

The Special Master advised that distribution of the Direct
Purchaser Settlement Fund be conducted on a pro rata basis
and that each Direct Class member receive the Net Settlement
amount multiplied by the quotient of the Adjusted Purchases
of the claimant divided by the aggregate Adjusted Purchases
of all approved direct purchaser claims. The Adjusted
Purchases of a claimant would be calculated by multiplying
the amount paid for Rough Diamonds by 1.22 (the average
Rough to Polished Matrix factor), and adding the total
amount paid for Polished Diamonds. (App‘x 1533-34.)
10

The Special Master recommended that the Indirect
Purchaser Consumer Subclass receive a pro rata share of the
Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund, calculated by multiplying
the Net Consumer settlement fund amount by the quotient of
a consumer‘s total recognized diamond claim divided by the
total recognized diamond claims of all consumers. (App‘x
1547.) In contrast, a Reseller Subclass member‘s claim
would be calculated in a three step process: (1) all of the
claimant‘s diamond purchases are converted to the common
metric of polished wholesale value and adjusted to reflect the
number of years each Reseller operated during the class
period; (2) claims are weighted by applying the absorption
weighting factor derived from a fixed effects regression
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Purchasers, who purchased diamonds only, Indirect
Purchasers generally purchased jewelry and other products
containing diamonds; given this, the Special Master
attempted to ascertain the cost of the diamonds in the final
purchased product separate and apart from the cost of other
components. The Special Master further recommended that
claims that would result in de minimis recoveries from the
settlement fund – equating to less than ten dollars11 – not be
paid in light of high administrative costs.12
With respect to plaintiffs‘ counsel‘s request for
analysis for each type of diamond purchase; and (3) the
claimant‘s pro rata share of the Reseller Subclass settlement
fund is the ratio of the claimant‘s ―absorption adjusted
purchases‖ to the sum of all claimants‘ ―absorption adjusted
purchases.‖ (Id. 1575.)
11

The Special Master‘s report noted that Indirect Purchaser
Consumer claims aggregating less than $165 for mixed stone
jewelry or products, and less than $95 for diamond only
jewelry or products, would be considered de minimis. (App‘x
1547-48.)
12

Additionally, the Special Master recommended a fourpart notification program – entailing direct notice, publication
notice, ―earned media outreach‖ in the form of press releases
and news reporting, and electronic notice – finding that it
provided notice ―in a reasonable manner to all class members
who would be bound by the proposed settlement.‖ (App‘x
1518-27 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)).) The District Court
adopted this recommendation and method of notification in
its October 1, 2007 Order.
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attorneys‘ fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses, the
Special Master recommended a percentage of recovery
approach with a lodestar cross-check, and concluded that the
request for 25% of the settlement fund in fees, and for under
1% of the fund in expenses, was fair, reasonable, and
adequate.13 The Special Master further decided that the
$220,000 in incentive awards sought on behalf of class
representatives was appropriate in light of the benefits
conferred upon the class and the risks incurred in engaging in
litigation.
In response to the preliminary certification of the
Settlement Agreement and the Special Master‘s
recommendations, the District Court received twenty separate
objections on behalf of thirty-seven objectors. All of the
objectors were members of the Indirect Purchaser Class; none
of the Direct Purchasers objected to the Settlement.14 Fifteen
of the twenty objections opposed class certification of the
settlement, four objected to the stipulated provision for
injunctive relief, six opposed the allocation and distribution of
the Settlement Funds, and nine objected to the provisions for
attorneys‘ fees. As required by the Federal Rules, the District
Court conducted a Fairness Hearing in the matter on April 14,
2008. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
The objectors challenging the propriety of certifying
13

The District Court rejected the Special Master‘s
recommendation of adding a percentage of the interest earned
on the total settlement fund to the total attorneys‘ fees.
14

Four objectors were members of the Indirect Purchaser
Reseller Subclass and thirty-three objectors belonged to the
Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass. (App‘x 272.)
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the two settlement classes raised two primary arguments.
First, the objectors contended that a nationwide class of
Indirect Purchasers should not be certified under Rule
23(b)(3) for purposes of administering a monetary settlement
of state law claims because significant differences existed
among the various antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust
enrichment laws of the relevant state jurisdictions.
Specifically, the objectors argued that the substantive law of
many states prohibits indirect purchasers from recovering
damages for antitrust injuries, exposing the class to
particularized legal variations and precluding a finding that
common questions of law or fact predominated over
individual issues.15 Second, the objectors challenged the
certification of both Direct and Indirect Purchaser classes for
purposes of implementing injunctive relief pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2). The objectors asserted that the market for rough
gem diamonds had become competitive during the course of
the instant litigation, rendering an injunction to enforce
compliance with antitrust laws superfluous, and divesting the
Indirect Purchasers of antitrust standing to seek relief.
Other objections challenged the fairness and adequacy
of the Settlement and the plan of allocation for the Indirect
Purchaser Settlement Fund as between the Reseller and
Consumer Subclasses, averring that each class member would
15

A related objection was filed on grounds that the equal
allocation of the Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund without
consideration of a claimant‘s state of controlling law was
improper since some states purportedly prohibited recovery
by indirect purchasers. These objectors asserted that class
members from states permitting indirect purchaser recovery
should be entitled to greater monetary compensation.
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collect only $1-2 in exchange for their full release of claims
against De Beers if every single putative class member
requested compensation; also, they might receive nothing
under the de minimis provision in the Settlement. Objectors
also urged that the award of attorneys‘ fees to plaintiffs‘
counsel was excessive and unreasonable in a default
judgment case with minimal litigation.
C. Acceptance and Certification of Class Settlement
In its May 22, 2008 Opinion, the District Court
considered and rejected each of the objections. Responding
to the Rule 23(b)(3) objections, the Court concluded that
differences in state antitrust and consumer protection statutes
did not override class commonalities.
Observing that
―‗predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust
laws,‘‖ (App‘x 276 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997))), the District Court noted that ―at
the class certification stage, the Court need not concern itself
with whether Plaintiffs can prove their allegations‖ so long as
they ―‗make a threshold showing that the elements of impact
will predominantly involve generalized issues of proof, rather
than questions which are particular to each member of the
plaintiff class,‘‖ (id. 277 (quoting In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2002)).) In this regard, the
District Court presented the following operative factual and
legal inquiries that, in its view, constituted common questions
that predominated over individual issues in the litigation:
(a)

Whether Defendants combined or
conspired with others to fix, raise,
stabilize and maintain the prices of
polished diamonds;
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(b)

Whether Defendants monopolized or
combined or conspired with others to
monopolize the supply of polished
diamonds;

(c)

Whether Defendants‘ conduct caused the
prices of polished diamonds to be
maintained at higher levels than would
exist in a competitive market;

(d)

Whether Plaintiffs and the Classes are
entitled to injunctive relief; and

(e)

Whether Defendants‘ conduct caused
injury to the business or property of
Plaintiffs and the other Class and
Subclass Members and, if so, the
appropriate class-wide measure of
damages.

(App‘x 276 (alterations omitted).) The District Court also
stressed that all class members shared a common
jurisdictional question pertaining to De Beers‘s refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of United States courts and the
potential burden of confirming domestic contacts for purposes
of establishing personal jurisdiction. (Id. 279.)
Considering the nature of De Beers‘s central role in the
alleged diamond conspiracy, the Court determined that each
class member shared ―a similar legal question arising from
whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy‖ aimed at
affecting diamond prices in the United States; concurrently,
all class members shared common factual issues pertaining to
the form, duration, and extent of the conspiracy. (App‘x 278-
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79.) The Court concluded that the totality of common issues
predominated over individual questions, and, as a result, the
objectors‘ assertion that disparities in state law precluded a
nationwide class settlement was unavailing. In its analysis,
the Court emphasized the expense, complexity, and
imprecision of weighing the relative strengths of different
state law claims, the policy interest in securing an expedient
resolution to the disparate claims of the Direct and Indirect
Purchasers, and De Beers‘s insistence upon a release of all
potential damage claims in all fifty states.
With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) analysis for
injunctive relief, the District Court rejected the objectors‘
assertion that both of the purchaser classes faced no risk of
future harm. The Court observed that De Beers had stipulated
to the injunction and ―waived the right to demand proof of
substantive elements of the claims‖ advanced by plaintiffs,
namely, that De Beers‘s ongoing conduct would continue to
anti-competitively increase the price of all diamonds on the
market. (App‘x 285.) Accordingly, the Court determined
that injunctive relief was appropriate and would benefit all
classes and subclasses.
Having ruled that the Rule 23(b) elements were
satisfied, the District Court then responded to the other
objections relating to the fairness and adequacy of the
Settlement and the plan of allocation and distribution, as well
as to objections pertaining to attorneys‘ fees. The District
Court conducted a fairness evaluation of the final settlement
by applying and weighing the fairness factors set forth in
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975), ―being mindful
of the heightened standard of review in place for a settlementonly class that has not yet been entirely certified.‖ (App‘x
288-89.) The Court concluded that the final settlement
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agreement and the plan of allocation were fair, reasonable,
and adequate. The District Court also reviewed the attorneys‘
fees application pursuant to Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy
Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000), similarly finding the
Special Master‘s recommendation for 25% of the settlement
fund in fees to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Accordingly, the District Court entered a final order on
May 22, 2008, certifying the Direct and Indirect Purchaser
Classes under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The Direct
Purchaser Class consists of all sightholders who purchased
rough gem diamonds directly from De Beers between
September 20, 1997 and March 31, 2006. The Indirect
Purchaser Class includes all Indirect Purchasers who acquired
gem diamonds between January 1, 1994 and March 31, 2006,
regardless of whether De Beers or one of its competitors
supplied the diamonds.16 The Court‘s order further included
the previously agreed-upon injunction, which is to remain in
effect for five years from the date of its issuance. The
objectors then filed the appeals presently before us.
D. Proceedings On Appeal
On appeal, a divided panel of this Court initially
determined that the District Court abused its discretion in
certifying the nationwide class of litigants. We vacated this
Opinion and granted rehearing en banc. While we do not
16

As the Panel Opinion noted, the parties did not explain,
nor did the record reveal, any reason for the disparity in the
time periods covered by the Settlement between the Indirect
and Direct Purchaser classes. See Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 143
n.8. We do not consider this difference pertinent to the
appeals.
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usually discuss the analysis contained in a vacated opinion,
we do so here because the Panel‘s decision reflected,
accepted, and elaborated upon one or more of the views
advanced by the objectors, with which we take issue. Our
dissenting colleagues also embrace certain of these views.
Addressing the objectors‘ challenge to the District
Court‘s finding of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), the
Panel undertook a wide-ranging fact-finding review of state
antitrust statutes, noting that the variance among states ―is
mainly a function of whether a state has chosen to follow the
Sherman Act principles regarding standing laid down by the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).‖ Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 146. There, the Supreme
Court decided that only direct purchasers possessed standing
under the federal Sherman Act to sue for monetary damages
incurred from an antitrust injury. The Panel observed that
some states follow this framework and prohibit monetary
recovery for indirect purchasers, while other states have
enacted statutes known as ―Illinois Brick repealers,‖ which
extend antitrust standing to indirect purchasers and
consumers.17 Id. As a result, the Panel found that ―only some
of th[e] jurisdictions recognize the claims for which recovery
is sought,‖ and that such distinctions reflected ―fundamental
policy differences among the several states.‖ Id. at 147, 149.
Based on its belief that many members of the Indirect
Purchaser Class lacked a substantive right to recover
damages, the Panel decided that ―no question of law or fact
17

Based on its assessment, the Panel found that at least
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia possess
Illinois Brick repealer statutes or have judicially extended
antitrust standing to indirect purchasers.
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regarding their legal rights is uniform throughout the class,‖
thereby defeating a finding of predominance. Id. at 149.
The Panel then considered the various state consumer
protection and unjust enrichment claims implicated by the
District Court‘s certification, again noting several variations
among jurisdictions:
differences in whether indirect
purchasers may invoke consumer protection and unjust
enrichment statutes to gain antitrust relief; variations in the
extent of elements of proof necessary to establish unjust
enrichment or consumer fraud; and dissimilarities in whether
a plaintiff must lack an adequate remedy at law to bring an
equitable claim.
Id. at 150-51.
Based upon these
discrepancies, the Panel decided that ―evidence of pricefixing and monopolization does not give rise in every state to
an unjust enrichment or consumer protection claim for
indirect purchasers,‖ defeating predominance and rendering
the District Court‘s certification of a nationwide class an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 151.
The Panel further observed that the District Court‘s
certification order contravened the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b), by extending antitrust remedies not rooted
in state substantive law to putative class members. Id. The
Panel expressly rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that De
Beers‘s willingness to stipulate to liability in all fifty states
should suffice for the District Court‘s predominance inquiry,
holding instead that such an approach would invite collusive
settlements. Id. In the same vein, the Panel expressed
concern that the District Court sacrificed principles of
federalism in favor of obtaining an expedient settlement by
certifying the nationwide class ―despite the fact that only
some of those jurisdictions recognize the claims for which
recovery is sought.‖ Id. at 152. Finding that certain states
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categorically deny to indirect purchasers a right to antitrust
recovery as a matter of substantive law, the Panel concluded
that the instant certification ―wrongly allowed the sovereignty
of the states to be subordinated to De Beers‘s desire to resolve
all indirect purchaser claims simultaneously.‖ Id.
Finally, the Panel rejected the District Court‘s
certification of the Indirect Purchaser Class under Rule
23(b)(2) for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. Relying upon expert
reports written to identify a methodology for calculating
damages, the Panel concluded that De Beers‘s market share
fell from approximately 65% in 2000 to 45% in 2006, and
determined that, as a result, plaintiffs face ―no significant
threat of future antitrust harm in the absence of the injunction
because . . . the market has become increasingly competitive
from 2006 onward.‖ Id. at 157-58. Accordingly, the Panel
found that plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing under § 16 of
the Clayton Act and vacated the District Court‘s order
certifying the injunctive class.
The Panel Opinion remanded the matter to the District
Court to consider whether ―a more limited class of indirect
purchasers is appropriate under Rule 23,‖ and instructed the
District Court to more precisely identify ―a readily
discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or
defenses to be treated on a class basis.‖ Id. at 154 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2)). The Panel noted that the Court
failed to clearly delineate the precise state law claims subject
to class treatment and did not explicitly state whether the
claims advanced apply to the Indirect Purchasers‘ antitrust,
consumer protection, or unjust enrichment claims, or to some
combination of the three. Accordingly, the Panel directed the
District Court to ―identify with particularity both the
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prerequisites for membership in the class and the issues or
claims that will be resolved on a class-wide basis.‖ Id. at 155.
In response, Appellees Shawn Sullivan, Arrigotti Fine
Jewelry, and James Walnum petitioned for rehearing, urging
that the Panel Opinion was inconsistent with our precedent
governing class action settlements. In support, they raised
several arguments. First, they contended that the Panel‘s
demand that all class members assert at least one ―uniform‖
claim in order for disparate state claims to be settled at once
contravened our clear holdings in Warfarin and Prudential.
(See Pet. of Appellees for Reh‘g or Reh‘g En Banc 2.) Next,
they urged that the Panel‘s extensive inquiry into the legal
viability of plaintiff‘s claims at the class certification stage
improperly adjudicated the merits of the asserted claims and
undermined the ―strong judicial policy in favor of class action
settlement.‖ (Id. (citation omitted).) Finally, the Appellees
observed that the Panel‘s methodology supplanted the District
Court as primary fact-finder and unilaterally reached factual
conclusions based upon evidence unrelated to the subject at
issue. (Id. 3-4.)
We granted the petition for the entire Court to address
these issues.
II. Jurisdiction And Standard of Review
The District Court exercised federal question
jurisdiction over the Direct Purchasers‘ Sherman Act antitrust
claim for damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15, and over both the Direct and Indirect Purchasers‘
claims for injunctive relief under § 16 of the same Act, 15
U.S.C § 26. Original jurisdiction over the federal claims also
arose under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a). The District
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Court possessed supplemental jurisdiction over the Indirect
Purchasers‘ state-law antitrust, consumer protection, and
unjust enrichment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We
review final orders of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
―Our role as an appellate court is to ascertain whether
or not the trial judge clearly abused his or her discretion in
approving or rejecting a settlement agreement.‖ Ehrheart v.
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010). A
district court abuses its discretion if its ―‗decision rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law
or an improper application of law to fact.‘‖ In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995) (―GM
Truck‖)). ―If the court‘s analysis on these points is correct,
[however,] then ‗it is fair to say that we will ordinarily defer
to its exercise of discretion‘ embodied in the findings on
predominance and superiority.‘‖ Linerboard, 305 F.3d at
149-50 (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,
448 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry,
Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l
Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.
2010) (―We review . . . the underlying determination whether
the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been
satisfied for abuse of discretion.‖) (citation omitted).
―Whether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue
of law to be reviewed de novo.‖ Id. (citation omitted).
The District Court‘s ―determination that the settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate‖ is likewise reviewed for
abuse of discretion. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201,
231 (3d Cir. 2001).
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III. Discussion
At issue on appeal is the District Court‘s approval of
the class settlement agreement and certification of the Indirect
Purchaser Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) and both the Direct
and Indirect Purchaser Classes under Rule 23(b)(2). We
begin by discussing the standards for certifying a settlement
class and will address the pertinent objections in light of the
District Court‘s – and the vacated Panel‘s – Opinions. We
will then consider the objections pertaining to the fairness of
the settlement, the plan of allocation, and the attorneys‘ fees
award, which we have not previously addressed.18
A. Certification Pursuant to Rule 23
As we have consistently observed, ―Rule 23 is
designed to assure that courts will identify the common
interests of class members and evaluate the named plaintiffs‘
and counsel‘s ability to fairly and adequately protect class
interests.‖ In re Comm. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291
(3d Cir. 2010) (―Comm. Bank II‖) (quoting GM Truck, 55
F.3d at 799) (alterations omitted). In turn, before approving a
class settlement agreement, ―a district court first must
determine that the requirements for class certification under
Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.‖ In re Pet Food Prods. Liab.
18

As mentioned above, because the Panel concluded that
certification was inappropriate, it did not reach the Special
Master‘s recommendations or the objections to the
distribution plan and fee award. Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 142
n.6. In light of our finding that class certification is
appropriate, we assess these objections for the first time.
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Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010). Rule 23(a) contains
four threshold requirements, which every putative class must
satisfy:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.
Upon finding each of these prerequisites satisfied, a district
court must then determine that the proposed class fits within
one of the categories of class actions enumerated in Rule
23(b).
As mentioned, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class actions
seeking injunctive relief in instances where the defendant
―has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see
In re Comm. Bank of N. Va. (Comm. Bank I), 418 F.3d 277,
302 n.14 (2005). Separately, certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3) seeking monetary compensation is permitted where
(1) ―questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,‖ and (2) ―a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Collins v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 34 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 1994).
These twin requirements are commonly referred to as
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predominance and superiority. We address the certification
of the damages class first before turning to the certification
for injunctive relief.
1. Predominance of Common Legal or Factual Issues
Under Rule 23(b)(3)
The objectors challenge the District Court‘s Rule
23(b)(3) analysis with regard to the state law claims asserted
by the Indirect Purchasers against De Beers. The District
Court concluded that differences in state law did not override
predominantly common factual and legal issues presented by
De Beers‘s integral role in perpetuating the alleged
conspiracy. Rejecting this view, the objectors argue that the
existence of substantive variations in the state antitrust laws
underlying the Indirect Purchaser damages claims should
preclude a court from finding that common issues affecting
the class as a whole predominate. They also urge that
differences among state consumer protection and unjust
enrichment laws would likewise preclude a finding of
predominance. Our dissenting colleagues focus on this issue
as well, and adopt a specific requirement that every class
member has ―some colorable legal claim‖ in order for a
district court to certify a class. (Dissenting Op. at 10.) In our
view, this requirement would result in a radical departure
from what Rule 23 envisions and what our precedent
demands, and it founders for many reasons.19
a. Legal Framework
19

The objectors also challenge the District Court‘s
purported failure to identify the state law claims that should
receive class treatment under the existing certification order,
as we discuss below.
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The predominance inquiry ―‗tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation,‘‖ In re Ins. Broker. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d
241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624),
and assesses whether a class action ―would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,‖ Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee‘s note to 1966
amendment. See also 2 William Rubenstein, Alba Conte &
Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 4:25 (4th ed.
2010) (―[T]he predominance test asks whether a class suit for
the unitary adjudication of common issues is economical and
efficient in the context of all the issues in the suit.‖). Parallel
with Rule 23(a)(2)‘s commonality element, which provides
that a proposed class must share a common question of law or
fact, Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance requirement imposes a
more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to ensure
that issues common to the class predominate over those
affecting only individual class members. Ins. Broker., 579
F.3d at 266.
―Hence, we consider the Rule 23(a)
commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more
stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and
therefore deem it appropriate to ‗analyze the two factors
together, with particular focus on the predominance
requirement.‘‖ Id. (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust
Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Danvers
Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148 (3d
Cir. 2008) (―[T]he commonality requirement is subsumed by
the predominance requirement.‖).
From our case law, we can distill at least three
guideposts that direct the predominance inquiry: first, that
commonality is informed by the defendant‘s conduct as to all
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class members and any resulting injuries common to all class
members; second, that variations in state law do not
necessarily defeat predominance; and third, that concerns
regarding variations in state law largely dissipate when a
court is considering the certification of a settlement class. We
address each of these guideposts in turn. Then, we turn to
case law demonstrating that Rule 23(b)(3) does not, as urged
by the objectors and the dissent, require individual class
members to individually state a valid claim for relief. Next,
we address the flaws inherent in the framework proposed by
the dissent. Finally, we discuss why an important by-product
of the class action device – settlement of all potential claims –
supports the decision we reach here.
i) Precedent Regarding Predominance:
Defendant’s Conduct and Class
Members’ Injuries
Our precedent provides that the focus of the
predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant‘s conduct
was common as to all of the class members, and whether all
of the class members were harmed by the defendant‘s
conduct. Our reasoning in Warfarin is instructive on this
point. The claims asserted there were remarkably similar to
the specific claims at issue here. There, we considered the
propriety of the certification of a settlement class arising out
of DuPont Pharmaceuticals‘ alleged dissemination of
misleading information about a competitor‘s product. 391
F.3d at 522. The plaintiffs averred that DuPont engaged in
anticompetitive conduct that allowed it to maintain a 67%
market share and to charge supracompetitive prices, in
violation of federal antitrust law, the antitrust statutes of
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Illinois Brick repealer states,20 the consumer protection and
deceptive practices statutes of all fifty states and the District
of Columbia, and the common law prohibitions on unjust
enrichment and tortious interference of every jurisdiction. Id.
at 523-25. After reaching a class settlement with the
defendant and receiving the district court‘s preliminary
approval, objections were lodged contesting the certification
of a single nationwide class of plaintiffs. The objectors
argued that such certification was inappropriate due to
inconsistencies in state antitrust and consumer fraud statutes‘
provision of statutory standing to assert antitrust claims and
eligibility for treble or punitive damages recovery, and the
relative weakness of certain consumer claims. Id. at 529-31.
Guided by the Supreme Court‘s observation that
―[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
consumer[ ] fraud or violations of the antitrust laws,‖ we
stated:
This case falls squarely into that category:
plaintiffs have alleged that DuPont engaged in a
broad-based campaign, in violation of federal
and state consumer fraud and antitrust laws, to
deceive consumers, TPPs, health care
professionals, and regulatory bodies into
believing that generic warfarin sodium was not
an equivalent alternative to Coumadin. These
allegations naturally raise several questions of
law and fact common to the entire class and
which predominate over any issues related to
20

As mentioned, certain states have enacted statutes known
as ―Illinois Brick repealers,‖ which extend antitrust standing
to indirect purchasers and consumers. See supra n.17.
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individual class members, including the
unlawfulness of DuPont‘s conduct under federal
antitrust laws as well as state law, the causal
linkage between DuPont‘s conduct and the
injury suffered by the class members, and the
nature of the relief to which class members are
entitled.
Id. at 528. In light of DuPont‘s allegedly deceptive ―broadbased, national campaign conducted by and directed from
corporate headquarters,‖ we emphasized that proof of liability
of DuPont‘s conduct ―depends on evidence which is common
to the class members‖ because ―liability depends on the
conduct of DuPont, and whether it conducted a nationwide
campaign of misrepresentation and deception, [and] does not
depend on the conduct of individual class members.‖ Id. As
a result, we affirmed the District Court‘s ruling that class
members shared predominantly common issues as to the
conduct of the defendants despite possessing claims arising
under differing state laws. Id. at 530.21
21

Contrary to the objectors‘ and the Panel‘s view that
Warfarin‘s analysis is inapplicable because the plaintiffs in
that case purportedly shared a common claim under the
Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, our holding in Warfarin did
not address the Delaware statute in analyzing predominance.
391 F.3d at 528-29. Indeed, Warfarin did not consider
whether every class member even possessed a claim under
Delaware law, nor did it undertake a choice-of-law analysis to
determine whether all members in the nationwide class could
assert a claim under the Delaware statute. Rather, we simply
concluded that any claims arising under the varying state laws
and the Delaware statute could be proved with common
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We applied a similar approach in Insurance
Brokerage, where, in evaluating a challenge to certification of
a settlement class on the basis of predominance, we
determined that the elements of a Sherman Act violation for
concerted anticompetitive activity focused upon ―the conduct
of the defendants.‖ 579 F.3d at 268. Noting the presence of
several shared questions of law and fact – including, among
others, whether the defendants conspired to allocate a
particular market, whether the conduct actually reduced
competition in the market by consolidating the industry, and
whether the conspiratorial conduct raised premiums for all
members of the class – we concluded that ―common questions
abound with respect to whether the defendants engaged in
illegal, concerted action.‖ 579 F.3d at 268. As a result, we
held that ―individual issues d[id] not overwhelm the common
ones.‖22
Id.; see also Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 162
(―[C]ommon issues [ ] predominate here because the inquiry
evidence, thereby supporting a finding of predominance. Id.
22

A comparable approach is evidenced in our decision in
Prudential, where we affirmed the district court‘s finding of
predominance based upon the central issue in the case – a
common nationwide scheme of deceptive conduct by the
defendant to defraud millions of customers. 148 F.3d at 315.
Similarly, in Linerboard, we noted that the ―critical inquiry
will be whether defendants successfully concealed the
existence of the alleged conspiracy,‖ and ―the fact of
concealment [ ] is the polestar in an analysis of fraudulent
concealment.‖ 305 F.3d at 163 (emphasis in original).
Because it was the defendant‘s conduct that demanded
attention, we found that ―allegations of proof are all common
to the defendants, not the plaintiffs.‖ Id.
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necessarily focuses on defendants‘ conduct, that is, what
defendants did rather than what plaintiffs did.‖) (citation &
quotations omitted); cf. In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d
136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing certification of
litigation class where plaintiffs‘ claims arose ―not out of one
single event or misrepresentation,‖ but out of ―nonstandardized and individualized sales ‗pitches‘‖).
In this regard, we note the dissent‘s misreading of the
Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Wal-mart Stores Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) as supporting its thesis that an
inquiry into the existence or validity of each class member‘s
claim is required at the class certification stage. To the
contrary, Dukes actually bolsters our position, making clear
that the focus is on whether the defendant‘s conduct was
common as to all of the class members, not on whether each
plaintiff has a ―colorable‖ claim. In Dukes, the Court held
that commonality and predominance are defeated when it
cannot be said that there was a common course of conduct in
which the defendant engaged with respect to each individual.
But commonality is satisfied where common questions
generate common answers ―apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation.‖ 131 S. Ct. at 2551. That is exactly what is
presented here, for the answers to questions about De Beers‘s
alleged misconduct and the harm it caused would be common
as to all of the class members, and would thus inform the
resolution of the litigation if it were not being settled.
Specifically, here, plaintiffs allege that De Beers
engaged in anticompetitive activity by exploiting its 65%
share of the diamond market and control of the world‘s
supply of rough diamonds to impose rigid constraints on the
sale and resale of those diamonds. This conduct resulted in a
common injury as to all class members – inflated diamond
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prices – in violation of federal antitrust law, and the antitrust,
consumer protection, or unjust enrichment laws of every state
and the District of Columbia.23 In this respect, as in Warfarin
and Insurance Brokerage, De Beers‘s asserted price-fixing
and monopolization conduct lies at the core of plaintiffs‘
claims, as do the common injuries which all class members
suffered as a result. Based upon our case law, we can distill
that ―each class member shares a similar legal question
arising from whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy
that was aimed to and did affect diamond prices in the United
States.‖ (App‘x 278-79 (emphasis added).) Evidence for this
legal question would entail generalized common proof as to
―the implementation of De Beers‘[s] conspiracy, the form of
the conspiracy, and the duration and extent of the
conspiracy.‖ (Id. 278.)
The plaintiffs likewise share common factual
questions as to whether De Beers ―acted in concert to
artificially fix, maintain, and stabilize prices and to
monopolize trade and commerce in the market for polished
diamonds,‖ and whether said activity resulted ―in an inflation
in the prices of diamonds sold to consumers.‖ (Id. 278-79.)
These allegations are unaffected by the particularized conduct
of individual class members, as proof of liability and liability
itself would depend entirely upon De Beers‘s allegedly
23

No one seriously disputes that De Beers‘s alleged
conduct, if true, was anticompetitive and violated state
antitrust laws. Our disagreement with the dissent arises
solely out of the question whether certain class members‘
potential inability to satisfy some states‘ statutory standing
requirements should have precluded the District Court from
certifying the settlement class in this case.
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anticompetitive activities. Indeed, the presence of these
questions stemming solely from De Beers‘s asserted behavior
and the fact that all class members purchased diamonds is an
apt illustration of why the predominance test is ―readily met
in certain cases alleging consumer [ ] fraud or violations of
the antitrust laws.‘‖24 Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 266 (quoting
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) advisory committee‘s notes to 1966 amendment
(providing that ―a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by
the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing
situation for a class action‖). Considering this presentation of
common issues, a finding that common inquiries
predominated over individual questions particular to any
putative class member appears reasonably within the
discretion of the District Court.
The dissent urges that according to our view, the class
is ―practically limitless.‖ (Dissenting Op. at 9.) This is
plainly incorrect: the limits are found in the conduct of the
defendant and the injuries sustained by class members as a
result of the conduct. These provide sufficient class contours.
The instant class is not made up of ―everyone on earth,‖
―regardless of diamond purchases.‖ (Dissenting Op. at 8 n.5.)
Instead, each member is a Direct or Indirect Purchaser,
harmed by what De Beers did. These class members,
24

As we noted in Insurance Brokerage, we do not presume
here ―that common issues necessarily predominate in every
antitrust case.‖ 579 F.3d at 267 n.26 (citing Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321-22). Here, we merely conclude
that the District Court was free to determine that common
issues of law or fact stemming from De Beers‘s conduct in
this instance satisfied the predominance requirement.
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moreover, possess a legally cognizable injury acknowledged
in hornbook law, as their injuries are real, and stem not from
simply feeling ―wronged,‖ as the dissent suggests (Dissenting
Op. at 8), but from De Beers‘s alleged anti-competitive
conduct, conduct which antitrust laws forbid.
ii) Precedent Regarding Variations in
State Law
Furthermore, our precedent provides that ―variations in
the rights and remedies available to injured class members
under the various laws of the fifty states [do] not defeat
commonality and predominance.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529
(quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig.
Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998)). This is so
because ―‗a finding of commonality does not require that all
class members share identical claims,‘‖ and predominance is
not considered deficient merely ―because claims were subject
to the [varying] laws of fifty states.‖ Id. ―‗Predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3) cannot be reduced to a mechanical,
single-issue test‘‖; rather, ―‗[a]s long as a sufficient
constellation of common issues binds class members together,
variations in the sources and application‘‖ of applicable laws
will not foreclose class certification. Linerboard, 305 F.3d at
162-63 (quoting with approval Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v.
Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting
argument that variations in twenty states‘ laws concerning
reliance, waiver, and statutes of limitations defeated
predominance)); see also Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.,
323 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2003) (―Rule 23(b)(3) requires
merely that common issues predominate, not that all issues be
common to the class.‖) (emphasis added). Thus, it is not
surprising that we can find no support in our Court‘s
jurisprudence for the proposition that commonality and

45

predominance are defeated merely because available rights
and remedies differ under the several laws that form the basis
for the class claims.25
We have never required the presentation of identical or
uniform issues or claims as a prerequisite to certification of a
class. Rather, our jurisprudence evinces a pragmatic response
to certifications of common claims arising under varying state
laws. In Prudential, we addressed the certification of a
settlement class arising under federal securities law and
varying state law formulations of common law fraud, breach
of contract, bad faith, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of state consumer
fraud statutes. 148 F.3d at 315. We emphasized our
willingness to certify nationwide classes where differences in
state law fell ―into a limited number of predictable patterns,‖
and any deviations ―could be overcome at trial by grouping
similar state laws together and applying them as a unit.‖ Id.
As such, we affirmed the district court‘s decision to subsume
the relatively minor differences in state law within a single
25

Other courts have similarly declined to examine the
controlling substantive law pertinent to asserted claims at the
class certification stage. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Tyson
Fresh Meats, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 605, 612 (D.S.D. 2004)
(―Where federal claims and common law claims are
predicated on the same factual allegations and proof will be
essentially the same, ‗even if the law of different states might
ultimately govern the common law claims – an issue that
need not and is not decided at this juncture – certification of
the class for the whole action is appropriate.‘‖) (quoting
Walsh v. Chittenden Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1043, 1055 (D. Vt.
1992)) (alteration omitted).
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class. Id.; see also Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 271 (noting that
―subclasses are appropriate ‗where a class is found to include
subclasses divergent in interest‘‖) (citation & alteration
omitted).
Similarly, in GM Truck, we approved the certification
of nationwide (b)(3) litigation classes where ―the laws of the
50 states could be reduced to [several] general patterns,
providing the framework for sub-classes if the nationwide
action had proven unmanageable.‖ 55 F.3d at 817-18
(discussing In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010
(3d Cir. 1986)). Observing that ―we [could not] conceive that
each of the forty-nine states [ ] represented here has a truly
unique statutory scheme,‖ we determined that a nationwide
class ―could have been properly certified.‖ Id. This
alternative to outright rejection of certification of a
nationwide class was deemed to be especially fitting because
it could ―surmount[ ] some of the individual issues while
retaining some of the substantive advantages of the class
action.‖ Id. at 818.
Echoing this approach, our fellow Courts of Appeals
have agreed that, for purposes of litigation classes, ―if the
applicable state laws can be sorted into a small number of
groups, each containing materially identical legal standards,‖
then certification of subgroups ―embracing each of the
dominant legal standards can be appropriate.‖ Klay v.
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004); see also
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.) (holding that class certification is
appropriate where state law variations can be grouped by
similar legal doctrines).
Where ―a sufficient constellation of common issues
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binds class members together,‖ Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 16263, differences in state law treatment of indirect purchaser
claims likely fall into a handful of clearly discernible
statutory schemes. Nothing in our case law or the language
of Rule 23 commands that everyone in a class must allege
precisely identical or ―uniform‖ causes of action, see
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149, and statutory variations do not
defeat predominance in the presence of other exceedingly
common issues.26 Instead, as Prudential and GM Truck
explain, where a defendant‘s singular conduct gives rise to
one cause of action in one state, while providing for a
different cause of action in another jurisdiction, the courts
may group both claims in a single class action. This tactic in
litigation advances the laudatory purposes of the class action
device, ―preserv[ing] the resources of both the courts and the
parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be
litigated in an efficient, expedited, and manageable fashion.‖
Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir.
1998).
iii) Certification of Settlement Classes:
Diminished Concern Regarding
Variations in State Law
But we need not rely merely on certifications
involving actual litigation of the class issues for the
proposition that differing state laws do not defeat
26

We do not reach this conclusion so as to allow district
courts to ―shirk‖ the requirements of Rule 23 when certifying
the class, as the dissent suggests. (Dissenting Op. at 21 n.13.)
We do not ignore the differences in state law, but rather find,
based on our precedent, that those differences do not defeat
predominance.
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commonality or predominance. The correct outcome is even
clearer for certification of a settlement class because the
concern for manageability that is a central tenet in the
certification of a litigation class is removed from the
equation. Indeed, the class settlement posture of this case
largely marginalizes the objectors‘ concern that state law
variations undermine a finding of predominance.
In Warfarin, we rejected an objection essentially
indistinguishable from the one advanced here, namely, that
―variations in and inconsistencies between the state consumer
fraud and antitrust laws of the fifty states defeat the
commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23.‖
391 F.3d at 529. In light of the Supreme Court‘s guidance
that a district court ―[c]onfronted with a request for
settlement-only class certification‖ need not inquire whether
the case ―would present intractable management problems,‖
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, in Warfarin, we delineated a ―key‖
distinction between certification of a class for settlement
versus certification for purposes of litigation, 391 F.3d at 529.
Specifically, we observed that, in the settlement context,
variations in state antitrust, consumer protection and unjust
enrichment laws did not present ―the types of insuperable
obstacles‖ that could render class litigation unmanageable.27
Id. (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315). We emphasized, as a
result, that ―variations [in state laws] are irrelevant to
27

In conducting the analysis in Warfarin, we expressly
distinguished the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in In re
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), in
which certification of a nationwide class arising under the tort
laws of all fifty states was sought for purposes of litigation,
rather than settlement. 391 F.3d at 529.
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certification of a settlement class‖ since a settlement would
eliminate the principal burden of establishing the elements of
liability under disparate laws. Id.; see, e.g., Davis v. J.P
Morgan Chase & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (W.D.N.Y.
2011) (―[S]tate-law distinctions impact trial manageability,
which is relevant principally with respect to litigation at
trial.‖) (citing Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529-30); In re Lupron
Mktg & Sales Practices Litig., 228 F.R.D. 75, 92 (D. Mass.
2005) (finding that ―differences in the state consumer
protection laws‖ implicate manageability concerns and do not
pose an obstacle to certification of a settlement class).
Hence, our consideration of varying laws in the
context of predominance has primarily focused on
manageability of a litigation class. This is a particularly
important point, as the objectors seem to conflate the
predicate predominance analysis for certification of a
settlement class with that required for certification of a
litigation class, relying exclusively upon cases implicating the
manageability obstacles inherent in class litigation. See, e.g.,
Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Mil. Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010); Cole v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007). The
Panel likewise referenced authority that focused on the
manageability issues pertinent to certification of litigation
classes in rejecting the settlement class certification. See
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 151 (quoting Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
188 F.R.D. 483, 501 (S.D. Ill. 1999) (discussing
―unmanageable‖ nature of varying state unjust enrichment
laws)).
Because we are presented with a settlement class
certification, ―we are not as concerned with formulating some
prediction as to how [variances in state law] would play out at
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trial, for the proposal is that there be no trial.‖ Ins. Broker.,
579 F.3d at 269 (internal citations & quotations omitted). As
such, we simply need not inquire whether the varying state
treatments of indirect purchaser damage claims at issue would
present the type of ―insuperable obstacles‖ or ―intractable
management problems‖ pertinent to certification of a
litigation class.28 Comm. Bank I, 418 F.3d at 299; Warfarin,
391 F.3d at 529. The proposed settlement here obviates the
difficulties inherent in proving the elements of varied claims
at trial or in instructing a jury on varied state laws, and ―the
difference is key.‖29
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529.
28

We are aware that there may still be circumstances, as we
and other Courts of Appeals have noted, where ―‗[i]n a multistate class action, variations in state law may swamp any
common issues and defeat predominance.‘‖ Klay v. Humana,
Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Castano
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996)). But
these decisions are inapplicable here, as the certification
orders at issue pertained to litigation classes and were
preoccupied with the attendant manageability aspects of
certification. More explicitly, the courts expressed unease
that if ―more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ,
the district judge would face an impossible task of instructing
a jury on the relevant law,‖ and noted ―the difficulties in
trying the [ ] claims on a class basis.‖ Id. (citation &
quotations omitted). Unlike those situations ―where the
certification inquiry [is] set against the backdrop of an
impending trial,‖ Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 269, the settlement
context here does not present equivalent concerns.
29

Unsurprisingly, we are not alone in recognizing the ―key‖
distinction between certification for settlement purposes
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Accordingly, while we are cognizant of our responsibility to
―protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad
class definitions,‖ Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d at 291, state law
variations are largely ―irrelevant to certification of a
settlement class,‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529.30
versus litigation, and ―courts are more inclined to find the
predominance test met [in the settlement context], even when
there are differences in applicable state laws.‖ Ersler v.
Toshiba Am., Inc., No. CV-07-2304, 2009 WL 454354, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (citing In re Grand Theft Auto
Video Game Consumer Litig., 251 F.R.D. 139, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
2008)); see, e.g., In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267
F.3d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that while
certification of litigation classes arising under varying
consumer fraud statutes is often inappropriate, the same is not
true for settlement classes where ―no one need draw fine lines
among state-law theories of relief‖); In re Inter-Op Hip
Prosthesis Liability Litig., 204 F.R.D 330, 347 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (―[W]hen taking the proposed settlement [ ] into
consideration for purposes of determining class certification,
individual issues which are normally present in . . . litigation
become irrelevant, allowing the common issues to
predominate.‖) (citation & quotations omitted).
30

Although we will not here speculate as to the type of
―situations where variations in state laws are so significant so
as to defeat commonality and predominance even in a
settlement class certification,‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 530, we
are confident that the several common questions of law or
fact arising from a ―single central issue‖ – namely, De
Beers‘s alleged anticompetitive conduct and the resulting
injury caused to each class member – predominate over any
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iv) Rule 23(b)(3) and our Precedent do
not Require that Individual Class
Members State a Valid Claim
At bottom, we can find no persuasive authority for
deeming the certification of a class for settlement purposes
improper based on differences in state law. The objectors and
our dissenting colleagues nevertheless insist that, despite the
prevalence of the shared issues of fact and law stemming
from the defendant‘s conduct common as to all class
members and each class member‘s resulting injury, states‘
inconsistent treatment of indirect purchaser damages claims
overwhelms the commonalities. They advocate this because
approximately twenty-five states have not extended antitrust
standing to indirect purchasers through Illinois Brick repealer
statutes or judicial edict; likewise, some uncertain number of
states do not permit an end-run around antitrust standing
through claims based on consumer protection and/or unjust
enrichment statutes. (See Quinn Supp. Br. on Reh‘g En Banc
21-22.) It follows then, they argue, that a large proportion of
the Indirect Purchaser Class lacks any valid claims under
applicable state substantive law, and, therefore, cannot
―predominantly‖ share common issues of law or fact with
those Indirect Purchasers actually possessing valid claims.31
issues concerning individual class members, Prudential, 148
F.3d at 314 (citation & quotations omitted).
31
As noted, the Panel conducted an extensive review of
relevant state statutes and reached the conclusion that
―indirect purchasers do not have a right to recover in all
states, and, therefore, no question of law or fact regarding
their legal rights is uniform throughout the class.‖ Sullivan,
613 F.3d at 149.
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In turn, they insist that a district court must undertake a
thorough review of applicable substantive law to assure itself
that each class member has ―at least some colorable legal
claim‖ (Dissenting Op. at 10) or ―has a valid claim‖ (Quinn
Supp. Br. at 16) before certifying a settlement.
But this focus is misdirected. The question is not what
valid claims can plaintiffs assert; rather, it is simply whether
common issues of fact or law predominate. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3). Contrary to what the dissent and objectors
principally contend, there is no ―claims‖ or ―merits‖ litmus
test incorporated into the predominance inquiry beyond what
is necessary to determine preliminarily whether certain
elements will necessitate individual or common proof. Such
a view misreads Rule 23 and our jurisprudence as to the
inquiry a district court must conduct at the class certification
stage. An analysis into the legal viability of asserted claims is
properly considered through a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b) or summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, not as part
of a Rule 23 certification process. See Comm. Bank II, 622
F.3d at 303 (―[T]he Rule 23 requirements ‗differ in kind from
legal rulings under Rule 12(b)(6).‘‖) (quoting Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001)).
To adopt the position of the dissent and the objectors is
to introduce a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry as to every claim in the
class before a class may be certified. But Rule 23 makes
clear that a district court has limited authority to examine the
merits when conducting the certification inquiry:
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome
on the merits is not properly part of the
certification decision, discovery in aid of the
certification decision often includes information
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required to identify the nature of the issues that
actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it
is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery
into the ―merits,‖ limited to those aspects
relevant to making the certification decision on
an informed basis.
2003 Amendments to Rule 23 (emphasis added); see also
Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) (―The
ability of a named plaintiff to succeed on his or her individual
claims has never been a prerequisite to certification of the
class.‖). A court may inquire whether the elements of
asserted claims are capable of proof through common
evidence, but lacks authority to adjudge the legal validity or
soundness of the substantive elements of asserted claims. Put
another way, a district court may inquire into the merits of the
claims presented in order to determine whether the
requirements of Rule 23 are met, but not in order to determine
whether the individual elements of each claim are satisfied.
Citing our holdings in Hydrogen Peroxide and Newton
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154
(3d Cir. 2001), the objectors argue that the District Court
abused its discretion by failing to establish as part of the
certification process that each class member possessed a valid
claim under the applicable substantive laws.32 (See Quinn Br.
at 17.) But these cases do not stand for this proposition. We
explained in Hydrogen Peroxide that an examination of the
32

The Panel echoed the objectors‘ position, concluding after
examining the laws of fifty states that many jurisdictions
―categorically foreclosed‖ a legal right to recover on the
merits to indirect purchasers. Sullivan, 613 F.d at 151 n.14.
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elements of plaintiffs‘ claim is sometimes necessary, not in
order to determine whether each class member states a valid
claim, but instead to determine whether the requirements of
Rule 23 – namely, that the elements of the claim can be
proved ―through evidence common to the class rather than
individual to its members‖ – are met. 552 F.3d at 311-12. In
Newton, we similarly stated that a court may ―delve beyond
the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class
certification are satisfied,‖ and held that a court‘s rigorous
certification analysis may include a ―preliminary inquiry into
the merits.‖ 259 F.3d at 167 (citations & quotations omitted).
But we did not state that an inquiry into the merits was
necessary in order to prove that each class member has state a
valid claim as a prerequisite to class certification. Rather, the
Rules and our case law have consistently made clear that
plaintiffs need not actually establish the validity of claims at
the certification stage.33
33

The marginal role played by the question of ―validity‖ of
claims in class settlement certification situations is further
evidenced by considering our subsequent Prudential decision.
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261
F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001) (―Prudential II‖). There, we
released all state-law claims – including unnamed claims –
―arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as the
claims‖ actually considered by the Court without adjudicating
the validity of those other allegations. Id. We observed that
―a judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later
claims based on the allegations underlying the claims in the
settled class action‖ even where the ―precluded claim was not
presented, and could not have been presented, in the class
action itself.‖ Id. (citations omitted). We reasoned that while
our ―power to release those claims as part of a judgment‖ may
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Moreover, the merits inquiry is particularly
unwarranted in the settlement context since a district court
need not ―envision the form that a trial‖ would take, Newton,
259 F.3d at 167, nor consider ―the available evidence and the
method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the
evidence to prove‖ the disputed element at trial, Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312. In fact, the absence of evidentiary
and trial manageability concerns that initially motivated our
instruction to conduct a preliminary merits inquiry in the
predominance context reinforces the ―key‖ distinction
between certification of a litigation and settlement class.
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529. As such, the objectors‘ focus on
the legal strengths and weaknesses of class members‘ claims
misconstrues the requirements of Rule 23.34 See Newton, 259

―seem anomalous,‖ ―we have endorsed the rule because it
‗serves the important policy interest of judicial economy by
permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements
that ‗prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a
class action.‘‖ Id. (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982)). As such, the
unidentified prospective claims could be included in the
settlement without adjudication of their validity since they
arose from the identical fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the
defendant.
34

The objectors‘ associated argument that the predominance
inquiry presupposes that every putative class members
possesses at least a single valid cause of action likewise
misses the point. While Rule 23 may presuppose that every
class member does actually allege a predominantly common
claim against a defendant, Rule 23 does not mandate that each
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F.3d at 167-69.
Even still, the objectors and the dissent urge that the
absence of one particular element for some class members –
statutory standing – means that these members cannot state a
valid claim, and therefore, the class cannot be certified.
While it may be correct that states abiding by Illinois Brick
require a plaintiff to be a direct purchaser as one element of
an antitrust or consumer protection claim, the possibility that
some of the Indirect Purchasers in the instant class might be
unable to establish this element at trial is beside the point.
This element, often confusingly denoted as a statutory
standing requirement, is not jurisdictional.35
Statutory
standing is distinct from jurisdictional standing in that
―Article III standing is required to establish a justiciable case
or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts,‖
whereas ―lack of antitrust standing affects a plaintiff‘s ability
to recover, but does not implicate the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court.‖ Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., 526
F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see e.g.,
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003)
of these claims must be shown capable of prevailing on the
merits at the certification stage.
35
To further clarify, we use the term ―statutory standing‖ to
refer to the possession of a viable claim or right to relief, not
to a jurisdictional requirement. See generally Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (―It is
firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate
subject-matter jurisdiction,‖ and ―jurisdiction is not defeated
by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause
of action‖) (citations and alterations omitted).
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(noting that ―statutory standing under the antitrust laws is not
a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction‖);
Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778
(7th Cir. 1994) (―[D]espite the suggestive terminology,
‗antitrust standing‘ is not a jurisdictional requirement and is
therefore waivable.‖). Accordingly, statutory standing is
simply another element of proof for an antitrust claim, rather
than a predicate for asserting a claim in the first place.
Here, the supposed lack of one element necessary to
prove a violation on the merits – statutory standing – does not
establish a concomitant absence of other predominantly
common issues. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315 (affirming a
district court‘s certification of a settlement class despite the
fact that some objectors challenged the settlement on the
grounds that some plaintiffs could not establish reliance – a
necessary element of their state-law fraud claims). This is
especially true in the settlement context where no proof on
the merits need be adduced. See Linerboard, 305 F.3d at
162-63 (―‗[T]he mere fact that such concerns [of
individualized factual and legal determinations] may arise and
may affect different class members differently does not
compel a finding that individual issues predominate over
common ones.‘‖) (quoting Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 296).
Common questions as to the nature of De Beers‘s ―conduct
under federal antitrust laws as well as state law‖ and ―the
causal linkage between [De Beers‘s] conduct and the injury
suffered by the class members‖ may still be found to
predominate. See Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 528; see also Pet
Food, 629 F.3d at 342 (―[T]he predominance requirement
was satisfied because the same set of core operative facts and
theory of proximate cause apply to each member of the
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class.‖) (internal quotations omitted).36
v) The Dissent’s Proposed Framework
The dissent‘s proposed framework mistakenly places
the cart before the horse by requiring the District Court to
establish the validity of the disputed elements of the asserted
claims – namely, the viability of indirect purchaser actions
under state substantive laws – prior to certifying the class.
Under this approach, the dissent seems to require that class
members show that they can state a valid claim for relief. But
the Rule 23 inquiry does not, and should not, involve a Rule
(12)(b)(6) inquiry. 37
36

The Panel analyzed the antitrust claims separately from
the consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims,
seemingly concluding that plaintiffs could only prevail if each
putative class member alleged either a ―uniform‖ antitrust
cause of action, a ―uniform‖ consumer protection cause of
action, or a ―uniform‖ unjust enrichment claim. Sullivan, 613
F.3d 146, 150. We will not read into Rule 23 this heightened
threshold requirement that plaintiffs must allege an identical
cause of action, when all that is required is that common
issues of law or fact predominate over questions particular to
individual class members.
37

The dissent describes this requirement in varied ways:
under their view, class members who, ―according to the plain
terms of controlling law have no claim at all‖ (Dissenting Op.
at 16 n.11), have ―no legal claim‖ (Id. at 1), have ―no cause of
action,‖ (Id. at 4), have a claim ―clearly lacking a colorable
basis‖ (Id. at 15), or have a claim ―nonexistent as a matter of
substantive law‖ (Id. at 13), are barred from partaking in this
class action settlement. The problem with this requirement,
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Were we to require district courts to ensure that ―each
member of a settlement class has a valid claim‖ in order to
establish predominance, (Quinn Supp. Br. at 16), or that each
class member has a ―colorable legal claim,‖ district courts
would be obligated at the class certification stage to, sua
sponte, conduct a thorough Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of every
statutory and common-law claim to ensure that each plaintiff
– including absent class members – possesses a valid cause of
action or a ―colorable claim‖ under the applicable federal or
state substantive law. Such an inquiry into the merits goes
beyond the requirements of Rule 23, for Rule 23 does not
require a district court to determine whether class members
individually have a colorable claim – one that ―appear[s] to
be true, valid, or right. (Dissenting Op. at 10 n.8.) In
addition to exceeding the plain requirements of Rule 23, in
nationwide class settlements, such as the one here, and even if
limited to a statutory standing inquiry, this analysis would
necessitate an intensive, fifty-state cataloguing of differences
in state law at an early stage of the proceedings, and without
the benefit of a developed record.38 Despite the dissent‘s

however, is that in order to separate class members
possessing an ―existent‖ legal claim from those possessing a
―nonexistent‖ one, district courts would have to perform a
Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry into each class member‘s claim.
38
At the same time, it is by no means clear that the dissent‘s
proposed analysis could be cabined to only consider the
differing statutory standing requirements in the process of
evaluating the validity of claims. As discussed supra,
statutory standing for indirect purchasers is treated as but one
element of a cause of action, rather than a jurisdictional
requirement, as the dissent mistakenly suggests. If a district
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view, Rule 23 does not require such an intensive cataloguing
of each class member‘s claim in order to establish
predominance. Even more troublesome, this merits analysis
might not actually answer the salient question of whether
common issues of fact or law actually predominate over
individual ones.
Moreover, district courts undertaking the scrupulous
review of state laws could not ensure the validity of each
individual claim without first settling upon the precise state
law governing each of the putative class members‘ claims.
This choice-of-law analysis would be particularly difficult in
a nationwide class action where an array of factors beyond
the residence of the class members must be considered,
including, inter alia, the location of the parties and the
purchased items, and the place of contracting and
performance. See generally Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull
Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit
rightly noted that ―choice-of-law issues in nationwide class
actions are rarely so uncomplicated that one can delineate
clear winning and losing arguments at an early stage in the
litigation‖; ―the legal uncertainty resulting from the
complicated choice-of-law issues‖ would unduly complicate
the process for establishing predominance under Rule 23.
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir.
court were required to evaluate the statutory standing element
to assess a claim‘s viability, logic and consistency suggest
that the court should also consider other aspects of a claim for
Rule 12(b)(6) and other deficiencies. This approach would
delay proceedings in the trial court, as it would require the
parties to engage in ill-timed, protracted merits litigation at
the class certification stage.
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2006). As a result, many courts find it ―inappropriate to
decide choice of law issues incident to a motion for class
certification.‖ See, e.g., In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md. 1991); Singer v. AT&T
Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (―It is wellestablished that consideration of choice of law issues at the
class certification stage is generally premature.‖).
Even were a district court to properly ascertain the
applicable law after conducting the choice-of-law inquiry, it
would likely encounter unsettled legal questions, further
undermining its ability to assess the viability of some class
members‘ claims and increasing the costs of administration.
By way of example, in Warfarin, we remarked on the
―unsettled question of law as to whether Tennessee‘s antitrust
statutes . . . cover only violations occurring in intrastate
commerce or extend to cover violations occurring in interstate
commerce as well.‖ 391 F.3d at 530 n.12. Relegating the
issue to a footnote, we did not think it necessary to pry into
the legal merits of the Tennessee claims in approving the
class settlement. In another instance, the Fifth Circuit
confronted the unresolved question of whether Louisiana
antitrust law granted standing to indirect purchasers of
consumer products as part of the class certification process,
and asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to accept certification
of the question. See Free v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 176 F.3d 298,
298-99 (5th Cir. 1999). When the state court declined, the
Fifth Circuit was ―le[ft] to fathom Louisiana‘s unsettled
antitrust law.‖ Id. By requiring district courts to assess the
validity of unsettled state law claims at the certification stage,
we would needlessly introduce additional legal uncertainty

63

into a certification process that does not demand it.39
39

Application of the proposed inquiry to the instant matter
demonstrates the likely obstacles the District Court would
encounter under this approach. The objectors present Ohio‘s
statutory regime as emblematic of the impropriety of the type
of class settlement certification at issue here. Citing the Ohio
Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 834
N.E.2d 791 (Ohio 2005), they urge that Ohio law prohibits all
indirect purchaser claims asserting violations of Ohio antitrust
law, common law claims for unjust enrichment where a
purchaser cannot establish that he conferred a benefit upon a
defendant, and claims alleging violations of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act predicated upon monopolistic
pricing practices. (Quinn Br. at 60-61.) As a result, they
insist that, ―[d]irectly contrary to the district court‘s
[certification], an Ohio class member does not have a valid
claim under Ohio law.‖ (Id. at 61.) The objectors contend
that a similar problem exists for other Illinois Brick states.
This inference is flawed for several reasons. First, the
objectors fail to engage in the type of choice-of-law exercise
necessitated by their proposed approach – the evaluation of
whether an Ohio class member is asserting a claim pursuant
to Ohio law or pursuant to the law of a repealer state or a state
affording an alternative basis for recovery. Undoubtedly, this
analysis would present significant hurdles and potentially
alter the presumed outcome. Second, although Johnson
provides that an indirect purchaser lacking an antitrust claim
under Illinois Brick cannot circumvent this limitation by
relying upon the Ohio consumer protection statute, the Ohio
Supreme Court did not, nor could it, preclude consumer
protection claims predicated on fraud or deception. As the
plaintiffs point out, the claims settled here include allegations
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We raise the following questions to further
demonstrate the error of the proposed framework adopted by
our dissenting colleagues. If the dissent‘s ―colorable legal
claim‖ test is a threshold inquiry for commonality, why
should the court not consider every potential disqualifier from
one‘s having a ―colorable legal claim?‖ For example, in any
class certification case, should the court consider whether all
potential class members complied with applicable pre-notice
requirements under the relevant substantive law? Should the
court consider whether every potential class member
exhausted her administrative remedies under the relevant
substantive law? Should the court evaluate whether each
class member‘s claim complies with the applicable statute of
limitations? The answers to these questions most certainly
implicate whether a litigant, in a class action or otherwise, has
a ―colorable legal claim.‖ These questions, moreover, show
how flawed, from an administrative, logical, and practical
of fraud and deception separate from the antitrust allegations,
suggesting that some avenue of recovery arising from the
same defendant conduct remains available to indirect
purchasers even in Ohio. (See Pls.‘ Br. in Response to
Quinn‘s Response to Class Counsel‘s Mot. for Leave to File
Record Excerpts 13-14.) Finally, if the court is to evaluate
the viability of plaintiffs‘ statutory standing element under
Ohio law at the class certification stage, the objectors
presented no sensible reason why the court should not
likewise inspect the viability of every other aspect of an
antitrust, consumer protection, or unjust enrichment claim,
such as statutes of limitation, conditions precedent to suit, and
the like. We do not doubt that such an exhaustive analysis
would produce absurd results and cause undue delay in our
trial courts.
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standpoint, the dissent‘s and objectors‘ approach really is. No
class would ever be certified because it would be impossible
to demonstrate that every class member has a ―colorable legal
claim.‖ (Dissenting Op. at 10.) More than this, it would gut
commonality, for, most certainly, individual issues would
then predominate. There would simply be no class that could
meet this commonality and predominance test.
vi) Settlements
Finally, were we to mandate that a class include only
those alleging ―colorable‖ claims, we would effectively rule
out the ability of a defendant to achieve ―global peace‖ by
obtaining releases from all those who might wish to assert
claims, meritorious or not. We need not take judicial notice
of the fact that plaintiffs with non-viable claims do
nonetheless commence legal action. Here, in an effort to
avoid protracted litigation and future relitigation of settled
questions in federal and state courts across numerous
jurisdictions, De Beers pursued a global settlement and
demanded a release of potential damage claims in all fifty
states. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 326 n.82 (noting that
release of all claims ―serves the important policy interest of
judicial economy by permitting parties to enter into
comprehensive settlements that prevent relitigation of settled
questions at the core of a class action‖) (citation & quotations
omitted). Specifically, De Beers sought ―global peace‖ in a
settlement covering plaintiffs in every federal and state case,
as well as potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed cases in
either federal or state court. See generally Klein v. O’Neal,
Inc., 2009 WL 1174638, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2009) (―In
a class action settlement setting, defendants seek and pay for
global peace-i.e., the resolution of as many claims as
possible.‖); In re Vioxx Prods. Liability Litig., 574 F. Supp.
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2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 2008) (quoting In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No.
05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *3 (D. Minn. 2008) (noting
that the parties ―contemplated a global settlement covering
Plaintiffs from both the MDL and state cases, and included
Plaintiffs whose cases had been filed or transferred to the
MDL, Plaintiffs whose cases were filed outside the MDL in
state court proceedings, and potential Plaintiffs who had not
yet filed their cases‖)). The parties entered a mutual
agreement and sought certification of a settlement class with
the aim of avoiding countless individual suits in diverse
jurisdictions.
Our dissenting colleagues disparage the concept of
―global peace‖ as if it were an impermissible objective in
using the class action device. From a practical standpoint,
however, achieving global peace is a valid, and valuable,
incentive to class action settlements. Settlements avoid future
litigation with all potential plaintiffs – meritorious or not. If
the dissent‘s position were adopted, there would be no
settlements, collusive or otherwise. First of all, litigating
whether a claim is ―colorable‖ and defending who is in and
who is not in the class would be an endless process,
preventing the parties from seriously getting to, and engaging
in, settlement negotiations. And, as discussed above, the
―individualized‖ nature of the task would doom the class
certification process from the outset. Second, since releases
would necessarily be limited to the qualifying class members,
those ultimately excluded would no doubt go right back into
court to continue to assert their claims. No defendants would
consider settling under this framework, for they could never
be assured that they have extinguished every claim from
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every potential plaintiff.40
As applied here, the objectors‘ approach would subject
De Beers to numerous individual suits brought by claimants
excluded from the class, undermining ―the strong
presumption in favor of voluntary settlement agreements,
which we have explicitly recognized with approval.‖
Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 594 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough,
676 F.2d 77, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1982)). ―This presumption is
especially strong in class actions and other complex cases . . .
because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and
lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal
courts.‖ Id. (citations omitted). By contrast, requiring a class
to assert uniform or identical questions of law or fact and to
preemptively demonstrate their legal viability ―would
seriously undermine the possibility for settling any large,
multi district class action.‖ Prudential II, 261 F.3d at 367.
Apart from imposing immense administrative costs, the
extraordinary requirement that class members individually
possess a ―colorable legal claim‖ would make it increasingly
difficult to approve nationwide class settlements entailing
predominantly common issues but arising under varying state
40

Of course, some global settlements may nevertheless be
rejected for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 23. In
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 528 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme
Court rejected a global settlement in a mandatory class action
based on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
There, the plaintiffs seeking class certification failed to
demonstrate that the fund available to pay claims was limited
beyond the fund amount agreed to by the parties. There, the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) were not met; here, the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met.
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laws. The resulting framework would likely siphon the
various state law claims from federal class actions, and
defendants seeking to settle ―in such suits would always be
concerned that a settlement of the federal class action would
leave them exposed to countless suits in state court despite
settlement of the federal claims.‖ Id.; see also Pet Food, 629
F.3d at 342 (―[A]bsent class certification, the Court may be
faced with litigating over 100 individual lawsuits all of which
would arise out of the same set of operative facts.‖).
Rather than ―concentrating the litigation of the claims‖
in a superior single action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C), this
would serve to frustrate ―[t]he core purpose of Rule
23(b)(3),‖ which ―is to vindicate the claims of consumers and
other groups of people whose individual claims would be too
small to warrant litigation,‖ Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
b. Rules Enabling Act & Federalism Concerns
The objectors further contend that the District Court‘s
certification of the settlement class was flawed because it
―recognized as valid, for purposes of Rule 23, claims that are
not recognized as valid under applicable state law.‖ (Quinn
Supp. Br. at 28.) Accordingly, they argue, the order ran afoul
of the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that the rules of
procedure ―shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).41 We cannot agree.
41

The Panel agreed with this characterization, holding that
―the order contravenes the Rules Enabling Act‖ because it
―extends antitrust remedies that, in many instances, have no
root in state substantive law.‖ Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149. The
Panel rejected the argument that De Beers‘s willingness to
stipulate to liability obviated this concern, noting that a court
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In Prudential, we approved a district court‘s
certification of a proposed settlement despite objections that
the certification modified or abridged state law rights. 148
F.3d at 324 (discussing 962 F. Supp. 450, 461-62 (D.N.J.
1997)). We agreed with the district court that ―approval of a
settlement under Rule 23 merely recognizes the parties‘
voluntary compromise of their rights and does not itself affect
their substantive state law rights.‖ Id. (citation & alterations
omitted). As a result, we also agreed with the district court‘s
assessment that the proposed settlement could not violate the
Rules Enabling Act since a ―court‘s approval of a voluntary
settlement, by nature a compromise of rights, does not affect
substantive state rights.‖ Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 462.
It is well established that ―settlement agreements are
creatures of private contract law.‖ See, e.g., Bauer v. Trans.
Sch. Dist. of City of St. Louis, 255 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir.
2001). ―A district court is not a party to the settlement, nor
may it modify the terms of a voluntary settlement agreement
between parties.‖ Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 593 (emphasis
added). Thus, a district court‘s certification of a settlement
simply recognizes the parties‘ deliberate decision to bind
themselves according to mutually agreed-upon terms without
engaging in any substantive adjudication of the underlying
causes of action. In the absence of a finding that plaintiffs are
actually entitled to relief under substantive state law, we
reiterate that a court does not ―abridge, enlarge, or modify
was obligated even in the settlement context to ensure that all
of Rule 23‘s requirements were met and could not
―effectively grant[ ] relief to individuals to whom De Beers
had no antitrust liability.‖ Id. The dissent repeats this
argument.
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any substantive right‖ by approving a voluntarily-entered
class settlement agreement. § 2072(b).
In the same vein, we disagree with the contention that
the District Court violated principles of federalism by
extending to the plaintiffs a substantive right that they could
not have asserted in state court.42 As an initial matter, the
District Court‘s approval of the parties‘ settlement should not
be considered a recognition or expansion of substantive rights
unavailable in a particular state.43 See supra. In this regard,
42

The Panel agreed with this argument, noting that certain
states‘ ―categorical refus[al] to allow indirect purchasers to
bring a price-fixing claim‖ was ―not trivial‖ and represented
―fundamental policy differences among the several states.‖
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 152, 148. The Panel concluded that
these state interests were in effect ―subordinated to De
Beers‘s desire to resolve all indirect purchaser claims
simultaneously‖ and ―in a quest to clear the queue in court.‖
Id. at 152 (citation & quotations omitted).
43

The dissent concludes that approving class certification
here endorses the enlargement of substantive rights because
had some class members brought these claims individually in
state court, they would ―be immediately shown the exit.‖
(Dissenting Op. at 30.) This is incorrect, for the state court
would not automatically dismiss them without a motion from
De Beers. More significantly, nothing would prevent De
Beers from settling those claims in lieu of moving to dismiss
them, and doing so in that scenario would not be an
enlargement of substantive rights.
In responding to this point, the dissent equates an objection
to class certification with a motion to dismiss, but such
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the disputed certification order did not subordinate the states‘
interests, as it did not in fact validate any asserted claims
purportedly rejected by the states.44
Moreover, consideration of the policy imperatives
underlying Illinois Brick confirms that the District Court‘s
certification of a settlement class here did not infringe upon
federalism principles. Illinois Brick‘s restriction on indirect
purchaser recovery was motivated by prudential concerns for
manageability; it does not reflect a categorical policy
judgment that indirect purchasers do not merit antitrust
protection. As we previously highlighted, the Illinois Brick
treatment demonstrates the very flaw in its position. Class
certification and motions to dismiss involve two distinct (and
different) standards, and the former does not permit as
extensive an inquiry into the merits as the latter does. (See
Dissenting Op. at 30 n.21.)
44

The dissent decries this position, contending that
including Indirect Purchasers in the class who could not, on
an individual basis, state a claim for recovery impermissibly
modifies the rights of those Indirect Purchasers who could
recover individually. In so asserting, the dissent assumes that
the size of the settlement fund would be the same if the
Indirect Purchasers who cannot recover individually were
excluded from the class. Surely this cannot be the case, for
the settlement amount to which De Beers has agreed must be
based in large part on the number of potential class members
and on securing global peace. Had those Indirect Purchasers
who could not recover individually been excluded, we
seriously doubt that the Indirect Purchaser settlement fund
would still be $272.5 million.
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Court offered ―three policy reasons for its holding‖:
(1) a risk of duplicative liability for defendants
and potentially inconsistent adjudications could
arise if courts permitted both direct and indirect
purchasers to sue defendants for the same
overcharge; (2) the evidentiary complexities
and uncertainties involved in ascertaining the
portion of the overcharge that the direct
purchasers had passed on to the various levels
of indirect purchasers would place too great a
burden on the courts; and (3) permitting direct
and indirect purchasers to sue only for the
amount of the overcharge they themselves
absorbed and did not pass on would cause
inefficient enforcement of the antitrust laws by
diluting the ultimate recovery and thus
decreasing the direct purchasers' incentive to
sue.
Howard Hess Dental Labs Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 424
F.3d 363, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Illinois Brick, 431
U.S. at 730-35, 740-43).45 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
45

Other Courts of Appeals have recognized a similar
functional focus in the Supreme Court‘s decision. See, e.g.,
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989,
991 (7th Cir. 2006) (―An example of the prudential
limitations on standing is the judge-made ‗indirect purchaser‘
doctrine of antitrust law,‖ which is premised on minimizing
complicated litigation), rev’d on other grounds, Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007);
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 852 (6th
Cir. 1989) (―The question of whether a plaintiff has standing
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acknowledged that its aversion to administering indirect
purchaser recoveries undoubtedly ―denie[d] recovery to those
indirect purchasers who may have been actually injured by
antitrust violations.‖ Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.46
Here, contrary to the dissent‘s and the objectors‘
argument, the District Court‘s certification order did not
undermine these prudential considerations. De Beers‘s
agreement to a specified recovery payment – and the
interrelated removal of a need to ascertain and prove the
amount of passed-on overcharges – marginalizes the first two
Illinois Brick concerns for duplicative liability and
complexity in ascertaining the passed-on overcharges. The
third prudential concern is similarly inapposite since the
Direct Purchaser Class pursued and approved a separate
settlement agreement and there is no indication that the
Indirect Purchaser Settlement undermined ―the direct
purchasers‘ incentive to sue.‖ Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 370.
to sue under the antitrust laws depends largely on prudential
considerations.‖).
46

States on both sides of the indirect purchaser restriction
have likewise appreciated the pragmatic origins of and
purposes served by Illinois Brick. See, e.g., Lorix v.
Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007) (noting
that antitrust standing ―has prudential limits based on
remoteness of injury and complexity of proof‖); Comes v.
Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Iowa 2002) (―[T]he
Illinois Brick court was wholly concerned with the
complexity of litigation and the possibility of multiple
liability.‖); Abbott Labs, Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 50607 (Tex. 1995) (discussing the prudential policy concerns
underlying Illinois Brick).
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Indeed, the immediate relief offered by the instant settlement
appears to offer the most ―[ ]efficient enforcement of the
antitrust laws,‖ id., when compared to the highly uncertain
result the plaintiffs would encounter by engaging in
protracted litigation against a party with a long track record of
avoiding the jurisdiction of courts in the United States. See
generally Comment, The Diamond Cartel, 56 Yale L.J. 1404,
1411 (1947) (discussing De Beers‘s avoidance of effective
antitrust prosecution in light of ―the twin difficulties of
obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign corporations and of
retaining within the court‘s reach tangible assets sufficient to
enforce a decree‖).
Accordingly, we reject the assertion that the District
Court inappropriately subordinated state sovereignty in
certifying the class.
c. Identification of Class Claims
Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(B)
Apart from our disagreement with the objectors‘
arguments regarding commonality and predominance, we
similarly reject the view that the District Court‘s Order in this
case failed to satisfy all of Rule 23(c)(1)(B)‘s substantive
requirements.
As we have explicated, Rule 23(c) provides that a
certification order ―must include (1) a readily discernible,
clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the
class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible,
clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be
treated on a class basis.‖ Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at
320-21 (citation & quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(c)(1)(B) (―An order that certifies a class action must
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define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses. . .
.‖).
The District Court‘s Order ―easily meets the
requirements of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) with respect to the
definition of the class itself.‖ Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir.
2006). The Court properly delineated the parameters of the
Indirect Purchaser Class, defining class members as any
purchasers of any diamond product in the United States
except for those who purchased directly from De Beers or its
competitors. (App‘x 270.)
As to the second prong of the above test, the
contention is raised that the Court‘s Order did not ―explicitly
define which claims, issues, or defenses are to be treated on a
class basis.‖ Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189. We disagree with this
characterization, as the settlement posture of this class action
makes our decision on this front particularly simple. As we
noted in Wachtel, a ―critical‖ purpose of Rule 23(c)(1)‘s
requirement of a ―full and clear articulation of the litigation‘s
contours at the time of class certification‖ was the ―need [ ] to
determine how the case will be tried‖ through presentation of
―a ‗trial plan‘ that describes the issues likely to be presented
at trial and tests whether they are susceptible to class-wide
proof.‖ 453 F.3d at 186 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A)
advisory committee‘s note) (quotations omitted). In the
settlement context, however, this concern evaporates, ―for the
proposal is that there be no trial.‖ Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d
at 291 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). As such, we agree
with the Seventh Circuit‘s sentiment that ―[g]iven the
settlement, no one need draw fine lines among [the various]
theories of relief.‖ Mexico Money, 267 F.3d at 747.
The District Court‘s Order identified six common legal
or factual issues it reasonably found to ―predominate‖ over
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individual questions and susceptible to class treatment, (see
App‘x 276); the Court also expressly included in its Opinion
a background section titled ―Underlying Claims, Cases &
Parties,‖ which laid out in depth all the claims asserted in
each individual suit to be resolved by the class settlement,
(App‘x 263-65). See also supra note 6. It is undisputed that
the Settlement Agreement resolves and releases each and
every one of these asserted claims and issues, obviating any
need to ―cobble together‖ some uncertain category of issues
to be tried as a class. Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189. ―[N]o
particular format is necessary in order to meet the substantive
requirement of [Rule 23(c)], and we will not set aside
substantively conforming certification orders purely over
matters of form.‖ Id. at 188 n.10. The District Court‘s
Opinion ―facilitate[d] meaningful appellate review of [this]
complex certification decision[ ]‖ by providing us with ample
guidance as to the ―contours‖ of the settlement.‖ Id. at 186.47
47

We find additional support for our conclusion from the
First Circuit‘s recent ruling in In re Pharmaceutical Industry
Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 588 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.
2009). There, the Court remarked that ―Rule 23(c)(1)(B) was
added . . . to help appellate courts reviewing an order better
understand the district court‘s decision,‖ and to allow
―appellate courts, attorneys, and parties [to] proceed with
more information and mutual understanding.‖ Id. at 40
(citing Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 186-87). As a result, the Court
upheld a district court‘s certification order that ―plainly
defined the class and the class claims, issues, and defenses in
sufficient detail,‖ ―devoted many pages to the class‘s factual
allegations against the defendant,‖ ―carefully analyzed the
proposed class‘s suitability for certification, again explaining
the issues common to the class,‖ and also ―discussed the state
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Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did
not run afoul of the requirements of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and
properly certified the two classes of claims.
2. Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)
In addition to certifying the Direct and Indirect
Purchaser Classes under Rule 23(b)(3), the District Court
further certified the purchaser classes pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief under §
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.48 (App‘x 285.)
Plaintiffs alleged that, in the absence of injunctive relief, De
Beers‘s anticompetitive conduct would continue to cause the
consumer protection statutes underlying the class‘s claims,
noting differences among them.‖ Id. Likewise here, the
District Court clearly defined the class, listed six common
claims and issues, devoted significant discussion to the
factual allegations, analyzed the class‘s suitability for
certification by explaining the predominantly common issues,
and noted the differences among the various statutes
implicated in the claims. As succinctly stated by our fellow
Court of Appeals, ―[t]hat is enough.‖ Id. at 41.
48

15 U.S.C. § 26 reads in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief, in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
law . . . when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage is granted by courts of equity.
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entire membership of all classes to pay artificially inflated
prices. The objectors counter that class members lack
antitrust standing to seek injunctive relief because they cannot
demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending
violation of the antitrust laws. In support, they point to expert
reports submitted in 2008 for the targeted purpose of
identifying a common methodology benchmark for
calculating damages; these reports suggested that the market
for rough diamonds became more competitive in the interim
between mid-2006 and 2008, in concert with De Beers‘s
weakening position in the market.49 In making this argument,
the objectors reject the District Court‘s conclusion that De
Beers‘s willful entry into the settlement removed the
plaintiffs‘ burden to establish the likelihood of future injury.
(See App‘x 285.)
In contrast to the damages provision of § 4 of the
Clayton Act, ―‗Section 16 has been applied more expansively,
both because its language is less restrictive than that of § 4 . .
. and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and
adaptable tool for enforcing the antitrust laws than the
damage remedy. . . .‘‖50 McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80
49

After evaluating the mentioned expert reports, the Panel
agreed with the objectors that plaintiffs no longer faced ―a
significant threat of future antitrust harm in the absence of the
injunction,‖ and, therefore, lacked antitrust standing under §
16 of the Clayton Act. Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 157-58.
50

Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief, in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened
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F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Schoenkopf v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980)). Because actions seeking injunctive relief under § 16
do ―not present the countervailing considerations – such as
the risk of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of
a trial burdened with complex and conjectural economic
analyses,‖ plaintiffs need not ―satisfy the direct purchaser
requirement as a condition of seeking injunctive relief.‖ In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir.
2000) (Warfarin I) (quoting Mid-West Paper Prods Co. v.
Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 594 (3d Cir. 1979))
(quotations omitted). Instead, to establish the need for
injunctive relief, plaintiffs must generally demonstrate three
uncomplicated prerequisites: ―a threat of loss‖; that the injury
in question ―is of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent‖; and ―a significant threat of injury from a violation
of the antitrust laws.‖ Id. at 399 (citations & quotations
omitted; alterations added).
Despite this burden, it is well established that ―parties
to a suit have the right to agree to anything they please in
reference to the subject matter of their litigation, and the
court, when applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their
agreement, if it comes within the general scope of the case
made by the pleadings.‖ Sansom Comm. by Cook v. Lynn,
735 F.2d 1535, 1548 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Pac. R.R. v.
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws, . . . when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or
damage is granted by courts of equity.
15 U.S.C. § 26.
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Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879) (quotations & alterations
omitted)). In turn, ―[a]s the Supreme Court has recognized, a
district court may ‗provide broader relief in an action that is
resolved before trial than the court could have awarded after a
trial.‘‖ In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d
179, 185 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)
(alterations omitted).
Accordingly, district courts are
afforded wide discretion to give effect to joint compromises
that timely advance the interests of the parties without
wasteful litigation.51 In exercising this discretion, the District
Court here could reasonably approve a mutually agreed-upon
stipulation enjoining conduct within the Court‘s jurisdiction
regardless of whether the plaintiffs could have received
identical relief in a contested suit by satisfying each of the
aforementioned requirements at trial.
Yet because of the class nature of the instant suit, the
District Court‘s approval of the stipulated injunction borne
out of a class settlement did need to satisfy an additional test.
Specifically, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class certification only
when ―the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
51

Unsurprisingly, a paucity of case law addresses the issue
of whether parties to a lawsuit may consent to the issuance of
an injunction that is agreeable to all parties without a court‘s
asking whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) have been
satisfied. This dearth of precedent is to be expected since it
would be highly illogical for a defendant to dispute an
injunction to which it in fact agreed, and for a plaintiff
beneficiary to object to an injunction entered for its benefit.
Curiously, the latter situation is presented here.

81

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.‖ Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).52 Important to the analysis ―is that the
relief sought . . . should benefit the entire class,‖ and ―the
putative class [must] ‗demonstrate that the interests of the
class members are so like those of the individual
representatives that injustice will not result from their being
bound by such judgment in the subsequent application of
principles of res judicata.‘‖ Baby Neal for and by Kanter v.
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hassine, 846
F.2d at 179). ―[I]njunctive actions, seeking to define the
relationship between the defendant and the ‗world at large,‘
will usually satisfy the requirement.‖ Id.
Here, we have no difficulty concluding that Rule
23(b)(2)‘s requirement that De Beers‘s alleged conduct be
―generally applicable to the class‖ was satisfied. Indeed,
much of our discussion of ―predominance‖ in the previous
section of this Opinion specifically emphasized the common
elements of the complained of conduct that are equally
applicable to ―the class as a whole.‖ See supra. As the
District Court discussed, the plaintiffs alleged that De Beers‘s
anticompetitive behavior ―caused the entire membership of all
classes to pay artificially inflated prices,‖ and that, in the
52

―This rule applies when the putative class seeks injunctive
or declaratory relief, and ‗does not extend to cases in which
the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages,‘‖ as with a certification
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d
291, 301 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
advisory committee‘s note).
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absence of injunctive relief, all classes would continue to pay
artificial premiums. (App‘x 285.) These claims demonstrate
shared interests between the members of the putative class,
and, these allegations, if proven, would support injunctive
relief respecting the class as a whole. Likewise, the parties‘
mutual decision to settle claims ―on grounds generally
applicable to the class‖ complies with the text of Rule
23(b)(2) and should be respected.
In reaching this decision, we also reject the objectors‘
request that we engage in fact-finding as to whether all class
members could show an imminent threat of prospective
antitrust injury. Due to the settlement posture of this case,
which controls, we need not concern ourselves with this issue.
Moreover, the District Court never addressed the question of
whether changes in the market negatively affected De Beers‘s
ability to extract higher rents from diamond sightholders and
subsequent purchasers.53 Without the benefit of the District
53

The objectors urge, based on the damages methodology
expert reports, that De Beers‘s market share fell to
approximately 46% in 2006, and, therefore, posed little
continuing threat of future antitrust harm. (Quinn Br. 19.)
Although the experts mentioned that De Beers lost its
dominant share of an increasingly competitive market, the
experts never opined – as the objectors contend – that
plaintiffs face no significant threat of future antitrust harm.
Were we to conduct our own independent analysis, we might
draw a very different conclusion as to De Beers‘s asserted
ability to inflict future harm: we might decide that De Beers‘s
ongoing leadership position – considering its purported 46%
market share in the diamond market – afforded it ample
opportunity to influence diamond prices, posing an ongoing
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Court‘s factual findings on the matter in any event, ―[w]e
deem it inappropriate to treat this question without any
evidence having been presented on [it] and without the
benefit of the findings and opinion of the district judge.
Merola v. Atl. Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 173 (3d Cir.
and significant threat of antitrust injury. See generally United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 459 (1964)
(discussing defendant‘s ―dominant position‖ based upon a
43%-46% market share in a highly concentrated industry).
The objectors place far too much stock in De Beers‘s
purported market share, ignoring one of the basic tenets in
assessing market power: ―Obviously no magic inheres in
numbers; the relative effect of percentage command of a
market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed.‖
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612
(1953).
Curiously, the objectors and the Panel also rejected the
plaintiffs‘ contention that the injunction entered by the
District Court in 2006 – an injunction directly tailored to
fostering competition – played any role in the increasingly
competitive market. Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 157. The Panel
opined that although the mid-2006 competitive increases
―roughly coincided with the District Court‘s issuance of the
injunction,‖ this coincidence did not support the reasonable
deduction that the injunction ―played a meaningful role in
producing those competitive gains.‖ Id. at 157-58. An
equally logical inference would be that increased competition
approximating the issuance of the injunction evidenced the
efficacy of the relief. That said, we will abstain from
extrapolating broad legal conclusions of market
competitiveness from data narrowly focused on damages
methodology.
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1975).
At bottom, we hold that the District Court acted within
its discretion in accepting De Beers‘s stipulation to the
injunctive relief.
B. Fairness of the Class Action Settlement & the Plan of
Allocation
Apart from contesting the certification of the
settlement class, the objectors raise two other arguments as to
the fairness and adequacy of the proposed settlement. First,
they quarrel with the District Court‘s approval of the
settlement as a whole under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e)‘s requirement that the settlement be ―fair, reasonable,
and adequate.‖ (See Bagolie Br. at 18-28.) Second, the
objectors dispute the fairness and adequacy of the
settlement‘s plan of allocation for a portion of the settlement.
Specifically, they urge that the proposed Indirect Purchaser
Settlement distribution is ―patently unfair‖ and presents ―an
intra-class conflict of interest that renders Class Counsel, as
well as the class representative, inadequate.‖ (See Murray
Consol. Br. at 13; Quinn Br. at 63-64; Petrus Br. at 12-13.)
We address each objection in order.
1. Approval of the Settlement
Before approving a class settlement agreement, a
district court must find that the requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met, and must
separately ―determine that the settlement is fair to the class
under [Rule] 23(e).‖ Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 257. Rule
23(e) provides that a proposed settlement may only be
approved ―after a hearing and on finding that it is fair,
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reasonable, and adequate.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In this
process, ―trial judges bear the important responsibility of
protecting absent class members,‖ and must be ―assur[ed] that
the settlement represents adequate compensation for the
release of the class claims.‖ Pet Food, 629 F.3d at 349
(citation & quotations omitted); see also Ehrheart, 609 F.3d
at 593 (stressing that ―[t]he purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect
the unnamed members of the class,‖ and that a ―district court
acts as a fiduciary‖ for absent class members) (citing
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534). ―[W]here settlement negotiations
precede class certification, and approval for settlement and
certification are sought simultaneously, district courts should
be even ‗more scrupulous than usual‘ when examining the
fairness of the proposed settlement.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at
534 (quoting GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 805).
In assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement, we
have articulated nine well-established primary factors for a
district court to consider in conducting its inquiry:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to
the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings
and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of
establishing damages; (6) the risks of
maintaining the class action through the trial;
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a
greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of
the best possible recovery; [and] (9) the range
of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a
possible recovery in light of all the attendant
risks of litigation.
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Pet Foods, 629 F.3d at 350 (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521
F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)). (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
Furthermore, a district court may consider several
other factors ―illustrative of additional inquiries that in many
instances will be useful for a thoroughgoing analysis of a
settlement‘s terms,‖ id.:
[T]he maturity of the underlying substantive
issues, as measured by experience in
adjudicating
individual
actions,
the
development of scientific knowledge, the extent
of discovery on the merits, and other factors
that bear on the ability to assess the probable
outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and
individual damages; the existence and probable
outcome of claims by other classes and
subclasses; the comparison between the results
achieved by the settlement for individual class
or subclass members and the results achieved—
or likely to be achieved—for other claimants;
whether class or subclass members are accorded
the right to opt out of the settlement; whether
any provisions for attorneys' fees are
reasonable; and whether the procedure for
processing individual claims under the
settlement is fair and reasonable.
Id. (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323). The ―settling
parties bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors
weigh in favor of approval of the settlement‖ throughout this
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analysis.54 Id. (citation omitted). ―Because of the district
court‘s proximity to the parties and to the nuances of the
litigation, we accord great weight to the court‘s factual
findings‖ in conducting the fairness inquiry. Prudential, 148
F.3d at 317.
The District Court in this instance engaged in a
thorough review of the Girsh factors, holding that the relevant
considerations on balance weighed in favor of a finding of
fairness under Rule 23(e). We conclude that the Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding the settlement to be fair,
reasonable, and adequate.
a. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of
the Litigation
The first Girsh factor ―captures the probable costs, in
both time and money, of continued litigation.‖ Warfarin, 391
F.3d at 536 (citation omitted). The District Court found that
this litigation ―would have been difficult, as multiple parties,
multiple claims, extensive jurisdictional problems, and
complicated discovery would be involved.‖ (App‘x 289.)
54

We have separately observed that ―an initial presumption
of fairness‖ may apply when reviewing a proposed settlement
where: ―(1) the settlement negotiations occurred at arm‘s
length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents
of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
only a small fraction of the class objected.‖ Warfarin, 391
F.3d at 535 (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d
201, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (―Cendant‖). The District Court did
not consider or rely upon this presumption in assessing
fairness. Because we find no error in the Court‘s thorough
analysis, we will likewise disregard this presumption.
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The Court further discussed the likelihood of extensive
motion practice as to jurisdiction, the lifting of default
judgments, statute of limitations issues, and the concern for
protecting foreign litigants in United States courts. (Id. 28990.)
We agree with the District Court‘s conclusion that
litigation of the numerous legal and factual issues discussed
would have inevitably contributed to the expense and
duration of the proceedings. Faced with the uncertainty
arising from the existing defaults and De Beers‘s ongoing
denial of personal jurisdiction, the settlement provided
substantial and immediate relief to the class without further
expense. Moreover, extended motion practice ―would not
only further prolong the litigation but also reduce the value of
any recovery to the class.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536.
Accordingly, this first factor favors the settlement.
b. The Reaction of the Class to the Settlement
The second Girsh factor ―attempts to gauge whether
members of the class support the settlement,‖ by considering
the number of objectors and opt-outs and the substance of any
objections. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318. The District Court
determined that the reaction of the class was overwhelmingly
positive,55 and noted that all twenty of the objections
55

The Court noted that, as of March 31, 2008, it had
received 433,891 claims forms from all classes – nine from
members of the Direct Purchaser Class and 433,882 from the
Indirect Purchaser Class, with 431,380 from the Consumer
Subclass and 2,502 from the Reseller Subclass. (App‘x 291.)
The Court also stated that five requests for exclusion had
been received from the Direct Purchaser Class and 139 from
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pertained to the Indirect Purchaser Class, with all but four
objections relating to the consumer subclass, which consists
of between 67 and 117 million members. (App‘x 290-91.)
We agree with the District Court‘s observation that the
minimal number of objections and requests for exclusion are
consistent with class settlements we have previously
approved, and we are satisfied that the District Court acted
within its discretion in finding this factor to favor settlement.
c. The Stage of the Proceedings and the
Amount of Discovery Completed
The third Girsh factor ―captures the degree of case
development that class counsel had accomplished prior to
settlement,‖ and allows the court to ―determine whether
counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case
before negotiating.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (citation,
quotations & alterations omitted).
The District Court
thoroughly discussed the development of this case prior to
settlement, highlighting the extensive factual discovery of
industry participants, consumers, and experts in the field; the
retention of economic experts; the review of publicly
available information; the experiences of counsel who had
previously sued De Beers for price-fixing; and the analysis of
proceedings relating to De Beers‘s other contractual
entanglements in the field. (App‘x 292.) The Court further
the Indirect Purchaser Class (66 from the Reseller Subclass
and 69 from the Consumer Subclass). (Id.) The Court
received no objections from any direct purchasers and also
noted that notice was provided to the United States Attorney
General and the Attorney Generals of all fifty states, with
none seeking to participate in the proceedings. (Id. 290-291,
1449-1450.)
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observed that several of the individual suits had been in
litigation for years before negotiation of the settlement, and
emphasized that classes had been certified in several
individual suits after significant factual investigation and
legal development. (Id.) The Court committed no error in
concluding that counsel adequately appreciated the merits of
the case prior to reaching a settlement, and we agree that this
factor favors approval of the settlement.
d. The Risks of Establishing Liability
The fourth Girsh factor ―examine[s] what the potential
rewards (or downside) of litigation might have been had class
counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle them.‖
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 237. As already highlighted, the
District Court discussed at length the various difficulties
plaintiffs would likely encounter in attempting to collect on
default judgments in foreign jurisdictions, observing that the
Court‘s monetary judgments would likely be perceived as
―beyond its authority‖ and ―effectively void.‖ (App‘x 29495.) The objectors‘ misguided contention that no risk of
establishing liability exists entirely disregards the potential
drawbacks of litigating and attempting to collect in foreign
jurisdictions, including the extensive motion practice and
expense such an uncertain tactic would entail. We are also
influenced by De Beers‘s track record of rejecting United
States jurisdiction over its legal affairs and the fact that De
Beers has continued to deny any wrongdoing even in reaching
a settlement agreement in this matter. Accordingly, we
discern no error in the District Court‘s conclusion that this
factor favors settlement.
e. The Risks of Establishing Damages
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As with the fourth Girsh factor, ―this inquiry attempts
to measure the expected value of litigating the action rather
than settling it at the current time.‖ Cendant, 264 F.3d at
238-39 (citation & quotations omitted). The District Court
found that entry of a default judgment against De Beers
would prompt the court to ―conduct such hearings or order
such references as it deems necessary and proper‖ to ascertain
the amount of damages since the damages had not presently
been established with certainty. (App‘x 296 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)).) The expert reports submitted by the various
parties indicated that these proceedings would likely entail a
―battle of the experts,‖ with each side presenting its figures
and defenses to the other side‘s proposals. (Id. 297.)
Because of the ―uncertainty attendant to such a battle,‖ the
District Court determined this factor to weigh in support of
settlement, (id.), and the objectors do not contest this finding
on appeal. Accordingly, we find no flaw in the District
Court‘s decision that the additional ―risk in establishing
damages‖ counsels in favor of approval of the settlement.
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 239.
f. The Risks of Maintaining the Class Action
Through Trial
The sixth Girsh factor ―measures the likelihood of
obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were
to proceed to trial‖ in light of the fact that ―the prospects for
obtaining certification have a great impact on the range of
recovery one can expect to reap from the class action.‖
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (internal quotations & citation
omitted). Class certification is tenuous, as a ―district court
retains the authority to decertify or modify a class at any time
during the litigation if it proves to be unmanageable.‖ Id.
(citation omitted). As we have discussed supra, although the
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size and variety of issues implicated in this nationwide class
action do not present an obstacle to certification of a
settlement class, ―there is a significant risk that such a class
would create intractable management problems if it were to
become a litigation class, and therefore be decertified.‖ Id.
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the
considerable risk of maintaining the class action through trial
weighed in favor of settlement.56
g. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a Greater
Judgment
The seventh Girsh factor considers ―whether the
defendants could withstand a judgment for an amount
significantly greater than the settlement.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d
at 537-58 (citation, quotations, & alteration omitted). The
District Court observed that ―little fact-finding has been done
on this issue,‖ and noted that the parties did not dispute De
Beers‘s ability to withstand a greater judgment. (App‘x 29856

The objectors aver that drawing a distinction between
settlement and litigation classes ―would create two standards
for class certification‖ although ―the federal rules do not
provide for such a difference.‖ (Bagolie Br. at 25.) This
argument patently disregards our clear and consistent
precedent on the subject.
While the standards for class
certification are the same for both settlement and litigation
classes, certification in the former context need not consider
―whether the case, if tried, would present intractable
management problems, for the proposal is that there be no
trial.‖ Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d at 291 (citing Amchem, 521
U.S. at 620). This added risk is of utmost significance in
determining whether a settlement would best serve the
interests of the class.
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99.) Even so, the Court found this factor to neither favor nor
disfavor the proposed settlement because ―it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to collect a judgment
from De Beers.‖ (Id.) The objectors contend that the District
Court made insufficient findings as to De Beers‘s market
capitalization, which suggested an ability to withstand a much
higher judgment, and, therefore, should have weighed this
factor against the settlement. (Bagolie Br. at 26-27).
In comparing the value of settlement versus trial, we
must be careful to judge the fairness factors ―against the
realistic, rather than theoretical, potential for recovery after
trial.‖ In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D.
436, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In this regard, a finding that an
immediate settlement is preferable to the high unlikelihood of
collecting a theoretical judgment against De Beers appears
entirely reasonable. Moreover, a defendant‘s ability to
withstand a much higher judgment does not necessarily
―mean that it is obligated to pay any more than what the
[class members] are entitled to under the theories of liability
that existed at the time the settlement was reached.‖
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538. That said, ―[t]he proponents of a
settlement bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors
weigh in favor of approval,‖ and we have previously found
that defendants‘ speculative ability to pay ―substantially more
than they did under the Settlement‖ cut against approval,
―albeit only moderately.‖ Cendant, 264 F.3d at 241.
At bottom, we agree that, ―in any class action against a
large corporation, the defendant entity is likely to be able to
withstand a more substantial judgment, and, against the
weight of the remaining factors, this fact alone does not
undermine the reasonableness of the instant settlement.‖
Weber v. Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 447 (D.N.J.

94

2009). As such, we find no error in the District Court‘s
conclusion that De Beers‘s ability to withstand a greater
judgment does not necessarily undermine the fairness of the
settlement.
h. The Range of Reasonableness of the
Settlement in Light of the Best Possible
Recovery and All Attendant Risks of Litigation
The final two Girsh factors consider ―whether the
settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor
value for a strong case.‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538. The
reasonableness of a proposed settlement is assessed by
comparing ―the present value of the damages plaintiffs would
likely recover if successful [at trial], appropriately discounted
for the risk of not prevailing . . . with the amount of the
proposed settlement.‖ Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322. Notably,
in conducting the analysis, the court must ―guard against
demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the
merits of the litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a
yielding of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and
resolution.‖ GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 806 (citations omitted).
Applying this framework, the District Court described
the methodology utilized by the Indirect Purchaser Consumer
Subclass‘s expert, who theorized that the average overcharge
for diamond sales was 4.85% and the total worldwide
overcharge equalled $4.99 billion; the United States
consumes approximately 50% of the diamonds and diamond
jewelry worldwide, rendering the overcharge to the U.S.
market equal to $2.49 billion. (App‘x 300.) Accordingly, the
proposed $272.5 million Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund
represented 10.93% of this overcharge. (Id.) The expert
further posited that although the Direct Purchaser Class
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recovery could not be precisely quantified in the absence of
data as to the exact amount of non-De Beers sales to Direct
Purchasers, the value could reasonably be estimated. Placing
the total value of United States imports of rough diamonds
during the Direct Purchaser Class Period at $4.3 billion, the
expert estimated that at least 46% – or approximately $2
billion – of the rough diamond sales were excluded sales;
applying the 4.85 weighted overcharge percentage to that $2
billion, the expert theorized that the overcharge percentage
was near $100 million. (Id.) As such, the proposed $22.5
million recovery represented more than 20% of the single
damages. (Id.) The District Court found this estimate
reasonable and the objectors do not protest this methodology.
Instead, the objectors contend that the District Court
abused its discretion in overvaluing the settlement by
considering only estimated single damages in its ―best
possible recovery‖ inquiry, rather than comparing the
settlement amount to the treble damages that are an automatic
component of antitrust damages recovery in many
jurisdictions. (Bagolie Br. 28, 32-43.) Although the
objectors correctly note that the District Court compared the
settlement recovery to single damages in evaluating the
propriety of the settlement‘s monetary component, (App‘x
301), we do not agree with the objectors that this
methodology constituted legal error.
Some disagreement exists in the case law as to whether
the reasonableness of a settlement amount should be
evaluated by comparison to the potential single damages of a
class or the trebled damages authorized in certain
jurisdictions. Compare County of Suffolk v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1324 (2d Cir. 1990) (―[T]he
district judge correctly recognized that it is inappropriate to
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measure the adequacy of a settlement amount by comparing
to a trebled base recovery figure.‖), Carnegie v. Household
Intern., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(―[N]umerous courts have held that in determining a
settlement value, the potential for treble damages should not
be taken into account.‖), and Lorazepam & Clorazepate
Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 376 (D.D.C. 2002) (―[T]he
standard for evaluating settlement involves a comparison of
the settlement amount with the estimated single damages.‖),
with In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 170792,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (―[T]here are few perceptible
justifications of the single damages standard for the
determination of the fairness of antitrust class actions,‖ which
―places the settlement court, [acting] as a fiduciary for the
absent class members, in a position in which it may be forced
to approve a settlement that no non-representative plaintiffs
would accept‖), and In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D 197, 210 n.30 (D. Me. 2003)
(―[I]f a settlement reflects a potential damage recovery, it
should logically reflect the other parts of that recovery
(trebling and attorneys‘ fees) that the statute awards
automatically.‖).
That said, ―we know of no authority that requires a
district court to assess the fairness of a settlement in light of
the potential for trebled damages.‖57 Comm. Bank II, 622
F.3d at 312 (emphasis in original); see also Rodriguez v. West
57

Peculiarly, the objectors at once argue ―that treble
damages could be considered in assessing‖ fairness while also
presuming without cause that a fairness inquiry ―necessarily
involves consideration of treble damages.‖ (Bagolie Br. 3839 (emphasis added).)
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Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2009) (―We
have never precluded courts from comparing the settlement
amount to both single and treble damages. By the same
token, we do not require them to do so in all cases.‖). Rather,
―courts generally determine fairness of an antitrust class
action settlement based on how it compensates the class for
past injuries, without giving much, if any, consideration to
treble damages.‖58 Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 964; see also City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 458-59 (2d Cir.
1974) (―[T]he vast majority of courts which have approved
settlements . . . have given their approval . . . based on an
estimate of single damages only.‖), overruled on other
58

We agree with our fellow Court of Appeals that, in
reaching a private consensual settlement, the ―parties,
counsel, mediators, and district judges naturally arrive at a
reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood
of a plaintiffs‘ or defense verdict, the potential recovery, and
the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present value.‖
Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 965. Our principal role in this
engagement ―is to protect the unnamed members of the
class.‖ Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 593. As such, we must remain
cognizant that our ―‗intrusion upon what is otherwise a
private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties
to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a
reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of
fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the
negotiating parties.‘‖ Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 965 (quoting
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir.
1998)); see also GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 805 (same). No
assertion of collusion, fraud, or overreaching is advanced or
evidenced in the settlement at issue here.
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grounds as recognized by U.S. Football League v. Nat’l
Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1989).
Without delving into the debate over whether single or treble
damages are the proper variable of comparison, we cannot
label the District Court‘s adherence to the commonly
accepted procedure for assessing the fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness of a settlement an abuse of discretion.59
Moreover, many of the state law claims asserted would not
provide for treble damages recovery.
Finding no abuse in the District Court‘s conclusion
that the proposed settlement offered a reasonable recovery,
particularly ―when accounting for the additional relief
provided by the injunction,‖ (App‘x 301), we are also not
persuaded that the Court erred in assessing the reasonableness
of the settlement in light of all of the attendant risks of
litigation. Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157. The District Court found
59

The objectors also allege legal error in the District
Court‘s estimate of the ―best possible recovery‖ for the
Indirect Purchaser Class by reference to the class as a whole,
rather than by making separate findings as to estimated
damages for the Consumer and Reseller subclasses. (Bagolie
Br. at 27.) This argument falls short. The Special Master –
whose findings were accepted by the District Court –
thoroughly considered several expert reports and econometric
models submitted by various counsel discussing the proper
share of damages within the Indirect Purchaser class. The
Special Master established an appropriate distribution of the
Indirect Purchaser fund based upon estimated damages to
both the Consumer and Reseller subclasses, and the objectors
have not demonstrated the inaccuracy of this analysis. (See
App‘x 1473-1508.)
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the ―magnitude of the potential risks in litigation, including
likely profound difficulties enforcing United States default
judgments in the relevant foreign countries, establishing
personal jurisdiction, and establishing liability,‖ to compare
unfavorably to the recovery offered by the proposed
settlement. (App‘x 301-02.) Based on this assessment, we
find the District Court‘s conclusion that these final factors
weigh in favor of the settlement compelling.
On balance, we conclude that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the Settlement as a whole fair,
adequate, and reasonable.
2. Plan of Allocation
The objectors next aver that the previously discussed
differences in state law mandate a differential allocation in
the percentage of recovery within the Indirect Purchaser
Consumer Settlement Fund, which should ―account for the[ ]
varying strengths and weaknesses‖ of consumer claims as
informed by the applicable state law treatments of indirect
purchaser causes of action.
(Murray Br. at 15-18.)
Accordingly, they contend that the District Court should
utilize subclasses in accounting for the varied rights to
recovery caused by Illinois Brick disparities in state laws.
(Quinn Answer to Pet. for Reh‘g En Banc at 11.)
A district court‘s ―principal obligation‖ in approving a
plan of allocation ―is simply to ensure that the fund
distribution is fair and reasonable as to all participants in the
fund.‖ Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d
956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983). In prior instances where objectors
challenged the fairness of intra-class allocation of settlement
funds, we have explained that ―where a class is found to
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include subclasses divergent in interest,‖ the use of subclasses
may be appropriate and ―is designed to prevent conflicts of
interest in class representation.‖ Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at
271. We have likewise noted the potential drawbacks of
subclassing, including the potential ―‗Balkanization‘ of the
class action,‖ and creation of ―a huge obstacle to settlement if
each subclass has an incentive to hold out for more money.‖
Id. (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173,
202 (3d Cir. 2005) (―Cendant Sec.‖)). We accord ―substantial
deference to district courts with respect to their resolution of
this issue‖ because such decisions ―require[ ] a balancing of
costs and benefits that can best be performed by a district
judge.‖ Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 271. ―Where the district
court has declined to certify a subclass‖ and treats all class
members as falling within a single class for purposes of a
fund allocation, ―we will ordinarily defer to its decision
unless it constituted an abuse of discretion.‖ Id. (quoting
Cendant Sec., 404 F.3d at 202) (quotations & alterations
omitted).
In Insurance Brokerage, the objectors asserted that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to require the
establishment of subclasses where ―the increased recovery of
one sub-class was achieved at the expense of another
subclass‘s diminished recovery.‖ Id. at 270. There, the plan
of allocation tied reimbursement ―to the extent of damages
incurred on certain policies of insurance,‖ and was ―allocated
in such a way that policyholders who likely incurred the most
damage are entitled to a larger proportion of the recovery than
those whose injuries were less severe.‖ Id. at 272-73.
Although we observed that the proposed subclasses ―ha[d]
some appeal‖ in remedying an unequal division of the
settlement fund, we deferred to the district court‘s thorough
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explanation that the objectors had failed to evidence
―divergent or antagonistic interests between the three
groups,‖ and had not established that ―these groups have
claims of varying merit.‖ Id. at 272 (citation & quotations
omitted). Indeed, despite the factual disparities in the type of
insurance at issue, the district court had highlighted that ―all
of the class members shared a unified interest in establishing [
] liability for engaging in anticompetitive conduct which
increased the cost of premium for all policyholders,‖
undermining the showing of divergent interests. Id. at 273.
We further noted that the plan of allocation ―was carefully
devised to ensure a fair distribution of the settlement fund,‖
and ―merely created a structure for ensuring that
reimbursement [was] tied to the extent of damages incurred.‖
Id. at 272. Accordingly, we found the settlement allocation
fair and within the district court‘s discretion. Id.
We reached a different conclusion in Pet Food. 629
F.3d at 353. There, the district court carefully examined the
fairness of the total settlement fund, but did not discuss
whether an allocation of the fund to a sub-segment of claims
– namely, to consumers who had received refunds outside of
the settlement – was inadequate and rendered the settlement
unfair and unreasonable to those who had received nothing on
account of their claims. 629 F.3d at 353 (noting that although
―we do not doubt the able District Court properly determined
that the fund was a fair and adequate settlement of all the
claims advanced by plaintiffs in this case[,] . . . [w]e are
unable to determine whether the $250,000 allocation was a
fair and adequate settlement of the Purchase Claims‖). There,
we decided that the district court lacked sufficient
information to decide whether the allocation to certain
claimants was fair, and, thus, we remanded for further
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proceedings. Id. at 356.
Like the progressive settlement contemplated in
Insurance Brokerage, the settlement at issue here provides for
a pro rata distribution to all class members, and does not
distinguish based upon any variables, such as the applicable
state law of claimants‘ states of residence or location of
purchase. While the District Court here did not specifically
evaluate the pro rata allocation through the fairness lens, it
did consider the differential allocation question in conducting
the predominance analysis, noting the imprecision inherent in
weighing class member claims ―based on the relative strength
of different state law claims.‖ (App‘x 279.) The District
Court further noted in its Rule 23(a) analysis that the various
―individual classes were represented by separate counsel
during settlement negotiations, allowing for ‗adequate
structural protections to assure that differently situated
plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests.‘‖ (App‘x
220 (quoting Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 533).) Moreover, the
Court observed that there were no intra-class conflicts since
all putative members experienced injury caused by De Beers,
all sought recovery for overpayment caused by allegedly
anticompetitive behavior, and all shared common interests in
establishing damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 220-21.)
It may be entirely reasonable to apply the same
damages calculation to claimants from all states because, as
the district court in Warfarin observed, ―[i]t is purely
speculative that claimants from indirect purchaser states could
anticipate a greater recovery than claimants from other
states.‖ In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D.
231, 260 (D. Del. 2002); see also Cendant, 264 F.3d at 250
(given the ―speculative‖ nature of such an inquiry, differences
in the liability standards between § 11 and § 10(b) securities
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claims did not warrant differential plan of allocation). And
only by engaging in the type of fact-intensive merits and
choice-of-law analyses that we have rejected could a district
court attempt to assay the ―varying strengths and weaknesses‖
of asserted state claims. (See Murray Br. at 15-18.) We can
find no support in our case law for differentiating within a
class based on the strength or weakness of the theories of
recovery. Accordingly, we decline to require such an
analysis.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that each putative class
member suffered the same alleged injury as a result of De
Beers‘s anticompetitive conduct, irrespective of the vagaries
of applicable state laws. Recognizing this, the plan of
allocation here ―adjust[s] diamond purchases to a common
measure,‖ allowing an ―apples to apples‖ comparison ―of the
relative amount of damages suffered by various claimants
within the classes and subclasses and permits distribution pro
rata based on the relative amounts of damages suffered.‖
(App‘x 1530.) Courts ―generally consider plans of allocation
that reimburse class members based on the type and extent of
their injuries to be reasonable,‖ In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and we are
mindful that ―district courts have broad supervisory powers
over the administration of class action settlements to allocate
the proceeds among the claiming class members equitably,‖
McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 448, 469 (D.N.J.
2008). The record here confirms that the District Court
carefully considered expert advice in accepting the plan of
allocation, and ―[t]his kind of decision is intensely fact-based,
falling within the purview of the District Court‘s decision.‖
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 254. In light of the foregoing analysis,
we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its
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discretion in accepting the carefully negotiated plan of
allocation.
Lastly, the objectors contend that the settlement‘s
minimum claim payment requirement of $10 provides
inadequate settlement relief, as it will eliminate the rights of
many class members without providing any compensation.
(Petrus/Giddings Br. at 12.) They urge that a minimum
payment provision contradicts the purpose of the class action
mechanism to provide recovery even where the amount is
―paltry.‖ (Id. at 16 (quoting Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 106
(3d Cir. 2004)).) We disagree and find no abuse in the
District Court‘s decision to approve the minimum claim
payment threshold.
As other courts have observed, ―de minimis thresholds
for payable claims are beneficial to the class as a whole since
they save the settlement fund from being depleted by the
administrative costs associated with claims unlikely to exceed
those costs and courts have frequently approved such
thresholds, often at $10.‖ In re Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd.,
No. CV-02-1510, 2007 WL 1191048, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2007); see, e.g., In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA
Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the
minimum recovery requirement is a common procedure that
addresses ―the undeniable fact that claims-processing costs
money, which comes out of the settlement fund‖); Mehling v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 248 F.R.D. 455, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(approving settlement plan with $50 minimum payment).
The District Court adopted the Special Master‘s considered
decision that ―administrative costs to make de minimis
payments are too large to justify the small payments,‖ and the
objectors have offered only conclusory counter-allegations.
(App‘x 1531). Indicative of the disingenuous nature of their

105

responses is the objectors‘ assertion that ―[i]n exchange for
their release, millions of class members [will] receive no
money.‖ (Quinn Br. at 63-64.) This argument fails to
acknowledge the injunctive relief offered by the settlement,
however, which is intended to benefit all class members
regardless of individual monetary recovery.60
Furthermore, the objectors appear to ignore a key
rationale underlying the class action mechanism. In addition
to providing individual class members with payments, ―‗[t]he
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism‘‖ is to
provide sufficient incentive to prosecute an action ―‗by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone‘s (usually an attorney‘s) labor,‘‖
Yang, 392 F.3d at 106 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617). In
this instance, the representative parties and their counsel were
properly incentivized to bring and prosecute this action
through settlement, resulting in a net benefit to the class. As
a result, based upon the evidence offered before the Special
60

The objectors‘ related argument that the de minimis
provision will deprive 57 million consumers of monetary
recovery even if they file a claim is equally weak.
(Giddings/Petrus Br. 9.) This contention unfairly presumes
that every single putative class member will timely submit
claims forms, rendering every member‘s pro rata recovery
below $10. By contrast, the evidence accepted by the Special
Master demonstrated that ―consumer claim filing rates rarely
exceed seven percent, even with the most extensive notice
campaigns.‖ (App‘x 1550 (citation & quotations omitted).)
In the absence of any credible evidence subjecting the
objectors‘ position, we cannot conclude that the District Court
abused its discretion in adopting the distribution plan.
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Master and the arguments alleged herein, we cannot conclude
that the District Court abused its discretion in approving this
element of the plan of allocation.
C. Objections to the Fee Award
The objectors likewise aver that the District Court
abused its discretion in awarding attorneys‘ fees that they
urge are excessive. (Quinn Br. at 65; Hicks Prelim. Op. Br. at
7; Petrus/Giddings Br. at 12.) They contend that class
counsel will receive in excess of $73 million – equal to
approximately 25% of the $293 million principal settlement
fund – despite this being a default judgment case, which
entailed minimal motions practice and discovery.
Additionally, considering the large number of putative class
members and the alleged lack of risk undertaken by class
counsel in prosecuting this case to settlement, the objectors
urge that the award is unjustified under our jurisprudence.
We disagree.
Our case law makes clear that a ―robust‖ and
―thorough judicial review of fee applications is required in all
class action settlements,‖ In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524,
537-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation & quotations omitted), but
that ―the amount of a fee award . . . is within the district
court‘s discretion so long as it employs correct standards and
procedures and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous,‖
In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.
2005) (citation & quotations omitted). See also Ursic v.
Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1983) (―[T]he
district court has discretion in determining the amount of a
fee award . . . in view of [its] superior understanding of the
litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate
review of what essentially are factual matters.‖) (quoting
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Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).
Attorneys‘ fees requests are generally assessed under
one of two methods: the percentage-of-recovery (―POR‖)
approach or the lodestar scheme. ―The former applies a
certain percentage to the settlement fund,‖ while ―[t]he latter
multiplies the number of hours class counsel worked on a
case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services.‖
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 540 (citation, quotations, &
alterations omitted). The POR method ―is generally favored
in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees
from the fund ‗in a manner that rewards counsel for success
and penalizes it for failure.‘‖ Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 300
(citation & quotations omitted). The lodestar method, which
is more commonly utilized in statutory fee-shifting cases and
―where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value
that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide
inadequate compensation,‖ Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 540-41, is
then used ―to cross-check the reasonableness of a percentageof-recovery fee award,‖ AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d at 164.61
Because the case at issue entailed a common fund, the District
Court applied the POR method and utilized a lodestar crosscheck. (App‘x 310.). The objectors do not dispute the
61

The lodestar crosscheck ―is performed by dividing the
proposed fee award by the lodestar calculation, resulting in a
lodestar multiplier.‖ AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d at 164. The
multiplier endeavors ―to account for the contingent nature or
risk involved in a particular case,‖ and may be adjusted ―to
account for particular circumstances, such as the quality of
representation, the benefit obtained for the class, [and] the
complexity and novelty of the issues presented.‖ Id. at 164
n.4 (citations & quotations omitted).
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propriety of this approach, and we find no fault with this
decision.
In determining the appropriate percentage fee award,
the District Court then devoted detailed consideration to each
of the ten factors that we identified in Gunter v. Ridgewood
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000),62 and Prudential,
148 F.3d 283,63 finding, inter alia, that the complexity and
duration of the litigation, the time and skill committed to the
62

The Gunter factors are as follows:
(1) the size of the fund created and the number
of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or
absence of substantial objections by members of
the class to the settlement terms and/or fees
requested by counsel; (3) the skill and
efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the
complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the
risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time
devoted to the case by plaintiffs‘ counsel; and
(7) the awards in similar cases.
223 F.3d at 195 n.1.
63

The Prudential factors are:
(8) the value of benefits attributable to the
efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of
other groups, such as government agencies
conducting investigations, (9) the percentage
fee that would have been negotiated had the
case been subject to a private contingent fee
arrangement at the time counsel was retained,
and (10) any innovative terms of settlement.
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at
338-40).
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litigation, the ever-present risk of nonpayment from De
Beers‘s tenuous status in the United States, the absence of
substantial objections, and the achievement of both monetary
and injunctive relief without any governmental investigation
or assistance all weighed in favor of approving the Special
Master‘s recommended 25% attorneys‘ fee award. (App‘x
311-21.) The objectors do not contend that the District Court
applied incorrect legal standards or procedures or that the
Court improperly ―brushed over our required analysis.‖ In re
Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir.
2001). Rather, they disagree with the Court‘s factual findings
as to two of the factors; they contend that we should find an
abuse of discretion because this case is ―‗neither legally nor
factually complex and did not require significant motion
practice or discovery‘ by class counsel.‖ (Quinn Br. at 65
(quoting Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 743).)
Because of the objectors‘ narrow focus before us and
the District Court‘s thorough analysis of each of the Gunter
and Prudential factors, we will only address the specific
objections raised herein. As an initial matter, the objectors
neglect to mention the primary reason for our finding of error
in Cendant PRIDES – the principal case advanced in support
of their position. There, we criticized the district court‘s
failure to ―explicitly consider any of [the Gunter] factors,‖
and its neglect to ―‗make its reasoning and application of the
fee-awards jurisprudence clear.‘‖ Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d
at 734-35 (quoting Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196). We engaged in
our own analysis of the propriety of the fee award only
because the district court failed to consider the fee award
factors that we had deemed ―essential to a proper exercise of
discretion.‖ Id. at 735; see also Ne. Women’s Ctr. v.
McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1989) (―[A]n
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appellate court, which relies on a cold record, is even more
poorly positioned to assess the nature and quality of the legal
services performed at the trial court level.‖). We have no
such concern here, as the District Court clearly set forth its
reasoning for the fee award. Indeed, the objectors never
explain exactly where in its lengthy analysis the District
Court misapplied the Gunter factors; the objectors simply
dislike the conclusion reached by the Court. See generally
McMonagle, 889 F.2d at 475 (―[T]he appellate court may not
upset a trial court‘s exercise of discretion on the basis of a
visceral disagreement with the lower court‘s decision.‖)
(citation & quotations omitted).
Moreover, the District Court‘s factual findings as to
the complexity and demands of this case further distinguish
the instant circumstances from Cendant PRIDES and do not
suggest an abuse of discretion. As we discussed in Rite Aid,
the Cendant PRIDES counsel ―only spent approximately
5,600 hours on the action,‖ ―Cendant had conceded liability
and no risks pertaining to liability or collection were
pertinent.‖ 396 F.3d at 304 (discussing Cendant PRIDES,
243 F.3d at 735). These factors are absent in this case.
Contrary to the objectors‘ contention, the Special Master and
District Court both observed that counsel devoted nearly
39,000 hours to litigating this matter in the various federal
and state courts and to the subsequent negotiations and
disputes pertaining to the settlement itself. The Court noted
that, apart from addressing complicated legal questions and
the secrecy surrounding the diamond industry, plaintiffs‘
counsel was forced to litigate against opposition from
intervenors and amicus curiae, engaged in protracted
settlement negotiations lasting approximately one year, and
ultimately confronted the difficult settlement, distribution,
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and injunctive issues addressed in this appeal. (App‘x 31718.) Given the complexity of the legal and factual issues
implicated and the difficult questions raised in the postsettlement process, we find no abuse of discretion in the
District Court‘s conclusion that the complexity and duration
of the litigation supported the requested fee.64
64

The objectors‘ further contention that the size of the
percentage fee award should decrease in light of the large size
of the overall settlement, (Quinn Br. at 66), is premised on
several of our opinions in which we stated that ―the
percentage of a recovery devoted to attorneys‘ fees should
decrease as the size of the overall settlement or recovery
increases.‖ Cendant, 264 F.3d at 284 n.55 (citations &
quotations omitted). We so ruled because ―in many instances
the increase in recovery is merely a factor of the size of the
class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel.‖
Id. In particular, we have vacated large fee awards ―‗when
much of the settlement apparently resulted from the work of
state regulators and a multi-state insurance task force.‘‖ Ride
Aid, 396 F.3d at 303 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 338342). But ―there is no rule that a district court must apply a
declining percentage reduction in every settlement involving
a sizable fund,‖ and we have approved large settlements
where ―class counsel‘s efforts played a significant role in
augmenting and obtaining an immense fund.‖ Id. Ultimately,
―the fact-intensive Prudential/Gunter analysis‖ must trump
all other considerations. Id.
Here, plaintiffs‘ counsel prosecuted this matter through
settlement with no certainty as to their ability to enforce any
judgment against De Beers. The District Court‘s factintensive Gunter analysis found that plaintiffs‘ counsel deftly
and efficiently handled this complex matter and played a
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Furthermore, unlike in Cendant PRIDES, the risk of
nonpayment here remained ever-present throughout the
litigation and settlement proceedings. The objectors dispute
that counsel faced such risk after agreeing to settle and the
depositing of the settlement amount into an escrow account.
It is unclear, however, whether an agreement to settle after
inception and prosecution of a matter should play a role in a
court‘s evaluation of the risk of nonpayment; indeed, our case
law has ―never addressed whether courts must reconsider the
risk of nonpayment as the action evolves.‖ Diet Drugs, 582
F.3d at 543. Although we previously approved a district
court‘s evaluation of risk ―as of ‗the inception of the action
and not through the rosy lens of hindsight,‘‖ we emphasized
that our endorsement took into consideration the district
court‘s ―more comprehensive‖ reevaluation of the risk over
the course of the proceedings. Id. (quoting In re Diet Drugs,
553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2008)). There, we did not
directly resolve whether a district court should reassess risk
throughout a litigation, but found the risk of nonpayment to
be ongoing, noting that while a settlement agreement and ―the
escrow funds undoubtedly reduced the risk of nonpayment,
those funds were but one part of an intricate agreement‖ and
the efforts of counsel could still ―have been for naught.‖ Id.
Here, we are similarly satisfied that counsel faced a
legitimate risk of nonpayment throughout the litigation. The
District Court found that De Beers possessed few assets in the
United States against which a judgment could be enforced
significant role in the outcome. Accordingly, we disagree
that the size of the overall settlement bears no relationship to
the efforts of counsel and will defer to the District Court‘s
considered judgment.
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and effectively dodged jurisdiction in the United States for
over fifty years, evidencing a cognizable risk of nonpayment
at the inception stage. (App‘x 319.) Although the District
Court‘s order did not address the prospects for nonpayment
post-settlement, it is evident that De Beers never conceded
liability or admitted any wrongdoing, and that the escrow
funds ―were but one part of an intricate agreement‖ that – as
demonstrated by the Panel‘s original decision to reject
settlement class certification – continued to pose a genuine
risk of nonpayment to counsel. As such, the objectors‘ ―view
of the risk of nonpayment is more myopic than the Court‘s,‖
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 543, and we are not persuaded that
the District Court abused its discretion in finding this factor to
favor the requested fee.
Finally, the objectors‘ assertion that the award
improperly exceeds the awards in similar cases is equally
unavailing. In Cendant PRIDES, we discussed fee awards in
class actions in which the settlement fund exceeded $100
million and which relied upon the POR method, finding that
―the attorneys‘ fee awards ranged from 2.8% to 36% of the
total settlement fund.‖ 243 F.3d at 737. Similarly, in Rite
Aid, we found no abuse of discretion in a district court‘s
reliance on three studies that demonstrated an average
percentage fee recovery in large class action settlements of
31%, 27-30%, and 25-30%. 396 F.3d at 303. Here, the
District Court determined that the 25% fee requested by
counsel fell within this range. (App‘x 320.)
We are cognizant that a comparison of this award to
fees ordered in other cases is a complex analytical task, in
light of variations in the efforts exerted by attorneys and the
presence of complex legal and factual issues. That said, we
have emphasized ―that a district court may not rely on a
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formulaic application of the appropriate range in awarding
fees but must consider the relevant circumstances of the
particular case.‖ Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 736.
Although this case may have lacked some of the contested
motion practice and extensive discovery elicited in some of
the other cases receiving similar percentage awards, see id. at
740-41, the case presented other challenges, including ―De
Beers‘[s] denial of jurisdiction [and liability], the secrecy of
the diamond industry, and unavailability of ordinary
discovery methods, the substantial risk of non-collection of a
U.S. judgment in foreign countries and the historic injunction
obtained.‖ (February 15, 2008 Report and Recommendation
of Special Master on Incentive Awards, Cost Reimbursement
& Attorneys‘ Fee Awards at 31.) The District Court here
properly considered the relevant Gunter and Prudential
factors, and determined that the case presented all of the
factors we had recognized as supporting a higher award:
―complex and/or novel legal issues, extensive discovery,
acrimonious litigation, and tens of thousands of hours spent
on the case by class counsel.‖ (App‘x 320 (quoting Cendant
PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 741).)
Because the District Court employed the ―correct
standards and procedures‖ and its findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous, we do not find an abuse of discretion in its
calculation of the attorneys‘ fee award. Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at
299.65
65

We also reject the sole objection pertaining to the District
Court‘s decision to grant incentive awards to class
representatives. ―Incentive awards are not uncommon in
class action litigation and particularly where . . . a common
fund has been created for the benefit of the entire class.‖
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court‘s Order.

Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 400 (internal quotations omitted).
―The purpose of these payments is to compensate named
plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they
incurred during the course of class action litigation,‖ and to
―reward the public service of contributing to the enforcement
of mandatory laws.‖ Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No.
09-905, 2011 WL 1344745, at *22 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2011)
(citations & quotations omitted). Contrary to the objectors‘
contention, the District Court – relying upon the Special
Master‘s more detailed findings – discussed the role played
by the several class representatives and the risks taken by
these parties in prosecuting this matter. (App‘x 326-27; R&R
on Awards at 42-46.) We find no error in the District Court‘s
decision.
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Sullivan v. DB Investments, et al.,
Nos. 08-2784/2785/2798/2799/2818/2819/2831/2881
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I fully concur in the Court’s opinion. I write
separately to address this case in the wider context of the
evolving law on settlement classes.
Ever since the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in
Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), one of the
most vexing questions in modern class action practice has
been the proper treatment of settlement classes, especially in
cases national in scope that may also implicate state law.
Grounded in equitable concepts of structural and procedural
fairness for absent plaintiffs—competent and conflict-free
representation, fair allocation of settlement, absence of
collusion—Amchem and Ortiz set down important standards
and guidelines for settlement classes.1

1

The class action device has a venerable pedigree in equity
practice. As early as the seventeenth century, English
chancery courts employed bills of peace to facilitate
representative suits analogous to “common question” suits
under Rule 23(b)(3). Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An
Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1861-65 (1998). Inchoate class actions
continued in the American legal system until codified under
Rule 23 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Id. at

1

Despite initial uncertainty the opinions might pose
formidable obstacles for settling massive, complex cases, this
has not, for the most part, proved to be the case. Nonetheless,
class settlement in mass tort cases (especially personal injury
claims) remains problematic, leading some practitioners to
avoid the class action device—most prominently in the recent
$4.85 billion mass settlement of 50,000 claims arising out of
use of the drug Vioxx. In fact, some observers believe there
has been a shift in mass personal injury claims to aggregate
non-class settlements.
“The Zyprexa and Ephedra
settlements, as well as the more recent Guidant and Vioxx
settlements, suggest that the MDL process has supplemented
and perhaps displaced the class action device as a procedural
mechanism for large settlements.” Thomas E. Willging &
Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz,
58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 775, 801 (2010); see also Thomas E.
Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It
Make?, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 591, 636 tbl. 12 (2006)
(presenting evidence that, in sample, 41% of cases denied
1878-1942. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 substantially
modified earlier practice and ushered in a class action
“revolution” by introducing most of the current aspects of
class action litigation, particularly the broad provisions of
23(b)(3) and the concomitant procedural safeguards requiring
predominance and notice. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1484-89 (2008).

2

class certification ended in non-class settlement). This is
significant, for outside the federal rules governing class
actions,2 there is no prescribed independent review of the
structural and substantive fairness of a settlement including
evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest,
and counsel’s allocation of settlement funds among class
members.3
Because of the pivotal role and ensuing consequences
of the class certification decision, trial courts must conduct a
“rigorous analysis” of Rule 23’s prerequisites. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S.---, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52
(2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d
305, 315-21 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs.
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 31-42 (2d Cir. 2006).4 The same
2

Bankruptcy may also provide a vehicle for some measure of
compensation to mass claimants (creditors) and for resolution
of liability.
3
Nevertheless, some MDL transferee judges have treated the
MDL proceedings as quasi class actions and restricted
contingent fee agreements in non-class aggregate settlements
under their equitable and supervisory powers. See In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558-62 (E.D. La.
2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL
682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
4
For a litigation class, the key decision is whether or not to
certify the class. Once a class is certified, the dynamics of the
case change dramatically. For many plaintiffs, denial of

3

analytical rigor is required for litigation and settlement
certification, but some inquiries essential to litigation class
certification are no longer problematic in the settlement
context. A key question in a litigation class action is
manageability—how the case will or can be tried, and
whether there are questions of fact or law that are capable of
common proof. But the settlement class presents no
management problems because the case will not be tried.
Conversely, other inquiries assume heightened importance
and heightened scrutiny because of the danger of conflicts of
interest, collusion, and unfair allocation. See Amchem, 521
U.S. at 620 (“[O]ther specifications of the Rule [23]—those
designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or
overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”).
In conducting a “rigorous analysis” under Rule 23,
lower courts have applied the strictures laid down in Amchem
and Ortiz, and added some of their own. So far, the
developing jurisprudence appears to have justified the
judgment of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and Advisory Committee on Civil
certification may sound the death knell of the action because
the claims are too small to be prosecuted individually. For
many defendants, class certification may create hydraulic
pressure to settle, even for claims defendants deem nonmeritorious. For these reasons, the Supreme Court adopted
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) to permit a
discretionary interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of
class certification.

4

Rules to defer consideration of a variant rule for settlement
class actions.
Rule 23(a) sensibly provides that every certified class
must share common questions of law or fact. For (b)(3)
classes, common questions must predominate over individual
questions, claims must be typical, and the class action device
must be superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Naturally, there is
some overlap in the requirements for commonality, typicality,
and predominance—all of which must be shown.
Commonality for a settlement class should be satisfied
under the standard for supplemental jurisdiction first set forth
in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966), allowing joinder of claims deriving from a
common nucleus of operative fact. See also Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., --- U.S. ---, 130
S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“A
class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a
species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims
of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”).
Variation in state law should not necessarily bar class
certification. The focus in the settlement context should be
on the conduct (or misconduct) of the defendant and the
injury suffered as a consequence. The claim or claims must
be related and cohesive and should all arise out of the same
nucleus of operative fact.
The “common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
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validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 131
S.Ct. at 2551. The interests of the class members should be
aligned.
The nature of the predominance analysis reflects the
purpose of the inquiry, which is to determine whether “a class
action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,
and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results.” Amchem, 521 U.S.
at 615 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note).
This is important even though, in the settlement context, a
court need not worry about the challenge of litigating the
claims to a verdict in a single proceeding. If the class
presented a grab-bag of unrelated claims, a trial court would
be unable to ensure that absent class members’ interests were
protected. The question, then, is what kind of common issues
a settlement class must share to satisfy commonality and
predominance.
In certain areas, such as antitrust, common issues tend
to predominate because a major focus is the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and its downstream
effects on plaintiffs. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,
579 F.3d 241, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).
Commonality and
predominance are usually met in the antitrust settlement
context when all class members’ claims present common
issues including (1) whether the defendant’s conduct was
actionably anticompetitive under antitrust standards; and (2)
whether that conduct produced anticompetitive effects within
the relevant product and geographic markets. See id. at 267.

6

Even when a settlement class satisfies the
predominance requirement, the inclusion of members who
have a questionable chance of a favorable adjudication may
present fairness concerns that demand the district court’s
attention. Trial courts must enforce the Rule 23(a) and (b)
requirements in order to obtain a “structural assurance of fair
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and
individuals affected.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627. In
discharging this responsibility, district courts have a number
of ways to address fairness concerns.5 Due to the context5

Trial courts can certify subclasses in situations where
divergent interests implicate fair allocation—a situation not
presented here, as all indirect class members have aligned
interests. Certifying subclasses may be proper “[w]here a
class is found to include subclasses divergent in interest.” In
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig, 579 F.3d at 271 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee note). Even the
conflicts in Amchem were amenable to resolution through
sub-classes. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (explaining that
Amchem requires “a class divided between holders of present
and future claims” to be “divi[ded] into homogeneous
subclasses . . . with separate representation to eliminate
conflicting interests of counsel”). Objector Quinn, in her
answer to the petition for rehearing, states that subclasses
would adequately address the Illinois Brick-based disparities
in this case; she does not argue that it would be categorically
improper to afford class treatment to indirect purchasers
governed by Illinois Brick. See Quinn Answer at 11. The
District Court here examined whether indirect purchasers’

7

specific nature of these judgments, district courts should be
afforded a broad ambit of discretion.
For viable settlement classes, Amchem and Ortiz made
clear that expediency could not negate the requirements of
Rule 23, which serve to protect absent class members. See
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (“Subdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule
23] focus court attention on whether a proposed class has
sufficient unity so that absent members can be fairly bound
by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern
persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.”). The
principal danger of collusion lies in the prospect that class
counsel, induced by defendants’ offer of attorneys’ fees, will
“trade away” the claims of some or all class members for
inadequate compensation. There is also the possibility that a
settlement will not serve the interests of all of the class
members, which may be in tension. In Amchem, for instance,
the Court concluded the settlement was not demonstrably
fair—there was insufficient allocation to asbestos claimants
who were seriously injured (e.g. mesothelioma) and
insufficient protection of non-impaired plaintiffs. 521 U.S. at
625-28. The Court worried that the claims of the exposureonly class members were being released without adequate
protection. Id.; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“Prudential”) (identifying and distinguishing Amchem’s
interests diverged depending on the law applied to their
claims, and found such differences to be irrelevant in the
context of this settlement. I find no abuse of discretion in
such a conclusion.
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concerns); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-86 (3d Cir. 1995)
(providing summary of the debate regarding propriety of
mass tort settlements prior to Amchem).
These observations elucidate the issues of
predominance and fairness present in this case. Here, the
objectors contend certain claims (claims under state-law
following Illinois Brick) are not viable--that is, they fail to
state a cause of action.6 For this reason, objectors believe that
defendants are barred from settling these claims in a
settlement class action because of the predominance
requirement. Under objectors’ view of Rule 23, trial courts
would be obligated at the settlement class certification stage
to decide which state’s law would govern for that particular
plaintiff, and whether a plaintiff has stated a valid cause of
action, even if no defendant has raised a Rule 12(b)(6)
objection—the usual way to contest the validity of a claim.
Objectors contend they seek to protect absent class members,
but fail to explain how absent class members—all of whom
claim injury—are harmed by the defendants’ willingness to
settle all potential claims.
This interpretation also presents significant
administrative problems.
Objectors view the indirect
purchaser class as composed of members who either have
valid claims under the laws of states with Illinois Brick
6

Objectors also claim that variance on state claims (based on
consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws) defeats
predominance as well.
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repealers or members who have invalid claims under the laws
of non-repealer states. But a claim cannot be declared invalid
without proper analysis, which would require a choice-of-law
examination for each class member’s claim. Such analyses
may pose difficulties in cases where the residence of the class
member is not the sole consideration; modern choice-of-law
standards often consider an array of factors particular to
individual plaintiffs.
Consequently, individual 12(b)(6)
inquiries for settlement class certification could present
serious difficulties in administration and greatly increase
costs and fees, and may deplete rather than increase the
recovery of even successful plaintiffs.7
7

The purported “overbreadth” of the putative class at issue
here is qualitatively different from the Supreme Court’s
concerns in Amchem. Under Amchem the significance of
variations in state laws is properly assessed in terms of the
interests of absent class members. The proposed Amchem
settlement, extinguishing claims for different injuries with
different onsets incurred at different times due to conduct of
different defendants, undercompensated exposure-only claims
and those with mesothelioma. Here, objectors contend some
class members do not have a valid cause of action, but these
class members with non-repealer state law claims have lost
nothing through inclusion in the class. Objectors speculate
inclusion of non-repealer state law claims necessarily
diminishes the settlement accrued to class members whom
they contend have undisputedly valid claims. But they
provided no support for their assertion. In Amchem the
objectors provided evidence of intraclass conflicts detrimental

10

Issues of predominance and fairness do not undermine
this settlement. All plaintiffs here claim injury that by reason
of defendants’ conduct—market manipulation and fraud—has
caused a common and measurable form of economic damage.
They seek redress under federal antitrust laws and state
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws.
All claims arise out of the same course of defendants’
conduct; all share a common nucleus of operative fact,
supplying the necessary cohesion. Class members’ interests
to class members. For example, 15% of the proposed
Amchem settlement’s mesothelioma claims arose in
California, where the average recovery for a mesothelioma
claim was more than double their maximum recovery in the
settlement. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 n.14.
The objectors have not shown that plaintiffs suffering
identical economic injuries due to a single course of conduct
on the part of the defendant have conflicting interests solely
because some class members may have stronger claims
depending upon variation in state law. Objectors assume that
the non-repealer state claims have zero settlement value and
that defendants would contribute the same amount to the
common settlement fund regardless of how many claims the
settlement may extinguish. But the settlement of the
considerable bulk of claims against the defendants for a prior
course of conduct may be of substantially greater value to
defendants than a settlement of only the strongest claims
against them. And, unlike in Amchem, objectors have not
shown the inclusion of more claims was achieved by grossly
underpaying some class members.
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are aligned. The entire DeBeers settlement class consists of
members with some pleaded claim (but not necessarily the
exact same one) arising out of the same course of allegedly
wrongful conduct such that shared issues of fact or law
outweigh issues not common to the class and individual
issues do not predominate. As the class structure and
settlement assure fairness to all class members, there appears
to be nothing in Rule 23 that would prohibit certification and
settlement approval.
Moreover, the focus on the alleged insufficiency of
some members’ claims is misplaced. Settlement of a class
action is not an adjudication of the merits of the members’
claims. It is a contract between the parties governed by the
requirements of Rule 23(a), (b), and particularly (e),8 and
8

Rule 23(e) is especially relevant in this context because it
governs the settlement, dismissal, or compromise of a class
action. It requires court approval of any agreement, and
establishes five procedural requirements that must be
satisfied:
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable
manner to all class members who would be
bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a
statement identifying any agreement made in
connection with the proposal.
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establishes a contractual obligation as well as a contractual
defense against future claims. Here, class members and
DeBeers want to settle all state and federal claims arising out
of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Amchem recognized the
legitimacy of such a settlement under Rule 23, setting forth
applicable parameters. The court’s responsibility is to
supervise and assume control over a responsible and fair
settlement. Those requirements have been met here.
A responsible and fair settlement serves the interests
of both plaintiffs and defendants and furthers the aims of the
class action device. Plaintiffs receive redress of their claimed
injuries without the burden of litigating individually.
Defendants receive finality. Having released their claims for
consideration, class members are precluded from continuing
to press their claims. Collateral attack of settlements and
parallel proceedings in multiple fora are common realities in
modern class actions—features that can imperil the feasibility
of settlements if defendants lack an effective way to protect
(4) If the class action was previously certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to
approve a settlement unless it affords a new
opportunity to request exclusion to individual
class members who had an earlier opportunity
to request exclusion but did not do so.
(5) Any class member may object to the
proposal if it requires court approval under this
subdivision (e); the objection may be
withdrawn only with the court's approval.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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bargained-for rights. See Prudential, 314 F.3d at 104-05. If
the indirect-purchaser claims at issue here were excluded,
nothing would bar the plaintiffs from bringing them as
separate class actions or as aggregate individual actions,
leaving defendants “exposed to countless suits in state court”
despite the settlement. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 367 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Prudential
II”). (Here, prior to removal and MDL consolidation, it
appears an Illinois state court certified a nationwide litigation
class asserting indirect-purchaser claims under the laws of all
50 states.) Perhaps a defendant will be willing and able to
defend or settle all of these actions separately, or perhaps it
won’t. Either way, the costs (direct and indirect) and risks of
continuing litigation will be greater. A defendant, therefore,
may be motivated to pay class members a premium and
achieve a global settlement in order to avoid additional
lawsuits, even ones where it might be able to file a
straightforward motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.9
Finally, new limitations such as those proposed by
objectors would, I believe, undercut the policy goals of the
9

Facing liability for alleged misconduct, a defendant may
desire global settlement for several possible reasons: (1)
redressing plaintiffs’ injuries; (2) the possibility of liability;
(3) the direct costs of defending suits, often in multiple fora;
(4) the risk of financially unmanageable jury verdicts which
may threaten bankruptcy; (5) the effects of pending or
impending mass litigation on its stock price or access to
capital markets; (6) the stigma of brand-damaging litigation;
and (7) maintaining financial stability.
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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4, and the Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1407, both of which are designed to encourage the
consolidation of mass claims national in scope—and in the
case of CAFA, with particular reference to class actions based
on state law claims. Of course, district courts must fully
enforce the requirements of Rule 23. But the limitations
objectors propose here “would seriously undermine the
possibility for settling any large, multi district class action.”
Prudential II, 261 F.3d at 367.10
10

In Prudential II, we affirmed the grant of an injunction
enjoining a state-court action brought by policyholders who
were members of the Prudential class to the extent the statelaw claims were based on or related to claims released in the
class action. We agreed with the district court that allowing
the policyholders to prosecute their civil actions in state court
“would allow an end run around the Class settlement by
affording them (and other class members who might later
attempt the same strategy) an opportunity for relitigation of
the released claims.” 261 F.3d at 367 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We noted that the position urged by the
policyholders “would seriously undermine the possibility for
settling any large, multi district class action. Defendants in
such suits would always be concerned that a settlement of the
federal class action would leave them exposed to countless
suits in state court despite settlement of the federal claims. . . .
[S]uch state suits could number in the millions.” Id. It is for
this reason that releases of all claims—whether state or
federal—have been held valid, “provided they are based on
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The class action device and the concept of the private
attorney general are powerful instruments of social and
economic policy. Despite inherent tensions, they have proven
efficacious in resolving mass claims when courts have
insisted on structural, procedural, and substantive fairness.
Among the goals are redress of injuries, procedural due
process, efficiency, horizontal equity among injured
claimants, and finality. Arguably a legal system that permits
robust litigation of mass claims should also provide ways to
fairly and effectively resolve those claims. Otherwise, mass
claims will likely be resolved without independent review and
court supervision.11
the same factual predicate.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 326 n.82.
So long as a sufficient factual predicate exists, a release can
even bar later claims which could not have been brought in
the court rendering the settlement judgment. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 377 (1996).
11
The final draft of the American Law Institute’s Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation points out the current lack
of judicial oversight over non-class aggregate settlement. §
3.15 cmt. a (2010). It notes that, unlike class settlements,
“[n]on-class aggregate settlements are governed primarily by
ethical rules and are rarely subject to court review or approval
for fairness” and so advocates “a fresh look . . . at how nonclass aggregate settlements should be regulated.” Id. In
particular, it proposes a rule to provide each plaintiff a
nonwaivable right to challenge in court a settlement that is
allegedly “not procedurally and substantively fair and
reasonable.” § 3.18(a). The ALI Principles analogizes these
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proposed requirements to those applied to class settlements.
§ 3.17 cmt. e.
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Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., (Nos. 08-2784/2785/2798/
2799/2818/2819/2831/2881)
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting
This is the Majority’s considered view of the law: in
certifying a class action, it makes no difference whether the
class is defined to include members who lack any claim at all.
As my colleagues in the Majority see it, “were we to mandate
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we
would effectively rule out the ability of a defendant to
achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those
who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.” (Slip
Op. at 66.) So, “come one, come all,” regardless of
substantive legal rights. That remarkable declaration sets the
class action ship in our Circuit badly adrift.
To be clear, the problem with the enormous,
nationwide class most particularly at issue in this case is not
that it may include people with marginal or dubious claims.
The class of indirect purchasers of De Beers diamonds
actually presents a far more troubling problem than that. It
includes people who have no legal claim whatsoever. That is
clear on the face of the statutory and decisional law of several
states whose laws are invoked as the basis for this class
action, 1 and no one has been able to mount a cogent argument
1

More precisely, we are dealing here with a set of
class actions, since the settlement involves the resolution of
several cases, as the Majority opinion notes. For ease of
reference, however, I will often refer to these matters in the
singular.

1

to the contrary. Despite the Majority’s elaborate construction
and dismantling of straw man arguments about commonality
and predominance, those state laws ought to stand as an
insurmountable barrier to any proper certification of a
nationwide indirect purchaser class. By treating the dictates
of state law as irrelevant, to be passed over in the name of
“global peace,” the Majority has endorsed the fabrication of
substantive rights where none before existed. This is, in
short, a bad day for Rule 23, for federalism, and for those
who thought the Rules Enabling Act was a restraint on
judicial legislating. I therefore dissent.
I.

Where We Agree

The Majority devotes much attention to the question of
whether “commonality and predominance are defeated
merely because available rights and remedies differ under the
several laws that form the basis for the class claims.” (Slip
Op. at 45-46.) In addressing that question, the Majority
inaccurately characterizes the now-vacated panel opinion as
having required “that everyone in a class must allege
precisely identical or ‘uniform’ causes of action.” 2 (Slip Op.
2

The Majority is oddly persistent in this confusion.
Despite the clear language in the panel opinion and repeated
assurance in this dissent that class members need not all share
a “uniform cause of action” to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23, the Majority continues to say by implication and
assertion that the panel opinion suggested that all members of
the class must assert a “uniform” cause of action or “identical
… issues or claims.” See Slip Op. at 46 (“We have never
required the presentation of identical or uniform issues or
claims as a prerequisite to certification of a class.”); id. at 48

2

at 48 (citing Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 613 F.3d 134,
149 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted and vacated by
Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 619 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.
2010)). But the panel opinion made no such statement, nor
have the objectors claimed that all class members must share
a “uniform cause of action.” The only “uniformity” required
by the panel opinion, or argued for by the objectors, is that at
least some “question of law or fact regarding [class
members’] legal rights [be] uniform throughout the class.”
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149. Insisting that there be a uniform
question of law or fact is nothing more than an application of
the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement that there be “questions of law
or fact common to the class.” The Majority’s assertion that
the panel demanded there be uniform causes of action – a
requirement far different than requiring uniform questions –
is unfounded and should not detain us any longer.
On this much we can agree: that, as the Majority says,
“where a defendant’s singular conduct gives rise to one cause
of action in one state, while providing for a different cause of
action in another jurisdiction, the courts may group both
claims in a single class action.” (Slip Op. at 48.) If that were
(“Nothing in our case law or the language of Rule 23
commands that everyone in a class must allege precisely
identical or ‘uniform’ causes of action … and statutory
variations do not defeat predominance in the presence of
other exceedingly common issues.” (internal citations
omitted)); id. at 60 n.36 (“The Panel … seemingly
conclude[ed] that plaintiffs could only prevail if each putative
class member alleged either a ‘uniform’ antitrust cause of
action, a ‘uniform’ consumer protection cause of action, or a
‘uniform’ unjust enrichment claim.”).
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the case before us, we would have unanimity. The problem,
though, is that the defendants’ singular conduct here gives
rise to causes of action in some states while providing for no
cause of action at all in others. Under these circumstances,
there can be no grouping of claims into a single class action,
because, by definition, some would-be class members have
no claim. As a result, and as discussed in the following
section, there can be no common questions of law or fact with
respect to that subset of would-be class members and,
therefore, neither the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a)(2) nor the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
can be satisfied.
II.

Commonality And Predominance Under Rule 23

The objectors 3 have challenged the commonality of the
indirect purchaser class, stating that “putative class members
who do not even have an arguable cause of action under
applicable law do not qualify for inclusion in a class action
for failure to satisfy [the] Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of
‘questions of law or fact common to the class.’”
(Supplemental Brief of Appellant Susan M. Quinn on
Rehearing En Banc at 11-12 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(2).) While they initially couched their arguments about
commonality in terms of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3),
the objectors’ position has always been that common
questions of law or fact do not predominate because there
simply are no questions of law or fact common to the entire
3

Both before the panel and the en banc court, objector
Susan M. Quinn has taken the lead on the issues of
commonality and predominance, and my references to the
arguments of the objectors come from her briefs.
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class of indirect purchasers. (See, e.g., Brief for Appellant
Susan M. Quinn at 32 (“The evidence supporting a lack of
commonality is abundant.”); id. at 38 (“[T]he question of
antitrust conspiracy is not common to the class.”); id. at 44
(“The district court did not even determine that there was a
common question involving unjust enrichment.”); id. at 45
(“The district court did not find a common question regarding
[the consumer protection/deceptive trade practice] claims.”).)
The panel opinion thus addressed the objectors’ arguments in
that light, holding that there was no predominance because
there were no questions of law or fact common to the entire
class. Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 148 (“[T]here can be no
certification of a nationwide class of state indirect purchaser
plaintiffs because there is no common question of law or
material fact.”).
Ultimately, though, whether the objectors’ argument is
framed as a Rule 23(a)(2) commonality challenge or a Rule
23(b)(3) predominance challenge is immaterial. 4 As noted by
4

Although the parties do not particularly press the
issue in their briefs, an argument can be made that the
proposed class might also fail to meet the requirements of
Rule 23(a)(4), which provides that a court may certify a class
only if “the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
By proposing a class that consists of individuals who have no
cause of action under state or federal law, the class
representatives have diluted the recovery for those who
actually have claims. Moreover, the class representatives also
unnecessarily incur the cost of giving notice under Rule 23 to
individuals who have no right to relief, as well as the cost of
compensating class counsel for undertaking unnecessary tasks
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the Majority, we have said before that “‘we consider the Rule
23(a) commonality requirement to be incorporated into the
more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and
therefore deem it appropriate to analyze the two factors
together.’” (Slip Op. at 37 (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009)).)
Whatever label we hang on the objectors’ argument, it always
has been clear that their basic contention is that there are no
questions of law or fact common to all class members, which
necessarily means that common questions do not
predominate. Whether coined as a Rule 23(a)(2) problem or
as a Rule 23(b)(3) problem, the determinative question of
commonality is the same.
The Majority spends little time explaining what makes
questions “common,” but the principle they seem to espouse
associated with such notice. Cf. In the Matter of Aqua Dots
Prods. Liability Litig., No. 10-3847, 2011 WL 3629723, at *3
(7th Cir. 2011) (“A representative who proposes that high
transaction costs (notice and attorneys’ fees) be incurred at
the class members’ expense to obtain a refund that is already
on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’
interests.” (citing Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627
F.3d 289, 293-94 (7th Cir. 2010))). Those costs reduce the
total amount of recovery available to the appropriate
members of the proposed class (i.e., individuals who may
assert an antitrust claim under federal or state law). In other
words, a class representative who unnecessarily increases the
cost of litigating a class action by including improper
plaintiffs in the class definition is at risk of being found to not
“adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4).
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is that questions are common when the “defendant’s conduct
was common as to all of the class members” and when “all of
the class members were harmed by the defendant’s conduct.”
(Slip Op. at 38.) Based on that, the Majority asserts that, as to
the indirect purchaser class, “each class member shares a
similar legal question arising from whether De Beers engaged
in a broad conspiracy that was aimed to and did affect
diamond prices in the United States” (Slip Op. at 43 (internal
quotation marks omitted)) and shares “common factual
questions as to whether De Beers ‘acted in concert to
artificially fix, maintain, and stabilize prices and to
monopolize trade and commerce in the market for polished
diamonds.’” (Slip Op. at 43 (quoting App. 278-79).) Those
questions are common to the class, according to the Majority,
because the “allegations are unaffected by the particularized
conduct of individual class members, as proof of liability and
liability itself would depend entirely upon De Beers’s
allegedly anticompetitive activities.” (Slip Op. at 43.)
In seeking to justify its “welcome all comers”
approach to class certification, the Majority has produced an
internally inconsistent definition of commonality. On the one
hand, as just noted, the Majority emphasizes that “proof of
liability and liability itself would depend entirely upon De
Beers’s allegedly anticompetitive activities” (Slip Op. at 43),
as if no reference need be made to the status of individual
class members. Indeed, if one examines what the Majority
identifies as “common factual questions” and “similar legal
question[s,]” it is apparent that no reference to anyone but De
Beers is called for, which means that the class is entirely
unbounded. Everyone in the world could share in a class
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defined on those lines. 5 On the other hand, evidently
recognizing the problem with a commonality definition that
looks only at De Beers’s activities, the Majority adds as
something of an afterthought that, well yes, there must be
some limiting feature of the class and that feature is injury;
class members must have been injured by De Beers’s
unlawful conduct. (Slip Op. at 38.)
Of course, as soon as one acknowledges that
commonality requires a consideration of whether class
members have sustained injury, one ought also have to
acknowledge, by logic grounded in hornbook law, that
“injury” is not an abstraction but rather refers to a concrete
and legally cognizable injury. A definition of commonality
that says, in effect, “if you feel wronged, you have a claim” is
a giant step away from precedent and the underlying premise
of Rule 23, which is designed to efficiently handle claims
recognized by law, not to create new claims. Cf. Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1442 (2010) (“Congress authorized ... promulgat[ion]
[of] rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a), but with the limitation that those rules ‘shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’
§ 2072(b).”). Never before has any court, to my knowledge,
tried to take the position effectively adopted by the Majority
here, namely that, in deciding commonality, one need not be
5

If one were actually to accept a test that looked solely
at the behavior of the alleged wrongdoer, it would make no
difference who was in the class. Thus, in this case, it would
be appropriate to certify a class consisting of everyone on
earth, regardless of diamond purchases, since the supposedly
common questions would stay the same.
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concerned with whether the alleged injuries of class members
are legally cognizable. 6
In stark contrast to the Majority’s practically limitless
definition of commonality is the measured definition provided
by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The Court
there clarified the meaning of “commonality” under Rule 23,
saying that the concept is “easy to misread.” Id. at 2551. In a
passage particularly apropos of the Majority’s new rule, the
Supreme Court said:
[A]ny competently crafted class complaint
literally raises common ‘questions,’
For
example: Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for
Wal-Mart? Do our managers have discretion
over pay? Is that an unlawful employment
practice?
What remedies should we get?

6

While trying to distance itself from the consequences
of its own ruling today, the Majority asserts that the “[indirect
purchaser] class members … possess a legally cognizable
injury acknowledged in hornbook law, as their injuries are
real, and stem not from simply feeling ‘wronged,’ as the
dissent suggests …, but from De Beers’s alleged anticompetitive conduct, conduct which antitrust laws forbid.”
(Slip Op. at 44-45.) If only my colleagues in the Majority
actually applied that assertion, this dissent would be
unnecessary, since the assertion concedes that (1) recovery
should be preconditioned on the existence of an injury that is
legally cognizable, and (2) whether an injury is legally
cognizable depends on the operative substantive law.

9

Reciting those questions is not sufficient to
obtain class certification.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Emphasizing a point that the Majority ignores, the Court
explained that “‘[w]hat matters to class certification … is not
the raising of common ‘questions’ – even in droves – but,
rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’” Id.
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age
of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). In
other words, common questions must have answers that “will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
the claims in one stroke.” Id. Thus, as defined by Dukes,
“common questions” are those that, because they have
answers that will affect the validity of all class members’
claims, can be said to be legally relevant. 7
A necessary corollary of that definition is that, for
there to be any common questions, all class members must
have at least some colorable legal claim. 8 Otherwise, it is

7

Similarly, if predominance means anything, it must
mean that the resolution of something will actually affect
somehow the claims of all class members. The claims might
vary among the class members, but, at a minimum, some
legal right to recover has to be held by everyone in the class.
8

A colorable claim is one that at least “appear[s] to be
true, valid, or right.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 301(9th ed.
2009). Requiring a district court to consider whether a claim
appears to be valid before certifying class, when the court is
expressly apprised of good reasons to doubt the same, does
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nonsense to speak of “resolv[ing] an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims ….” Id. It cannot be
sufficient, as the Concurring Opinion in this case suggests,
simply for each class member to have “some pleaded claim.”
(Concurrence Slip Op. at 12.) Merely pleading a claim is not
enough, because “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading
standard. A party seeking class certification must … prove
that there are in fact … common questions of law or fact. …
[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig.,
552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he requirements set out
in Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules. The court may delve
beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements
for class certification are satisfied.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). As the panel opinion explained it, “to
obtain certification of an indirect purchaser class, plaintiffs
would have to show that all class members share a right to
recover for antitrust harms, such that one or more common
issues affect all members’ claims.” 9 Sullivan, 613 F.3d at
154.
not transform the Rule 23 inquiry into one under Rule
12(b)(6), as I discuss infra.
9

To the extent that the quoted statement, read in
isolation, might suggest a rule that all class members had to
share an antitrust claim, the context of the statement – coming
after a discussion of other types of statutory or common law
claims that might give rise to common questions – makes it
clear that the panel was requiring only that all class members’
right to recover arise from the same harm or injury –
something unambiguously required under Supreme Court
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Dukes’s instruction that, for questions to be “common”
in the sense contemplated by Rule 23, their answers must
affect the validity of claims, does not set forth a new
principle. 10 In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the
precedent.
See, e.g., Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 1551
(“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
class members have suffered the same injury.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
10

The following passage in the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
articulates this basic principle:
The legal and factual issues involved in any
individual civil claim are a function of
applicable substantive law. … Factual issues
concern disputes about whether the evidence at
trial demonstrates, under the applicable standard
of proof, the existence of a given element. … A
factual issue may rise to the level of a common
issue if … a common body of evidence to be
presented on behalf of multiple claimants at
trial is capable of proving the existence of a
material fact as to all such claimants.
ALI,
Principles
of
Law:
Aggregate
Litigation
§ 2.01(b)(2010). Thus, the treatise supports the proposition
that in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality
requirement, there must be some “material” issue.
Materiality is a “function of applicable substantive law.” See
id.; In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290
(3d Cir. 2011) (“A material fact is ‘[a] fact[] that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))).

12

Supreme Court, in a discussion of predominance, said that the
common questions that matter are those “that qualify each
class member’s case as a genuine controversy.” 521 U.S.
591, 623 (1997). It seems self-evident that there can be no
“genuine controversy” with respect to plaintiffs whose claims
are nonexistent as a matter of substantive law. Likewise, in
Hydrogen Peroxide, we noted that Rule 23 requires plaintiffs
to show that the elements of their claim are “capable of proof
at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather
than individual to its members.” 552 F.3d at 311-12. Again,
for plaintiffs who lack any claim, there are certainly no
elements of a claim that are “capable of proof,” either
common or individual.
Accordingly, in assessing
commonality or predominance, an inherent step is deciding
that class members possess at least some legal basis for
asserting a claim.
By misconstruing Supreme Court precedent, the
Majority denies that district courts have either the need or the
power to take that essential step. My colleagues declare that
“[a] court may inquire [at the class certification stage]
whether the elements of asserted claims are capable of proof
through common evidence, but lacks authority to adjudge the
legal validity or soundness of the substantive elements of
asserted claims.” (Slip Op. at 55 (emphasis added).)
However, the Majority’s position is contrary to what the
Supreme Court has just said in Dukes:

By necessary implication, if certain members of the proposed
class cannot assert a claim under either federal or state law,
then there can be no common questions of law or fact that are
“material.”
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A statement in one of our prior cases, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974),
is sometimes mistakenly cited … : “We find
nothing in either the language or history of Rule
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.” But in that case,
the judge had conducted a preliminary inquiry
into the merits of a suit, not in order to
determine the propriety of certification under
Rules 23(a) and (b) (he had already done that,
see id. at 165), but in order to shift the cost of
notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) from the
plaintiff to the defendants. To the extent the
quoted statement goes beyond the permissibility
of a merits inquiry for any other pretrial
purpose, it is the purest dictum and is
contradicted by our other cases.
131 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, any suggestion that a district court
is prevented from “adjudging the legal validity or soundness
of the substantive elements of asserted claims” at the class
certification stage is clearly mistaken after Dukes. That
should already have been clear, however, from our statement
in Hydrogen Peroxide that “[a] concern for merits-avoidance
should not be talismanically invoked to artificially limit a trial
court’s examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned
determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of
establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements.”
552 F.3d at 318 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Majority repeatedly suggests that requiring
adherence to substantive law would “introduce a Rule
12(b)(6) inquiry as to every claim in the class.” (Slip Op. at
54.) More specifically, my colleagues in the Majority say
that, if my approach were followed, “district courts would be
obligated at the class certification stage to, sua sponte,
conduct a thorough Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of every … claim
to ensure that each plaintiff … possesses a valid cause of
action … .” (Slip Op. at 61.) That characterization is
incorrect. Rather, I advocate a procedure essentially identical
to the one that occurred here: A district court is approached
with a class complaint requesting relief under a variety of
state statutes. Because of differences among those statutes, it
is clear that some class members are entirely without a
cognizable claim. Objectors bring those issues to the district
court’s attention. Because “such variances … are so
significant as to defeat commonality and predominance even
in a settlement class certification,” In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2004)
(hereinafter “Warfarin Sodium II”), the district court should
deny certification. Assuming the parties revise the class to
eliminate claims clearly lacking a colorable legal basis, and
assuming the class otherwise satisfies Rule 23, the district
court could then certify the class. 11

11

There are at least two other problems with the
Majority’s assertion that “[t]o adopt the position of the dissent
and the objectors is to introduce a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry as to
every claim in the class before a class may be certified.”
(Slip Op. at 59.) First, it ducks the difficulty at the center of
this case, which is not and never has been about merely
dubious claims. Claims that are of doubtful quality still have,
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Note that the court in this hypothetical has neither
performed a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, nor conducted an

as the adjective indicates, some doubt about them, which
means they still retain at least some superficial possibility of
being valid. Such claims, because they cling to that
possibility, will typically not need to cause a district judge
any agita in addressing the certification of a class for
settlement purposes. The central problem in this case,
however, goes beyond factual disputes or debatable points of
law. The problem here is that there are class members who,
according to the plain terms of controlling law, have no claim
at all, not even a dubious one. We are not rightfully at liberty
to ignore that, nor was the District Court. The second
problem with the Majority’s parade-of-horribles rhetoric in
response to the suggestion that class members should actually
have claims (see Slip Op. at 60-66) is that objectors have
always been entitled to raise a legal challenge to claims being
included in a class, even a settlement class. Cf. Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (“[A] district court exercising
proper discretion in deciding whether to certify a class will ...
make findings that each Rule 23 requirement is met or not
met, having considered all relevant evidence and arguments
presented by the parties.”). In other words, district courts
have always been required to ensure that the requisites of
Rule 23 have been met, and that includes an obligation to
address the non-frivolous arguments and objections that are
put to them. A court does not need to assess sua sponte every
potential problem, nor need it engage in “an intensive
cataloguing of each class member’s claim” (Slip Op. at 62),
but it must give objections their due.
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individualized assessment of claims. 12 It has simply engaged
in a straightforward analysis of the applicable law. This is by
12

The Majority’s recoiling at the individualized
assessment of claims also reflects a failure to appreciate that
some such assessment does typically take place at some point
during the settlement process. The parties share a common
interest in ensuring that individuals falling outside the class
do not share the benefits of the settlement. For that reason, a
class member here must submit a proof of claim
demonstrating his or her purchase of a diamond within the
relevant time period. As is often the case, parties to an
antitrust settlement want to ensure that individuals seeking a
share of the settlement actually bought a product with an
allegedly inflated price, demonstrating their membership in
the class. See Warfarin Sodium II, 391 F.3d at 525. Some
settlements create elaborate systems for evaluating not only
the validity but the severity of each class member’s injury.
See In re Prudential Sales Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent
Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 295-96 (3d Cir. 1998). These proofs
of claim are rarely evaluated by the court. “Although the
court has general supervisory powers over settlements, it
usually does not handle the actual administration. As a rule,
the administration is delegated either to a special master or to
the plaintiff’s counsel or a committee of counsel.” 4 Alba
Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions
§ 11:33 at 68-69 (4th ed. 2002). It is universally recognized
that the special master, committee, or other body created to
administer the settlement agreement is responsible for
evaluating the validity of claims and calculating the
individualized recovery of a particular class member. See
David F. Herr, Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.661 (4th
ed. 2011) (“The administrator or special master may be
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no means unusual in considering the certification of a
settlement class. In Prudential, the plaintiffs “compiled a
series of charts setting forth comprehensive analyses of the
various states’ laws potentially applicable to their common
law claims.” 148 F.3d at 315 (internal quotation marks
omitted). There, we concurred with the district court’s
conclusion that “the elements of the[] common law claims are
substantially similar and any differences fall into a limited
number of predictable patterns.” Id.
In short, I have proposed only what the law has
heretofore always required: one must actually have a legal
claim before getting in line for a legal recovery. When
objections are raised that persuasively demonstrate that a
portion of a proposed class does not have any such claim,
courts of law are obliged to follow the law. That is the
circumstance we face, as was detailed at length in the panel
opinion and is again described briefly herein.
III.

Some Class Members Lack A Claim

As noted by the Majority, the indirect purchasers in the
consolidated actions “sought damages pursuant only to state
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment statutes
and common law.” (Slip Op. at 16.) Unlike the direct
purchasers, the indirect purchasers did not seek damages
under federal law, because, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977),

charged with reviewing the claims and deciding whether to
allow claims that are late, deficient in documentation, or
questionable for other reasons.”).
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only direct purchasers may bring an antitrust claim under
federal law.
Although most states have traditionally followed
federal law in interpreting their own state antitrust laws, some
have enacted “Illinois Brick Repealers,” rejecting the rule that
only direct purchasers may recover for an antitrust violation.
See, e.g., CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a). By contrast,
others have expressly followed Illinois Brick and declared
unequivocally that, in their states, indirect purchasers lack
standing to bring a claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Microsoft
Corp., 834 N.E.2d 791, 798 (Ohio 2005). Several states have
been even more precise, explaining that indirect purchasers
lack standing to bring what is effectively an antitrust claim,
regardless of how the claim is labeled, so that recovery is
precluded even if, for example, it is sought under a consumer
protection act (“CPA”) or the common law. See, e.g., Abbott
Labs., Inc. (Ross Labs. Div.) v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 507
(Tex. 1995) (“We will not interpret the [Texas CPA] in a
manner that rewards creative pleading at the expense of
consistent application of legal principles. … Our holding
today only forecloses the recovery of damages for seeking a
prohibited antitrust recovery under the masquerade of our
[CPA].”); Johnson, 834 N.E.2d at 801 (holding that Ohio
antitrust statute “provides the exclusive remedy for” claims
predicated upon “monopolistic pricing practices,” and thus
dismissing claims under Ohio’s CPA and common law). In at
least some states, then, indirect purchasers are absolutely
precluded from bringing an antitrust claim, no matter how
they dress it up. 13
13

For a more detailed discussion of which states
preclude claims entirely, see Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 147-48 &
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n.10-11, 150-51. According to the Majority, the panel
opinion “undertook a wide-ranging fact-finding review of
state antitrust statutes … .” (Slip Op. at 29.) That description
is puzzling, however, because there was no fact-finding
involved. The review of state law was just that: a review of
law. The panel opinion took the very ordinary approach of
examining the laws on which the plaintiffs purported to base
their claims, including state antitrust laws. The opinion also
stated:
We are certainly not saying that nuanced
differences among state laws will prevent the
certification of a class, nor are we suggesting
that a state-by-state cataloguing of differences
in state law is necessary every time a multijurisdiction class is certified. We are saying
that the difference between having an antitrust
claim under state law and having none is no
mere nuance and cannot be solved by any
reconfiguration of the nationwide class short of
changing it from a nationwide class to one or
more classes that exclude those who have no
claim.
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 148 n.12. Both the Majority and the
Concurring Opinions claim that it is wrong for us to pay
attention to the differences in state law because, as the
Concurrence puts it, “trial courts would be obligated at the
settlement class certification stage to decide which state’s law
would govern … .” (Concurrence Slip Op. at 9.) It bears
repeating, then, that nothing said by the panel opinion or in
this dissent would entail the cataloguing of differences in
state law in the mine run of cases. However, when, as in this
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Nevertheless, the Majority declares that those class
members whose claims purportedly arise in states that
preclude indirect purchaser recovery can still be part of the
indirect purchaser class. The Majority offers two arguments
in support of that conclusion. First, noting that indirect
purchasers lack only statutory standing under Illinois Brick,
rather than Article III standing, the Majority asserts that
“statutory standing is simply another element of proof for an
antitrust claim, rather than a predicate for asserting a claim in
the first place.” (Slip Op. at 59.) The Majority does not cite
any authority to support that assertion, and there is reason to
doubt it. 14 But, in any event, it misses the point. Even if the
case, an objection has been raised pointing out that there is a
body of claims that are undeniably impermissible under the
law of the state which governs them, we are not free to shirk
the responsibility of separating those unfounded claims from
the class.
14

It is not clear, to begin with, that the Majority’s
“statutory standing” label accurately describes the substantive
law of the several states denying a claim to indirect
purchasers. That aside, and although a dismissal for lack of
statutory standing may be viewed as akin to a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Baldwin v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011)
(noting that “[a] dismissal for lack of statutory standing is
effectively the same as a dismissal for failure to state a
claim”), compelling authority teaches that the absence of
statutory standing can also implicate the court’s power to
adjudicate a dispute under Article III, see Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“Dismissal
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the
adequacy of the federal claim is proper … when the claim is
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so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of
this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We have suggested this ourselves, see Malaysia
Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd., 436 F.3d 349,
359 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “non-Article III jurisdictional
issues like statutory standing” fit within a category of cases
somewhere between cases that have “jurisdictional issues that
cannot be bypassed because Article III of our Constitution
requires that they be addressed” and cases “with meritsrelated issues, which cannot be reached without first verifying
jurisdiction” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)),
rev'd on other grounds, 549 U.S. 422 (2007), and other
circuits have held the same, see Crawford v. Lamantia, 34
F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) (statutory standing under ERISA)
(“[W]e note that the basis for ‘[s]tanding, since it goes to the
very power of the court to act, must exist at all stages of the
proceeding, and not merely when the action is initiated or
during an initial appeal.’”); Alexander v. Anheuser Busch
Co., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1993) (statutory standing
under ERISA) (“In reviewing Alexander’s ERISA claims, we
raise, sua sponte, the question whether he has standing to
bring such claims. The issue of standing is jurisdictional in
nature.”); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit
Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1989)
(statutory standing under ERISA) (“We have recognized,
however, that standing is essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction, and that lack of standing can be raised at any
time by a party or by the court.”); cf. Mainstreet Org. of
Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Posner, J.) (describing lack of statutory standing under
Illinois Brick as “not jurisdictional, at least in the
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Majority’s ipse dixit were true as to antitrust claims under
federal law, there is no basis for saying it is so with respect to
claims under the laws of the several states that have adopted
the ultimate holding of Illinois Brick. Indeed, in several of
those states, courts have indicated that indirect purchasers are
barred from asserting a claim because they lack standing. 15
For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “an
indirect purchaser of goods may not assert a Valentine Act [,
i.e., a state antitrust act] claim for alleged violations of Ohio
antitrust law.” Johnson, 834 N.E.2d at 798. Likewise, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “indirect
conventional sense[,]” but nonetheless “belong[ing] to an
intermediate class of cases in which a court can notice an
error and reverse on the basis of it even though no party has
noticed it”).
15

Whether a party has standing under Article III is a
distinct inquiry from whether the party may assert a cause of
action under state or federal law. In Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011), the Supreme Court made clear
that a party may have standing under Article III, but fail to
assert a cause of action under state law. See id. at 2362
(“Still, the question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief
‘goes to the merits’ in the typical case, not the justiciability of
a dispute, and conflation of the two concepts can cause
confusion.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
However, even assuming indirect purchasers have standing
under Article III, they have no claim under federal law and
many of them lack standing to assert any claim under relevant
state law.
Because the proposed class includes such
individuals, it cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality
requirement.
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purchasers … have no standing to assert a private right of
action under the New Jersey Antitrust Act.” Wilson v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 921 A.2d 414, 416 (N.J. 2007). The
Connecticut Supreme Court has said the same, explaining that
Connecticut law allows “only those consumers who purchase
directly from the antitrust defendant to bring suit under our
state antitrust law.” Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d
1048, 1058 (Conn. 2002). Thus, it is clear that there are
states that decidedly do treat statutory standing 16 as “a
predicate for asserting a claim in the first place.” (Slip Op. at
59.)
Second, the Majority asserts, using the Ohio Supreme
Court’s Johnson case as an example, that “although Johnson
provides that an indirect purchaser lacking an antitrust claim
under Illinois Brick cannot circumvent this limitation by
relying upon the Ohio consumer protection statute, the Ohio
Supreme Court did not, nor could it, preclude consumer
protection claims predicated on fraud or deception.” (Id. at
64 n.39.) The Majority then says that “claims settled here
include allegations of fraud and deception separate from the
antitrust allegations.” (Id. at 64 n.39.) While the Majority is
correct that Ohio does not “preclude consumer protection
claims predicated on fraud or deception,” it is not correct that
such claims were brought in this case under the Ohio CPA –
or under the CPA of any state following Illinois Brick. Of the
seven complaints covered by the proposed class action
settlement, only two made allegations referencing violations
of the Ohio CPA, Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 04-cv16

Again, assuming that “statutory standing” is the
appropriate description of the principle under state law. See
supra n.13.
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02819 (D.N.J.) and Null v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 05-L209 (S.D. Ill.), and both of those complaints predicated their
Ohio CPA claims on monopolistic pricing practices. In
Sullivan, the only allegation with respect to the Ohio CPA is
that “Defendants’ contract, combination and conspiracy in
unreasonable restraint of trade and to monopolize and
defendants’ monopolization constitute a violation of various
state antitrust and/or consumer protection and deceptive and
unfair business practices acts and laws.” (App. at 652 ¶ 47.)
Likewise, the allegations in Null are that the CPA “laws of
the various states” were violated “through one or more of the
following unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices:
illegally and artificially restraining trade and increasing the
price of diamonds by controlling inventory, limiting supply,
restricting purchase and falsely advertising the scarceness of
diamonds.” (App. at 629 ¶ 61, 626 ¶ 45.) Thus, the only
claims brought under the Ohio CPA in any of the class
actions now at issue were “predicated upon monopolistic
pricing practices,” and, therefore, according to the highest
court in Ohio, those claims are precluded. Johnson, 834
N.E.2d at 801.
Moreover, even if any of the complaints could be
construed as raising claims for fraud under some state
CPAs, 17 those claims were, it appears, never brought to the
17

The Majority uses Ohio’s CPA as an example and
does not discuss whether fraud claims were brought under the
CPAs of other states following Illinois Brick. Nonetheless,
the pleading deficiency is the same for allegations involving
the laws of other states. The Sullivan and Null complaints are
the only complaints to invoke the CPAs of the states
following Illinois Brick and, as discussed above, neither of
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attention of, or considered by, the District Court, nor were
they raised before the Panel. As a result, the District Court
made no findings with respect to fraud claims under state
CPAs, including whether the elements of those claims could
be proven by “evidence common to the class,” as required by
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325. Of the five common
questions identified by the District Court, none pertain to
fraud. 18 Thus, even if there were fraud claims for all class
those complaints allege fraud; they merely pin the “fraud”
label on the price-fixing behavior at issue. Consequently,
there is no claim for fraud under the laws of any state
adhering to Illinois Brick.
18

Those questions are:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

Whether [D]efendants combined or
conspired with others to fix, raise,
stabilize and maintain the prices of
polished diamonds;
Whether [D]efendants monopolized or
combined or conspired with others to
monopolize the supply of polished
diamonds;
Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused
the prices of polished diamonds to be
maintained at higher levels than would
exist in a competitive market;
Whether [P]laintiffs and the Class[es] are
entitled to injunctive relief; and
Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused
injury to the business or property of
[P]laintiffs and the other [Class and]
Subclass Members and, if so, the
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members – which, for the reasons I have identified, there are
not – there has been no finding of commonality and
predominance with respect to those claims and, therefore, the
District Court’s class certification cannot rightly be affirmed
on that basis.
The bottom line is that, as to those class members who
purport to bring claims under the laws of states following
Illinois Brick, the status of being an indirect purchaser is not
only the gateway to membership in the class, it is what
entirely disqualifies them from asserting any claim based on
De Beers’s price-fixing conduct. That is a straightforward
application of state law. 19 The class thus includes members
appropriate
damages.

class-wide

measure

of

(App. at 276.)
19

In its effort to diminish the significance of the state
laws denying a cause of action to indirect purchasers, the
Majority likens those laws to pre-suit notice requirements or
other issues of form that may vary from state to state. (Slip
Op. at 65.) But we are not talking here about the niceties of
notice. In a class action invoking the laws of multiple
jurisdictions, there will often be variations in the law
pertaining to how a particular claim is to be presented. Those
variations may at times be framed as prerequisites to the
bringing of a cause of action or restrictions on the manner in
which the action is brought. Were the aggregated claims to
be brought individually, those prerequisites would in all
likelihood be met on a claim-by-claim basis, but, since the
claims are aggregated, those prerequisites are appropriately
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who are barred from asserting a claim in the first place. And,
because those class members lack any claim, there are no
questions common to all class members for which the
answers “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims.” Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.
Consequently, pursuant to long-standing principles of
aggregate litigation, most recently reaffirmed in Dukes, there
is neither commonality nor predominance under Rule 23. 20

bypassed. They amount to nothing more than variations in
form, not in kind, and neither the panel opinion in this case
nor the objectors nor this dissent have advocated the elevation
of form over substance. Differences in form are not at issue
here; it is the very existence of any cause of action at all that
is at stake. The distinction is crucial.
20

I am not suggesting that no class of indirect
purchasers could have been certified here. On the contrary,
as the panel opinion noted,
It may be that the antitrust and consumer
protection statutes in a more limited number of
states are sufficiently similar that common
issues of law or fact would predominate with
respect to plaintiffs in those jurisdictions.
However, it was improper for the District Court
to certify a nationwide class of plaintiffs based
on state law when many states withhold
antitrust standing from indirect purchasers and
where the variability in consumer protection
and unjust enrichment law in a context like this
is extreme.
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 153-54.
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IV.

The Rules Enabling Act and Federalism

In addition to violating the terms of Rule 23, certifying
this class violates the Rules Enabling Act and basic principles
of federalism. The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the
creation of “rules of practice and procedure,” but states that
“[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b). In Dukes, the
Supreme Court highlighted the role of the Rules Enabling Act
in class certification decisions, holding that, “[b]ecause the
Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right,’” the proposed class
could not be certified because it would have abridged
Wal-Mart’s statutory right to litigate certain defenses. 131
S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). That point is
consistent with the Court’s past cautionary statements that an
overly expansive reading of Rule 23 will violate the Rules
Enabling Act. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act underscores the need
for caution. As we said in Amchem, no reading of the rule
can ignore the Act’s mandate that rules of procedure shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613 (“We
therefore follow the path taken by the Court of Appeals,
mindful that Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in
keeping with Article III’s constraints, and with the Rules
Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure ‘shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))).
In this case, by approving certification of the indirect
purchaser class, the Majority proceeds heedless of that advice
and endorses the enlarging of substantive rights. Using the
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Majority’s example of a member of the indirect purchaser
class asserting under Ohio law a claim based on De Beers’s
price-fixing, it is indisputable that the same member would, if
he tried to bring his claim individually in an Ohio court, be
immediately shown the exit. 21 Controlling law allows no
21

The Majority tries to deny this, saying that a state
court would only dismiss the invalid claim upon a motion by
the defendant. (Slip Op. at 71 n.43.) But the procedural
mechanism that prompts application of substantive law is
irrelevant. Whether or not a motion brings to light a claim’s
fatal flaw, the flaw is there. To continue with the Ohio law
example, there is clearly no colorable claim for an indirect
purchaser, and that is true whether or not a defendant chooses
to file a motion to dismiss. Ohio law does not depend on the
whim of De Beers or any other defendant. It is telling that the
Majority’s rejoinder on this point is, in effect, “yes, the
claimant could be tossed out of state court, but only if there
were a motion.” That seems a concession that the differing
results that now obtain in this Circuit and in Ohio state courts
reflect an expansion of substantive rights. As to the “there
must be a motion” comment, irrelevant and of questionable
accuracy though it may be, it prompts re-emphasis of this
fact: there was a motion in this case, in the form of the
objections to the nationwide settlement of the indirect
purchaser class. Thus, the legal problem was squarely before
the District Court, as it is now before us. It does not matter
that the motion came from someone other than De Beers.
The issue has been raised and cannot be dodged by saying no
one brought it up. Nor can it be avoided by saying that De
Beers could have settled an individual suit in Ohio. We are
obviously not dealing with the settlement of a dispute
between private parties in Ohio state court; we are dealing
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result but dismissal of such a claim. But, under the
Majority’s class action certification theory, that individual
now has a right to share in the settlement fund based on a
claim he is otherwise forbidden to bring. If that is not an
enlargement or modification of substantive rights, it is hard to
know what would be. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
130 S. Ct. at 1442 (stating that, for purposes of the Rules
Enabling Act, a rule is substantive in nature if it alters the
rules of decision by which courts adjudicate rights). The
Majority seems to have a “no harm, no foul” feeling about
dispensing new rights, but legitimate class members are
harmed. If we enforced substantive law as we ought to, those
who actually have claims would not be required to share the
proceeds of a proper settlement with those who do not. 22
with a class action settlement binding on absent parties and
sanctioned by a federal court purporting to apply Ohio law.
22

Herein lies a fundamental flaw in the Concurring
Opinion as well, which takes the view that “[u]nder Amchem
the significance of variations in state law is properly assessed
in terms of the interests of absent class members[,]” and that
here class members from states adhering to Illinois Brick
“have lost nothing through inclusion in the class.”
(Concurrence Slip Op. at 10 n.7.) Very true. The problem
here is not that some absent class members who deserve
compensation are left out by the settlement. The problem is
that some class members who deserve nothing are included in
the settlement and hence are diluting the recovery of those
who are entitled to make claims. That harm is real, and the
cause of it, the overbreadth of the class, is akin to the problem
in Amchem. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (“But other
specifications of [Rule 23] – those designed to protect
absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
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Certifying the indirect purchaser class is, for the same
reasons, contrary to principles of federalism. The policy
decisions of the constituent states of our country are
“fundamental aspect[s] of our federal republic and must not
be overridden in a quest to clear the queue in court.” In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir.
2002). When one of those states says to its citizens “you have
no claim” – and the law covering many of the class members
here is just that clear – but those under that edict nevertheless
are joined in a class with people who do have a claim, by
what logical process consistent with federalism can
aggregating the “haves” and the “have-nots” imbue those
“have-nots” with the very claim that the state has said is
foreclosed to them? There is no sound answer to that
question. There is only the Majority’s and the Concurrence’s
policy preference, in derogation of controlling state law, for
“global peace” through unfettered access to class action
settlements. 23

definitions – demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in
the settlement context.”).
23

The Majority cites Warfarin Sodium II in an effort to
justify its decision today, but we were careful to say in that
case that “there may be situations where variations in state
law are so significant so as to defeat commonality and
predominance even in a settlement class.” 391 F.3d at 529.
That observation seems obvious and unassailable, and we are
presented here with exactly that kind of situation. If we
cannot bring ourselves to say plainly that the certification
here was improper, one is forced to wonder what limit is left
on the reach of Rule 23.
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My colleagues in the Majority of course dispute that
certifying this class implicates either the Rules Enabling Act
or federalism. With respect to the Rules Enabling Act, they
say that there has been a “voluntary settlement agreement
between parties” (Slip Op. at 70 (quoting Ehrheart v. Verizon
Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010)), and “a district
court’s certification of a settlement simply recognizes the
parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves according to
mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any
substantive adjudication of the underlying causes of action”
(id.). That may be so when a settlement involves only private
parties who all participate in the settlement process, but it is
not true in a class action settlement. In that latter context, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require district courts to be
intimately involved, because the approval of a class action
settlement gives the government’s imprimatur to the terms of
the settlement and binds absent parties. 24 As already
discussed, a court is not supposed to certify a class without
determining that there is a “genuine controversy” or, in other
words, that there is at least some legal basis for class
members to claim relief. If a district court credits potential
24

The Majority also writes that, in Prudential, “we
agreed with the district court that ‘approval of a settlement
under Rule 23 merely recognizes the parties’ voluntary
compromise of their rights and does not itself affect their
substantive state law rights,” and, therefore, held that “the
proposed settlement could not violate the Rules Enabling
Act.” (Slip Op. at 70 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 324).)
However, we also held in Prudential that the proposed
settlement was not contrary to the cited state law, and,
therefore, the Rules Enabling Act could not possibly have
been implicated. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 324 & n.77.
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class members with having a valid claim when the underlying
state law says there is none, the court has, by definition,
enlarged and modified those class members’ rights.
Moreover, while De Beers is now pleased to stipulate
to liability in all fifty states, and, for its own purposes, is
willing to forego legal arguments that it could have raised
about the substantive rights of class members, a defendant’s
willingness to waive an argument is not a reason to ignore it.
It is rather the very reason that collusive settlements are a
problem. No matter how much De Beers wants to bind
everyone in America, and no matter how much the attorneys
involved stand to gain from their percentage of the settlement,
and no matter how laudatory the “global” resolution of a
price-fixing case may be as policy matter, there are limits on
the power of federal courts to facilitate settlements and bind
absent class members and objectors. Amchem admonishes
courts approving settlement classes to pay “undiluted, even
heightened, attention” to issues of predominance as well as to
the other requirements of Rule 23 to ensure that a certified
class is not overbroad. 521 U.S. at 620. Approving a class
certification that groups together plaintiffs who have claims
with those who plainly do not results in such a class.
Furthermore, while the Majority speculates that the
approach I suggest will seriously impede class action
settlements, it is far from clear that limiting class certification
to people who have legal claims would actually undermine
the goal of global peace. Indeed, as the Concurrence
acknowledges, similar concerns in other cases have proved
largely unfounded. (Concurrence Slip Op. at 2.) But even if
one assumes that the Majority’s concerns about “global
peace” have some merit, Rule 23 remains the sole benchmark
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for determining whether a settlement class can be certified.
In Amchem, the Supreme Court reiterated that point over
Justice Breyer’s criticism that the Court had given insufficient
weight to the value of settlement. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at
629 (“Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the
Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent
class members in close view, cannot carry the large load
CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”);
id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the need for
settlement of this mass tort case, with hundreds and thousands
of lawsuits, is greater than the Court’s opinion suggests.”). In
Ortiz, the Court rejected a settlement expressly designed for
“total peace,” 527 U.S. at 864-65, even as several justices
acknowledged the need for a resolution to the “elephantine
mass of asbestos cases,” id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). We are not free to rewrite the requirements of
Rule 23 simply because it would allegedly advance the goal
of global peace.
The Majority also dismisses any federalism concern,
reasoning that the policy concerns behind Illinois Brick do not
apply. As the Majority sees it, “Illinois Brick’s restriction on
indirect purchaser recovery was motivated by prudential
concerns for manageability; it does not reflect a categorical
policy judgment that indirect purchasers do not merit antitrust
protection.” (Slip Op. at 72.) Thus, says the Majority,
because the “District Court’s certification order did not
undermine these prudential concerns,” the District Court did
not “inappropriately subordinate[] state sovereignty in
certifying the class.” (Slip Op. at 74-75.) But regardless of
the Majority’s novel views about the policy judgments
underlying Illinois Brick and whether “indirect purchasers …
merit antitrust protection,” the states which have chosen to
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follow Illinois Brick have decided – and plainly stated – that
indirect purchasers have no substantive right to recovery
under their laws. Principles of federalism do not permit us to
write our own exceptions into unambiguous state laws simply
because we think that the states would see things differently if
only they had our policy insights. 25 Somehow, though, the
Majority thinks that “the class settlement posture of this case
largely marginalizes the objectors’ concern that state law
variations undermine a finding of predominance.” (Slip Op.
at 49.) Once again, the promise of settlement trumps
everything else, even variations in state laws as wide as “you
have a claim” versus “you have none.”
V.

Conclusion

I cannot voice strongly enough my disagreement with
this elevation of settlement to the status of ultimate and
overriding good. (See Slip Op. at 66 (“[W]ere we to mandate
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we

25

The Concurring Opinion’s assertion that the
settlement of a class action is merely “a contract between the
parties” (Concurrence Slip Op. at 12) misses this point,
though the opinion adds a reference to Rule 23 (id. at 12-13
n.8). The states have an interest in not having their laws
strained beyond recognition or ignored entirely. A class
action settlement, whether it involves a settlement or a
litigation class, is not simply a private contract. If it were, it
would not need court approval, and federal courts called upon
to supervise class actions, including resulting settlements, are
obligated to see that Rule 23 does not become a tool for
modifying state law.
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would effectively rule out the ability of a defendant to
achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those
who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”). It has
been aptly observed that “[s]ocial peace is not the Article III
mission.” Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: the Illegitimacy
of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 475 (1997). Rather, we are to “decide
cases or controversies.” Id. Social peace becomes a natural
and very welcome byproduct of focusing on that specific
mission, “because for every carefully wrought judicial
decision, there may be hundreds or thousands of matters that
are privately resolved ‘in the shadow’ of the law.” Id.
On its own terms, then, the Majority’s decision is
short-sighted and counterproductive. In the interest of shortterm peace, it sacrifices long-term legitimacy and, with that, a
more stable, lasting peace. By failing to enforce the limits of
Rule 23, today’s decision will encourage frivolous class
action claims and have the predictable consequence of
weakening the incentives – the sheltering shadow – under
which non-frivolous disputes would otherwise be properly
resolved.
In sum, when a federal court issues an order certifying
that there are questions of fact or law common to all class
members, it necessarily concludes, whether explicitly stated
or not, that all class members have at least some colorable
legal claim. When there are members of a putative class who
do not, under the operative substantive law in a case, have a
colorable claim, certification of the class enlarges the
substantive rights of those members. Any such order is thus a
violation of the Rules Enabling Act, and, when it occurs in a

37

class whose only claims are based in state law, it also violates
core principles of federalism. The damage done by that
judicial usurpation is not made better by invoking the benefits
of social peace through litigation settlement. Private parties
have a free hand in settling their own disputes, but class
action settlements require federal courts to determine the
rights and obligations of people who are not there to speak for
themselves – hence the Supreme Court’s insistence that class
action settlements “demand undiluted, even heightened,
attention … ,” especially when there is a risk of “unwarranted
or overbroad class definitions,” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
That risk has been realized here.
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